Raskin J. D. (2011) On essences in constructivist psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31(4): 223–239. https://cepa.info/467
On essences in constructivist psychology.
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 31(4): 223–239.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/467
The notion of essence in psychology is examined from a constructivist viewpoint. The constructivist position is summarized and differentiated from social constructionism, after which constructs are distinguished from concepts in order to position ontology and epistemology as modes of construing. After situating constructivism in relation to philosophical approaches to essences, the distinction between essences and kinds is examined and the presumed constructivist critique of essences in psychology outlined. It is argued that criticizing constructivism as an “anything goes” form of antirealism fails to grasp how constructivist psychology, by emphasizing structure and viability, does indeed place limits on the constructions people may hold. In applying a constructivist understanding of essences in general to those fundamental to human psychology, people can be seen as having three essential psychological qualities: they are closed systems, active meaning-makers, and irreducibly social beings. Yet a constructivist view also maintains that these psychological essences only hold while operating within and committed to a constructivist perspective. In other words, what counts as an essence always depends on one’s assumptions, or how one construes events. Finally, a personal construct theory model of essentialist and nonessentialist construing is introduced that is based on the assumption that everyone construes in both essentialist and nonessentialist ways at different times because doing so is pragmatically viable.