Di Paolo E. A. (2009) Editorial: The social and enactive mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(4): 409–415. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5644
Editorial: The social and enactive mind.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(4): 409–415.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/5644
Excerpt: As alternatives to the dominant computationalist approach to cognition develop toward scientific maturity, the taken-for-granted departure and end points of mind science begin to be questioned more systematically. The simple and apparently given starting points are often revealed as presupposing the more complex stages that are relegated to longer term explanatory goals. Similarly, the apparently complex feat is sometimes shown to be simpler to explain and more basic once certain methodological and conceptual blinders are removed. We witness this pattern in various regions of cognitive science, for instance, over the last two decades, in the embodied turn in artificial intelligence and robotics, the emerging field of cognitive linguistics and in embodied and dynamical accounts of action and perception.