Chiari G. & Nuzzo M. L. (2003) Kelly’s philosophy of constructive alternativism. In: Fransella F. (ed.) International handbook of personal construct psychology. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester: 41–49. https://cepa.info/7095
Kelly’s philosophy of constructive alternativism.
In: Fransella F. (ed.) International handbook of personal construct psychology. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester: 41–49.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7095
Excerpt: Kelly was aware that philosophical speculation is inescapable for any scientiﬁc investigation. In fact, he chose to state his underlying assumptions right at the beginning, thus uncovering the philosophical roots of his theoretical position. He did that by coining two expressions that, consistent with his theoretical formulation, are shaped like the contrasting poles of a discrimination, a construct: accumulative fragmentalism versus constructive alternativism. Without entering the arena of the debate in the specialized ﬁeld of the philosophy of science, Kelly suggested a revolutionary alternative to the prevailing notions about the nature of scientiﬁc knowledge, and pursued its implications at the levels of theory construction and of || its clinical and psychotherapeutic application. On the other hand, his theoretical approach can be, and has been, applied to all the areas subjected to psychological inquiry. What he did in the 1950s was so much ahead of its time that his work is only now at the cutting edge of contemporary psychology and psychotherapy.