In this paper two swarm intelligence algorithms are used, the first leading the “attention” of the swarm and the latter responsible for the tracing mechanism. The attention mechanism is coordinated by agents of Stochastic Diffusion Search where they selectively attend to areas of a digital canvas (with line drawings) which contains (sharper) corners. Once the swarm’s attention is drawn to the line of interest with a sharp corner, the corresponding line segment is fed into the tracing algorithm, Dispersive Flies Optimisation which “consumes” the input in order to generate a “swarmic sketch” of the input line. The sketching process is the result of the “flies” leaving traces of their movements on the digital canvas which are then revisited repeatedly in an attempt to re-sketch the traces they left. This cyclic process is then introduced in the context of autopoiesis, where the philosophical aspects of the autopoietic artist are discussed. The autopoetic artist is described in two modalities: gluttonous and contented. In the Gluttonous Autopoietic Artist mode, by iteratively focussing on areas-of-rich-complexity, as the decoding process of the input sketch unfolds, it leads to a less complex structure which ultimately results in an empty canvas; therein reifying the artwork’s “death”. In the Contented Autopoietic Artist mode, by refocussing the autopoietic artist’s reflections on “meaning” onto different constitutive elements, and modifying her reconstitution, different behaviours of autopoietic creativity can be induced and therefore, the autopoietic processes become less likely to fade away and more open-ended in their creative endeavour.

Key words: creativity, autopoiesis, stochastic diffusion search, dispersive flies optimisation, generative art.

Excerpt: In their introduction to the first International Workshop on Epigenetic Robotics, Zlatev and Balkenius (2001) suggested the term epigenetic robotics to denote a new field of research resulting from the mutual rapprochement of developmental psychology and robotics, with a focus on the prolonged epigenetic developmental process through which increasingly more complex cognitive structures emerge in the system as a result of interactions with the physical and social environment.

For many years three key aspects of creative processes have been glossed over by theorists eager to avoid the mystery of consciousness and instead embrace an implicitly more formal, computational vision: autonomy, phenomenality and the temporally embedded and bounded nature of creative processes. In this paper we will discuss autopoiesis and creativity; an alternative metaphor which we suggest offers new insight into these long overlooked aspects of the creative processes in humans and the machine, and examine the metaphor in the context of dance choreography.

Key words: autonomy, autopoiesis, creativity, dance, improvisation.

The “Varieties of Enactivism: A Conceptual Geography” 4th April 2014, was a one day symposium which took place at Goldsmith University, London. The symposium had the explicit aim of clarifying the status of enactive cognitive science both as a unified paradigm for cognitive science and in relation to the broader embodied cognition framework. In what follows I offer a brief summery of the various talks followed by some thoughts on the current state of play within enactivism.

Key words: embodied cognition, enactivism, enactive cognitive science, conference report

This paper proposes a way of understanding the confluence of the enactive approach to cognition and musicology in a wider sense. The implication is that existing socio-cultural approaches to meaning in music – whereby music is seen as a total social phenomenon, and the naturalistic view of music cognition may be articulated via the life-mind continuum proposed by enactivism. On the one hand, discussions on embodied music cognition are presented with the opportunity to overcome their de facto individualism in a principled, naturalistic way. On the other hand, for the socio-cultural-historical approaches the opportunity seems to be to move beyond the biology-culture divide without submitting to reductionism. A wider explanatory unit is presented. The explanatory utility of embodiment is examined in relation to the wider frame of social-life in dialectical fashion. A definition of musicking is sketched considering it as an instance of processes of social-life. This paper signals a direction to take, yet methodologies, results, and homologies with other disciplines are left open to further discussion.

Key words: enactive cognition, embodied mind, music, meaning, participatory sense-making, autonomy

In this paper an alternative concept and understanding of knowledge representation in neural networks is presented. It is based on the assumption that (natural or artificial) neural structures are responsible for the generation of an organism’s behavior which is in interaction with its environment. This requires a completely new interpretation of neural systems as knowledge representing devices. The concepts of constructivism second-order cybernetics, embodiment of knowledge and functional fitness play an important role in this context. The idea of an structural isomorphism between the environment and representing structures will be given up in favor of a more sophisticated epistemological concept and constructive relation. As an implication knowledge becomes system relative and ‘private’ – an alternative understanding of language, symbols, communication, etc., which is based on these epistemological and neuroscientific ideas will be discussed.

Key words: artificial life, connectionism, knowledge representation, meaning, neural computation, semantics, symbol.

This paper explores a constructive revision of the conceptual underpinnings of Attachment Theory through an encounter with the diverse elements of 4e cognition. Attachment relationships involve the development of preference for one or a few carers and expectations about their availability and responsiveness as a haven of safety and a base from which to explore. In attachment theory, mental representations have been assigned a central organising role in explaining attachment phenomena. The 4e cognition approaches in cognitive science raise a number of questions about the development and interplay of attachment and cognition. These include: (1) the nature of what Bowlby called ‘internal working models of attachment’; (2) the extent to which the infant–carer dyad functions as an extension of the infant’s mind; and (3) whether Bowlby’s attachment control system concept can be usefully re-framed in enactive terms where traditional cognitivist representations are: (3i) substituted for sensorimotor skill-focused mediating representations; (3ii) viewed as arising from autopoietic living organisms; and/or (3iii) mostly composed from the non-contentful mechanisms of basic minds? A theme that cross-cuts these research questions is how representations for capturing meaning, and structures for adaptive control, are both required to explain the full range of behaviour of interest to Attachment Theory researchers.

Key words: attachment theory, 4e cognition, embodied cognition, extended mind, enactivism.

The new wave of robotics aims to provide robots with the capacity to learn, develop and evolve in interaction with their environments using biologically inspired techniques. This work is placed in perspective by considering its biological and psychological basis with reference to some of the grand theorists of living systems. In particular, we examine what it means to have a body by outlining theories of the mechanisms of bodily integration in multicellular organisms and their means of solidarity with the environment. We consider the implications of not having a living body for current ideas on robot learning, evolution, and cognition and issue words of caution about wishful attributions that can smuggle more into observations of robot behaviour than is scientifically supportable. To round off the arguments we take an obligatory swipe at ungrounded artificial intelligence but quickly move on to assess physical grounding and embodiment in terms of the rooted cognition of the living.

Key words: biorobotics, embodiment, umwelt, grounding, rooted cognition, robot intelligence, adaptive robotics, evolutionary robotics

Maturana’s cognitive perspective on the living state, Dretske’s insight on how information theory constrains cognition, the Atlan/Cohen cognitive paradigm, and models of intelligence without representation, permit construction of a spectrum of dynamic necessary conditions statistical models of signal transduction, regulation, and metabolism at and across the many scales and levels of organisation of an organism and its context. Nonequilibrium critical phenomena analogous to physical phase transitions, driven by crosstalk, will be ubiquitous, representing not only signal switching, but the recruitment of underlying cognitive modules into tunable dynamic coalitions that address changing patterns of need and opportunity at all scales and levels of organisation. The models proposed here, while certainly providing much conceptual insight, should be most useful in the analysis of empirical data, much as are fitted regression equations.

Key words: cognition, living state, mutual information, phase transition, rate distortion