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“Behavioral and Brain Sciences”
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fulltext:"artificial"
fulltext:22artificial
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fulltext:22artificial intelligence22 author:maturana
fulltext:"artificial intelligence" author:maturana
fulltext:"artificial intelligence" author:maturana
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Clark A. (2013) Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(3): 181–204. https://cepa.info/7285
Clark A.
(
2013
)
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.
The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
36(3): 181–204.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7285
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Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this “hierarchical prediction machine” approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency.
Key words:
action
,
attention
,
bayesian brain
,
expectation
,
generative model
,
hierarchy
,
perception
,
precision
,
predictive coding
,
prediction
,
prediction error
,
top-down processing.
Colombetti G. & Thompson E. (2005) Enacting emotional interpretations with feeling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28(2): 200–201.
Colombetti G.
&
Thompson E.
(
2005
)
Enacting emotional interpretations with feeling.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
28(2): 200–201.
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This commentary makes three points: (1) There may be no clear-cut distinction between emotion and appraisal “constituents” at neural and psychological levels. (2) The microdevelopment of an emotional interpretation contains a complex microdevelopment of affect. (3) Neurophenomenology is a promising research program for testing Lewis’s hypotheses about the neurodynamics of emotion-appraisal amalgams.
Emery N. J. & Clayton N. S. (2008) Imaginative scrub-jays, causal rooks, and a liberal application of Occam’s aftershave. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31(02): 134–135.
Emery N. J.
&
Clayton N. S.
(
2008
)
Imaginative scrub-jays, causal rooks, and a liberal application of Occam’s aftershave.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
31(02): 134–135.
Copy Ref
We address the claim that nonhuman animals do not represent unobservable states, based on studies of physical cognition by rooks and social cognition by scrub-jays. In both cases, the most parsimonious explanation for the results is counter to the reinterpretation hypothesis. We suggest that imagination and prospection can be investigated in animals and included in models of cognitive architecture.
Fodor J. (1980) Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63–110. https://cepa.info/4845
Fodor J.
(
1980
)
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3: 63–110.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4845
Copy Ref
The paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined. The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior. The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.
Gallagher S., Hutto D. D., Slaby J. & Cole J. (2013) The brain as part of an enactive system. Commentary on Schilbach et al., Toward a second-person neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(4): 421–422. https://cepa.info/5665
Gallagher S.
,
Hutto D. D.
,
Slaby J.
&
Cole J.
(
2013
)
The brain as part of an enactive system. Commentary on Schilbach et al., Toward a second-person neuroscience.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
36(4): 421–422.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5665
Copy Ref
The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computationalrepresentational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action.
Glasersfeld E. von (1978) Another minor revision, or the disregard for control theory and the analysis of inductive feedback systems. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(1): 79–80. https://cepa.info/1341
Glasersfeld E. von
(
1978
)
Another minor revision, or the disregard for control theory and the analysis of inductive feedback systems.
The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
1(1): 79–80.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1341
Copy Ref
Bindra’s proposal is still an attempt at “minor revision” that does not get away from the traditional tenet that living organisms are passive receivers of stimuli to which they react according to pseudo-mechanical principles A detailed analysis of what is covered by the term “gnostic organization” would, I believe, reveal the indispensability of induction and of inductively built-up representations of desirable and undesirable states and events that can then serve as goals in the assembly of adaptively modifiable behaviors
Key words:
cognition
,
cybernetics
,
feedback
Glasersfeld E. von (1978) Some problems of intentionality [Commentary on Haugeland’s “The nature and plausibility of cognitivism”]. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(2): 252–253. https://cepa.info/1343
Glasersfeld E. von
(
1978
)
Some problems of intentionality [Commentary on Haugeland’s “The nature and plausibility of cognitivism”].
The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
1(2): 252–253.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1343
Copy Ref
Key words:
cognition
Gopnik A. (2009) Rational constructivism: A new way to bridge rationalism and empiricism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32(2): 208–209.
Gopnik A.
(
2009
)
Rational constructivism: A new way to bridge rationalism and empiricism.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
32(2): 208–209.
Copy Ref
Recent work in rational probabilistic modeling suggests that a kind of propositional reasoning is ubiquitous in cognition and especially in cognitive development. However, there is no reason to believe that this type of computation is necessarily conscious or resource-intensive.
Myin E. (2003) An account of color without a subject? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 42–43.
Myin E.
(
2003
)
An account of color without a subject?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
26: 42–43.
Copy Ref
While color realism is endorsed, Byrne & Hilbert’s (B&H’s) case for it stretches the notion of “physical property” beyond acceptable bounds. It is argued that a satisfactory account of color should do much more to respond to antirealist intuitions that flow from the specificity of color experience, and a pointer to an approach that does so is provided.
O’Regan J. K. & Noë A. (2001) A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and brain sciences 24(5): 939–1031. https://cepa.info/2285
O’Regan J. K.
&
Noë A.
(
2001
)
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.
Behavioral and brain sciences
24(5): 939–1031.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2285
Copy Ref
Abstract:
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.
Relevance:
action; change blindness; consciousness; experience; perception; qualia; sensation; sensorimotor.
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