Publication 7703

Barandiaran X. E. (2014) Enactivism without autonomy? What went wrong at the roots of enactivism and how we should recover the foundations of sensori-motor agency. In: 40th annual convention of the society for the study of artificial intelligence and the simulation of behavior. Curran Associates, Red Hook NY: 640–642. Fulltext at
Different varieties of enactivism struggle to fill the empty throne after the long reign of representational cognitivism. And the notion of autonomy is one of the central claims under dispute within the different enactivist research programmes, des- pite the central role that it played on the early enactivist founda- tions. It is the very autonomy of enactivism itself what is at stake here, if it doesn’t want to be integrated back into a reformed ver- sion of representational cognitivism or subsumed under new forms of behaviourism. In this work I will show why autonomy is a necessary component of the enactive programme, I shall cla- rify some foundational misunderstandings or conceptual obstacles that have made autonomy a difficult notion to assume for some sensorimotor enactive approaches and, finally, I will propose to introduce autonomy back at the roots of enactivism through the notion of habit and sensorimotor agency. 1


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