Publication 4635

Kastrup B. (2017) On the plausibility of idealism: Refuting criticisms. Disputatio 9(44): 13–34. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4635
Several alternatives vie today for recognition as the most plausible ontology, from physicalism to panpsychism. By and large, these on- tologies entail that physical structures circumscribe consciousness by bearing phenomenal properties within their physical boundaries. The ontology of idealism, on the other hand, entails that all physical struc- tures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phe- nomenality in the first place. Unlike the other alternatives, however, idealism is often considered implausible today, particularly by analytic philosophers. A reason for this is the strong intuition that an objective world transcending phenomenality is a self-evident fact. Other argu- ments – such as the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, the evidence for the existence of the universe before the origin of conscious life, etc. – are also often cited. In this essay, I will argue that these objections against the plausibility of idealism are false. As such, this essay seeks to show that idealism is an entirely plausible ontology.

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