Lenay C., Auvray M., Sebbah F.-D. & Stewart J. (2006) Perception of an intentional subject: An enactive approach. In: ENACTIVE/06: Enaction & Complexity. Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on enactive interfaces. Association ACROE, Grenoble: 37–38. https://cepa.info/7194
Perception of an intentional subject: An enactive approach.
In: ENACTIVE/06: Enaction & Complexity. Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on enactive interfaces. Association ACROE, Grenoble: 37–38.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7194
Excerpt: Classical approaches in the philosophy of mind consider that the recognition of intentionality is the problem of the adoption of an intentional stance: identifying the behavioural criteria, which trigger the representation of the perceived object by an internal system of naive psychology (Premack, 1990; Cisbra et al., 1999; Meltzoff & Decety, 2004). This naive psychology poses many problems, in particular, how to account for the mutual recognition without falling into the aporias of the inclusion of representations: I have to have the representation of his representation of my representation of… his perception. Furthermore, in this approach, the recognition of another subject is only hypothetical, resulting from an inference based on well-defined perceptions. However, in our everyday experience as well as in many phenomenological descriptions (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Sartre, 1943) the lived experience of the presence of others seems certain and directly perceptive. How in everyday life or through technical devices (such as Internet), can we have the impression of the presence of another subject, and under which conditions can we differenciate another person from an object or a program?