Publication 2494

Stewart J. (2010) Foundational issues in enaction as a paradigm for cognitive science: From the origin of life to consciousness and writing. In: Stewart J., Gapenne O. & Di Paolo E. A. (eds.) Enaction: Toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 1–32. Fulltext at
Excerpt: There are two basic requirements for any paradigm in cognitive science: it must provide a genuine resolution of the mind-body problem, and it must provide for a genuine core articulation between a multiplicity of disciplines – at the very least between psychology, linguistics and neuroscience. Cognitive science owes its very existence to the fact the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), whatever its defects and limitations, does fulfill these two requirements. In order even to get off the ground, any candidate for the role of an “alternative paradigm” must do at least as well as CTM in both these respects. The aim of this text is to explain how the proto-paradigm of enaction does just this.

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