Moya P. (2014) Habit and embodiment in Merleau-Ponty. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 542. https://cepa.info/6921
Habit and embodiment in Merleau-Ponty.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 542.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6921
Excerpt: Merleau-Ponty (French phenomenological philosopher, born in 1908 and deceased in 1961) refers to habit in various passages of his Phenomenology of Perception as a relevant issue in his philosophical and phenomenological position. Through his exploration of this issue he explains both the pre-reflexive character that our original linkage with the world has, as well as the kind of “understanding” that our body develops with regard to the world. These two characteristics of human existence bear a close relation with the vision of an embodied mind sustained by Gallagher and Zahavi in their work The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Merleau-Ponty uses concepts like those of the lived or own body and of lived space in order to emphasize, from a first-person perspective, the co-penetration that exists between subject and world.