Pollard C. (2014) Merleau-Ponty and embodied cognitive science. Discipline filosofiche 24(2): 67–90. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5647
Merleau-Ponty and embodied cognitive science.
Discipline filosofiche 24(2): 67–90.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5647
Excerpt: The papers focus on two classes of learning problems: learning causal relations, from observing co- occurrences among events and active interventions; and learning how to organize the world into categories and map word labels onto categories, from observing examples of objects in those categories. Causal learning, category learning and word learning are all problems of induction, in which children form representations of the world’s abstract structure that extend qualitatively beyond the data they observe and that support generalization to new tasks and contexts. While philosophers have long seen inductive inference as a source of great puzzles and paradoxes, children solve these natural problems of induction routinely and effortlessly. Through a combination of new computational approaches and empirical studies motivated by those models, developmental scientists may now be on the verge of understanding how they do it.