Concurs with N. M. Agnew and J. L. Brown’s views that ontological and epistemological presuppositions impose certain constraints on the pursuit of knowledge. These authors have captured the constructivist thrust of G. A. Kelly’s (1955) psychology of personal constructs in their central theme.

Responds to comments by D. T. Campbell; D. N. Robinson; M. J. Mahoney; K. M. Ford; and J. Adams-Webber on the present authors’ articles. Issues related to the concepts of pragmatic and existential constructivism, relativism, realism, and entrainment are addressed.

Traditional views of knowledge are being challenged. An emerging “constructivist” perspective, as proposed by George Kelly, an engineer turned clinician, suggests that to a large degree we construct reality. In his “constructive alternativism” Kelly assumes that we validate our hypotheses and beliefs through subjectively construed goodness-of-fit criteria applied to perceived differences between anticipations and feedback. His model of construing is compatible with those emerging in the history and philosophy of science and in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, constructivists must answer a perplexing question: How can fallible knowledge, constructed as it is from abstracted and incomplete representations of objects and events, capture and maintain our confidence, as it does, and furthermore prove highly functional, as it does?

An evolving theory known as “constructivism” challenges the traditional view of how we generate and revise knowledge. Constructivism helps address a major issue raised by modern scholars of the history and philosophy of science, and decision theory. The question is: How do we reduce the search and solution space of complex and changing environments to “mind size” (i.e., to fit our limited memory and computational capacity)? One emerging answer is that we rely heavily upon robust presuppositions and simplified representations of environmental structure. However, such constructed knowledge is likely to be highly fallible, relying as it must on impoverished data bases in the service of strong expectations or paradigms. In this paper we address two issues: Under what conditions can knowledge be highly fallible and at the same time be highly functional?; Can we make a plausible case, within this constructivist frame of reference, for realism, for knowledge that approximates “reality”?

Asserts that N. M. Agnew and J. L. Brown’s articles on “Foundation for Model of Knowing” address central issues in psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence.

Comments on the articles on constructivism by N. M. Agnew and J. L. Brown and expands on three issues raised. These relate to definitions and boundaries of modern constructivism and constructivist meta theory.

Argues that constructionist positions may provide important answers to critiques of psychological theories in the twentieth century. Focus is on the mental characterization of psychology and the intentional nature of the mental. The constructionist argument in psychology is drawn by tracing its roots in the sociology of knowledge and antifoundational philosophy. The problems of language bear centrally on the constructionist thesis, particularly the view that psychological phenomena are inherently linguistic and lingual. In recent years, constructionist programs in psychology have begun to reorient and reconstruct understandings of the subject matter in such areas as social, developmental, and cognitive psychology. The charge of relativism remains a serious challenge for the constructionist, although a coherentist interpretation of constructionist justifications may resolve this issue.