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“Cognition”
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fulltext:maturana'or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana"or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--"x"="x/
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fulltext:maturana22 or (1,2)=(selectfrom(select name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a) -- 22x22=22x/
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Adams F. & Aizawa K. (2009) Why the mind is still in the head. In: Robbins P. & Aydede M. (eds.) cognition%22\ title=\List all publications from The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition\>The Cambridge handbook of situated cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 78–95.
Adams F.
&
Aizawa K.
(
2009
)
Why the mind is still in the head.
In: Robbins P. & Aydede M. (eds.)
The Cambridge handbook of situated
cognition
. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 78–95.
Copy
Philosophical interest in situated
cognition
has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head.
Aizawa K. (2014) Extended cognition. In: Shapiro L. (ed.) cognition%22\ title=\List all publications from The Routledge handbook of embodied cognition\>The Routledge handbook of embodied cognition. Routledge, London: 31–38. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4462
Aizawa K.
(
2014
)
Extended
cognition
.
In: Shapiro L. (ed.)
The Routledge handbook of embodied
cognition
. Routledge, London: 31–38.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4462
Copy
Excerpt:
This brief chapter will focus on two types of arguments for extended
cognition
inspired by Clark and Chalmers (1998). First, there has been the thought that
cognition
extends when processes in the brain, body, and world are suitably similar to processes taking place in the brain. We might describe these as cognitive equivalence arguments for extended
cognition
. Second, there has been the thought that, when there is the right kind of causal connection between a cognitive process and bodily and environmental processes, cognitive processes come to be realized by processes in the brain, body, and world. We might describe these as coupling arguments for extended
cognition
. What critics have found problematic are the kinds of similarity relations that have been taken to be applicable or suitable for concluding that there is extended
cognition
and the conditions that have been offered as providing the right kind of causal connection.
Asaro P. M. (2006) Computers as models of the mind: On simulations, brains and the design of early computers. In: Franchi S. & Bianchini F. (eds.) cognition: Early mechanisms and new ideas%22\ title=\List all publications from The search for a theory of cognition: Early mechanisms and new ideas\>The search for a theory of cognition: Early mechanisms and new ideas. Rodopi, Amsterdam: 89–116. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5026
Asaro P. M.
(
2006
)
Computers as models of the mind: On simulations, brains and the design of early computers.
In: Franchi S. & Bianchini F. (eds.)
The search for a theory of
cognition
: Early mechanisms and new ideas
. Rodopi, Amsterdam: 89–116.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5026
Copy
Excerpt:
The purpose of this essay is to clarify some of the important senses in which the relationship between the brain and the computer might be considered as one of “modeling.” It also considers the meaning of “simulation” in the relationships between models, computers and brains. While there has been a fairly broad literature emerging on models and simulations in science, these have primarily focused on the physical sciences, rather than the mind and brain. And while the cognitive sciences have often invoked concepts of modeling and simulation, they have been frustratingly inconsistent in their use of these terms, and the implicit relations to their scientific roles. My approach is to consider the early convolution of brain models and computational models in cybernetics, with the aim of clarifying their significance for more current debates in the cognitive sciences. It is my belief that clarifying the historical senses in which the brain and computer serve as models of each other in the historical period prior to the birth of AI and cognitive science is a crucial task for an archeology of AI and the history of cognitive science.
Ataria Y., Dor-Ziderman Y. & Berkovich-Ohana A. (2015) How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator. Cognition%22\ title=\List all publications from Consciousness and Cognition\>Consciousness and Cognition 37: 133–147.
Ataria Y.
,
Dor-Ziderman Y.
&
Berkovich-Ohana A.
(
2015
)
How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator.
Consciousness and
Cognition
37: 133–147.
Copy
This paper discusses the phenomenological nature of the sense of boundaries (SB), based on the case of S, who has practiced mindfulness in the Satipathana and Theravada Vipassana traditions for about 40years and accumulated around 20,000h of meditative practice. S’s unique abilities enable him to describe his inner lived experience with great precision and clarity. S was asked to shift between three different stages: (a) the default state, (b) the dissolving of the SB, and (c) the disappearance of the SB. Based on his descriptions, we identified seven categories (with some overlap) that alter during the shifts between these stages, including the senses of: (1) internal versus external, (2) time, (3) location, (4) self, (5) agency (control), (6) ownership, and (7) center (first-person-egocentric-bodily perspective). Two other categories, the touching/touched structure and one’s bodily feelings, do not fade away completely even when the sense-of-boundaries disappears.
Barsalou L., Barbey A. K., Simmons W. K. & Santos A. (2005) Embodiment in religious knowledge. Cognition and Culture%22\ title=\List all publications from Journal of Cognition and Culture\>Journal of Cognition and Culture 5: 14–57. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5951
Barsalou L.
,
Barbey A. K.
,
Simmons W. K.
&
Santos A.
(
2005
)
Embodiment in religious knowledge.
Journal of
Cognition
and Culture
5: 14–57.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5951
Copy
Increasing evidence suggests that mundane knowledge about objects, people, and events is grounded in the brain’s modality-specific systems. The modality-specific representations that become active to represent these entities in actual experience are later used to simulate them in their absence. In particular, simulations of perception, action, and mental states often appear to underlie the representation of knowledge, making it embodied and situated. Findings that support this conclusion are briefly reviewed from cognitive psychology, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. A similar representational process may underlie religious knowledge. In support of this conjecture, embodied knowledge appears central to three aspects of religious experience: religious visions, religious beliefs, and religious rituals. In religious visions, the process of simulation offers a natural account of how these experiences are produced. In religious beliefs, knowledge about the body and the environment are typically central in religious frameworks, and are likely to affect the perception of daily experience. In religious rituals, embodiments appear central to conveying religious ideas metaphorically and to establishing them in memory. To the extent that religious knowledge is like non-religious knowledge, embodiment is likely to play central roles.
Beaton M. (2014) Learning to perceive what we do not yet understand: Letting the world guide us. In: Cappuccio M. & Froese T. (eds.) cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense.%22\ title=\List all publications from Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense.\>Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense.. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills: 153–180.
Beaton M.
(
2014
)
Learning to perceive what we do not yet understand: Letting the world guide us.
In: Cappuccio M. & Froese T. (eds.)
Enactive
cognition
at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense
. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills: 153–180.
Copy
This chapter aims to defend the thesis that we can only perceive what we understand. Such a theory would seem to be unable to account for our learning to perceive what we do not yet understand. To address this objection, the paper presents a non-representationalist, direct realist theory of perception. In this, the sensorimotor theory of Noë and O’Regan plays a crucial role (although one important modification to the interpretation of that theory is proposed). The result is an account of how we are in contact with the world itself during perceptual experience; and this leads to an account of how the world itself guides our understanding, as we move from non-sense to sense.
Beer S. (1980) Preface. In: Maturana H. R. & Varela F. J. (eds.) cognition%22\ title=\List all publications from Autopoiesis and cognition\>Autopoiesis and cognition. Reidel, Dordrecht: 63–72. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2724
Beer S.
(
1980
)
Preface.
In: Maturana H. R. & Varela F. J. (eds.)
Autopoiesis and
cognition
. Reidel, Dordrecht: 63–72.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2724
Copy
This small book is very large: it contains the living universe. It is a privilege to be asked to write this preface, and a delight to do so. That is because I recognize here a really important book, both in general and specifically. Before talking about the specific contents at all, I would like to explain why this is in general so.
Bickhard M. H. (2000) Autonomy, function, and representation. Cognition-Artificial Intelligence%22\ title=\List all publications from Communication and Cognition-Artificial Intelligence\>Communication and Cognition-Artificial Intelligence 17(3–4): 111–131.
Bickhard M. H.
(
2000
)
Autonomy, function, and representation.
Communication and
Cognition
-Artificial Intelligence
17(3–4): 111–131.
Copy
Autonomy is modeled in terms of the property of certain far-from-equilibrium open systems to contribute toward maintaining themselves in their far-from-equilibrium conditions. Such contributions in self-maintenant systems, in turn, constitute the emergence of normative function. The intrinsic thermodynamic asymmetry between equilibrium and far-from-equilibrium processes yields the intrinsic normative asymmetry between function and dysfunction. Standard etiological models of function render function as causally epiphenomenal, while this model is of the emergence of causally efficacious function. Recursive self-maintenance – the meta-property of maintaining the property of being self-maintenant across variations in environment – yields the emergence of representation. This model of representation satisfies multiple criteria that standard approaches – such as symbolic or connectionist, or those of Fodor, Dretske, or Millikan – cannot.
Bitbol M. (2014) Making sense of non-sense in physics: The quantum koan. In: Cappuccio M. & Froese T. (eds.) cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense%22\ title=\List all publications from Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense\>Enactive cognition at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills: 61–80. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2477
Bitbol M.
(
2014
)
Making sense of non-sense in physics: The quantum koan.
In: Cappuccio M. & Froese T. (eds.)
Enactive
cognition
at the edge of sense-making: Making sense of non-sense
. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills: 61–80.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2477
Copy
Brier S. (1998) The cybersemiotic explanation of the emergence of cognition: The explanation of cognition, signification and communication in a non-Cartesian cognitive biology. Cognition and Evolution\>Cognition and Evolution 4(1): 90–102.
Brier S.
(
1998
)
The cybersemiotic explanation of the emergence of
cognition
: The explanation of
cognition
, signification and communication in a non-Cartesian cognitive biology.
Cognition
and Evolution
4(1): 90–102.
Copy
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