Rowlands M. (2009) Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi 28(1): 53–62. https://cepa.info/2287
Enactivism and the extended mind.
Topoi 28(1): 53–62.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2287
Abstract: According to the view that has become known as the extended mind, some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common to regard them as essentially variations on the same theme. In this paper, I shall argue that the similarities between enactivist and extended models of cognition are relatively superficial, and the divergences are deeper than commonly thought.