The consideration of the relation of mutual specification between a distinguished whole and the parts distinguished in it, and of their specification of two nonintersecting phenomenal domains, constitute the starting point for a radical constructivist redefinition of the ‘mind-body problem’ (MBP), where the opposition between mind and body turns into a relation of complementarity between components of a larger (social, ecological) whole. The implications as to the traditional views on the MBP are outlined, stressing in particular the overcoming of the holism/reductionism and parallelism/interactionism dualities.

Vico’s constructivist epistemology is compared with that of Piaget with a view to clarifying Piaget’s theory of knowledge. Piaget’s interpreters often show a lack of concern with the metaphysical foundations of cognitive structures. Vico’s emphasis on the limitations of human knowledge, therefore, is helpful in avoiding interpretive inconsistency. In Vico’s and in Piaget’s radical constructivism, knowledge is non-ontological in the sense that no claims may be made about the relation between cognitive structures and reality. Structural adequacy is derived from the consistency of the self-referencing cognitive system.

Key words: radical constructivism, history

The application of social constructivist thought and the concept of autopoiesis are discussed in relationship to the clinical practice of psychotherapy. After a brief discussion of these concepts, a theoretical basis for clinical practice is presented, focusing on the idea that human systems are essentially meaning generating systems. The concept of Problem Determined Systems is elaborated. The development of problem definitions, the management of the therapeutic conversation, and revised conceptualisations of the psychotherapeutic endeavour are discussed.

Hoffman details her shifts in therapeutic epistemology and describes the movements taken by family therapists in adopting a perspective which describes reality as that constructed by the observing system. In highlighting the centrality of ‘meaning’ to the constructivist position, she also emphasises the relevance of recognising a system as defined by a problem. She then examines the work and development of major constructivist contributors to family therapy practice, especially of those participating in and influenced by the Milan team.

This article, in the form of a dialogue between a poet and a family therapist, attempts to create a context for the emergence of a ‘Dostoyevskian dialogue’ wherein all voices may be heard and no final authoratative voice exists. This form is contrasted with autonomous monologue, Batesonian metalogue, self-refuting negate-alogues, and Socratic dialogue. Particular attention is paid to the ongoing dialogue between family therapists and neurobiologists. A critique is made of the passive acceptance by therapists of the neurobiologists’ pre-emptive prescriptions regarding how one must interact with their dialogues which become, in effect, repetitive rhetoric.