Berkovich-Ohana A. (2017) Radical Neurophenomenology: We Cannot Solve the Problems Using the Same Kind of Thinking We Used When We Created Them. Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 156–159. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4068
Radical Neurophenomenology: We Cannot Solve the Problems Using the Same Kind of Thinking We Used When We Created Them.
Constructivist Foundations 12(2): 156–159.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4068
Open peer commentary on the article “Enaction as a Lived Experience: Towards a Radical Neurophenomenology” by Claire Petitmengin. Upshot: The neurophenomenological project is too ambitious technically, but highly appealing on the philosophical level, as can be learned from the extremely high ratio between theoretical and empirical work concerning neurophenomenology accumulated thus far. While “radical” neurophenomenology could possibly create, in highly unique projects, “mutual generative constraints,” will the hard problem be dissolved? I argue that although using micro phenomenology, as long as experimental designs inspired by front-loading phenomenological insights are reviewed by the regular scientific mind, the question of validating the phenomenology with objective measures remains, and will keep blocking the outbreak in this promising field. Since “we cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that created them,” it is timely for the scientific community to practice an attitude shift.