Rockmore T. (2007) Hegel et le constructivisme épistémologique. Revue de métaphysique et de morale 53: 103–113. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5672
Hegel et le constructivisme épistémologique.
Revue de métaphysique et de morale 53: 103–113.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5672
This is a paper about Hegelian constructivism in relation to theory of knowledge. Constructivism, which is known at least since Greek antiquity, is understood in different ways. Euclidean geometry utilizes mathematical proofs that depend on the construction of plane figures with a straight edge and compass. Kantian constructivism is examined from time to time under the heading of the Copernician revolution. Hegelian constructivism, which is best understood as a reaction to and revision of Kantian epistemology, seems never to have been discussed in detail. This paper will sketch the outlines of Hegelian constructivism in relation to the critical philosophy. Hegelian constructivism amounts to an intrinsically historical view of epistemology as a trial and error process situated in the social context. I suggest that the considerable interest of a historical, constructivist, phenomenological approach to knowledge, such as Hegel’s, lies in its largely unexplored possibilities for advancing the epistemological debate.