Thompson E. & Cosmelli D. (2011) Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience. Philosophical Topics 39(1): 163–180. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2344
Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience.
Philosophical Topics 39(1): 163–180.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2344
We argue that the minimal biological requirements for consciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a surrogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actually shows is that the brain and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are explanatorily inseparable. Such entanglement implies that we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body, and hence we have good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system for consciousness includes the body and not just the brain. In this way, we put the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to a new use, one that supports the “enactive” view that consciousness is a life-regulation process of the whole organism interacting with its environment.