Raleigh T. (2018) Tolerant enactivist cognitive science. Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 226–244. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5677
Tolerant enactivist cognitive science.
Philosophical Explorations 21(2): 226–244.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5677
Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.