Podnieks K. (2014) The dappled world perspective refined. The Reasoner 8(1): 3–4. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/993
The dappled world perspective refined.
The Reasoner 8(1): 3–4.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/993
In this article I show how the Dappled World Perspective can be refined in the model-based model of cognition. The very idea of modeling as replacing implies severe limitations. And this implies the Dappled World perspective at the level of models: neither humans nor robots can hope to create a single model for extensive parts of their environment. At the model level, we will always have only a patchwork of models, each very restricted in its application scope. Thus, to manage what happens in the world, we need to generate a variety of different models. Could this be done by means of a single “theory of everything” (or, at least, by means of a limited system of theories), i.e., without any ad hoc assumptions? Relevance: This model-based model of cognition is a radical version of non-dualism.