Colombetti G. (2007) Enactive appraisal. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 527–546. https://cepa.info/775
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 527–546.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/775
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.” I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective notion of personhood. Relevance: It proposes an enactive conceptualization of the phenomenon of appraisal.