Publication 4664

Toribio J. (2002) Modularity, relativism, and neural constructivism. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2: 1–14. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4664
Fodor (1983) claims that the modularity of mind (the relatively encapsulated, insulated, special -purpose nature of the psychological mechanisms of perception) helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of (most forms of) relativism, and second, that an alternative (‘neural constructivist’) model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge.

Similar publications:

Log in to view a list of similar publications
Local

The publication has not yet bookmarked in any reading list

You cannot bookmark this publication into a reading list because you are not member of any
Log in to create one.

There are currently no annotations

To add an annotation you need to log in first

Download statistics

Log in to view the download statistics for this publication
Export bibliographic details as: CF Format · APA · BibTex · EndNote · Harvard · MLA · Nature · RIS · Science