Thompson E. (2006) Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(4): 407–427. Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4152
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(4): 407–427.
Fulltext at http://cepa.info/4152
The enactive approach offers a distinctive view of how mental life relates to bodily activity at three levels: bodily self-regulation, sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. This paper concentrates on the second level of sensorimotor coupling. An account is given of how the subjectively lived body and the living body of the organism are related (the body-body problem) via dynamic sensorimotor activity, and it is shown how this account helps to bridge the explanatory gap between consciousness and the brain. Arguments by O’Regan, Noë, and Myin that seek to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness in terms of ‘bodiliness’ and ‘grabbiness’ are considered. It is suggested that their account does not pay sufficient attention to two other key aspects of perceptual phenomenality: the autonomous nature of the experiencing self or agent, and the pre-reflective nature of bodily self-consciousness.