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Consciousness and Cognition
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Ataria Y., Dor-Ziderman Y. & Berkovich-Ohana A. (2015) How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator. Consciousness and Cognition 37: 133–147.
Ataria Y.
,
Dor-Ziderman Y.
&
Berkovich-Ohana A.
(
2015
)
How does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator
.
Consciousness and Cognition
37: 133–147.
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This paper discusses the phenomenological nature of the sense of boundaries (SB), based on the case of S, who has practiced mindfulness in the Satipathana and Theravada Vipassana traditions for about 40years and accumulated around 20,000h of meditative practice. S’s unique abilities enable him to describe his inner lived experience with great precision and clarity. S was asked to shift between three different stages: (a) the default state, (b) the dissolving of the SB, and (c) the disappearance of the SB. Based on his descriptions, we identified seven categories (with some overlap) that alter during the shifts between these stages, including the senses of: (1) internal versus external, (2) time, (3) location, (4) self, (5) agency (control), (6) ownership, and (7) center (first-person-egocentric-bodily perspective). Two other categories, the touching/touched structure and one’s bodily feelings, do not fade away completely even when the sense-of-boundaries disappears.
Cosmelli D. & Thompson E. (2007) Mountains and Valleys: Binocular Rivalry and the Flow of Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 16: 623–641. https://cepa.info/2352
Cosmelli D.
&
Thompson E.
(
2007
)
Mountains and Valleys: Binocular Rivalry and the Flow of Experience
.
Consciousness and Cognition
16: 623–641.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2352
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Binocular rivalry provides a useful situation for studying the relation between the temporal flow of conscious experience and the temporal dynamics of neural activity. After proposing a phenomenological framework for understanding temporal aspects of consciousness, we review experimental research on multistable perception and binocular rivalry, singling out various methodological, theoretical, and empirical aspects of this research relevant to studying the flow of experience. We then review an experimental study from our group explicitly concerned with relating the temporal dynamics of rivalrous experience to the temporal dynamics of cortical activity. Drawing attention to the importance of dealing with ongoing activity and its inherent changing nature at both phenomenological and neurodynamical levels, we argue that the notions of recurrence and variability are pertinent to understanding rivalry in particular and the flow of experience in general.
Friston K. & Frith C. (2015) A duet for one. Consciousness and Cognition 36: 390–405. https://cepa.info/5877
Friston K.
&
Frith C.
(
2015
)
A duet for one
.
Consciousness and Cognition
36: 390–405.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5877
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This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.
Key words:
communication
,
theory of mind
,
active inference
,
predictive coding
,
attention
,
sensory attenuation
,
bayesian
,
generalised synchrony.
Gallagher S. (2008) Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition 17(2): 535–543. https://cepa.info/5645
Gallagher S.
(
2008
)
Direct perception in the intersubjective context
.
Consciousness and Cognition
17(2): 535–543.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5645
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This paper, in opposition to the standard theories of social cognition found in psychology and cognitive science, defends the idea that direct perception plays an important role in social cognition. The two dominant theories, theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), both posit something more than a perceptual element as necessary for our ability to understand others, i.e., to “mindread” or “mentalize.” In contrast, certain phenomenological approaches depend heavily on the concept of perception and the idea that we have a direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc. This paper explains precisely what the notion of direct perception means, offers evidence from developmental studies, and proposes a non-simulationist interpretation of the neuroscience of mirror systems.
Key words:
direct perception
,
theory theory
,
simulation theory
,
mirror neurons
,
social cognition.
Gallagher S. & Brøsted J. (2006) Experimenting with phenomenology. Consciousness and Cognition 15(1): 119–134.
Gallagher S.
&
Brøsted J.
(
2006
)
Experimenting with phenomenology
.
Consciousness and Cognition
15(1): 119–134.
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Heavey C. L. & Hurlburt R. T. (2008) The phenomena of inner experience. Consciousness and Cognition 17(3): 798–810. https://cepa.info/6589
Heavey C. L.
&
Hurlburt R. T.
(
2008
)
The phenomena of inner experience
.
Consciousness and Cognition
17(3): 798–810.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6589
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This study provides a survey of phenomena that present themselves during moments of naturally occurring inner expe- rience. In our previous studies using Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) we have discovered five frequently occurring phenomena – inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Here we quantify the rel- ative frequency of these phenomena. We used DES to describe 10 randomly identified moments of inner experience from each of 30 participants selected from a stratified sample of college students. We found that each of the five phenomena occurred in approximately one quarter of sampled moments, that the frequency of these phenomena varied widely across individuals, that there were no significant gender differences in the relative frequencies of these phenomena, and that higher frequencies of inner speech were associated with lower levels of psychological distress.
Key words:
descriptive experience sampling
,
consciousness
,
awareness
,
inner experience
,
individual differences
,
inner speech
,
inner seeing
,
unsymbolized thinking
,
feelings
,
sensory awareness
Hurlburt R. T. & Akhter S. A. (2008) Unsymbolized thinking. Consciousness and Cognition 17(4): 1364–1374. https://cepa.info/7767
Hurlburt R. T.
&
Akhter S. A.
(
2008
)
Unsymbolized thinking
.
Consciousness and Cognition
17(4): 1364–1374.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7767
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Unsymbolized thinking – the experience of an explicit, differentiated thought that does not include the experience of words, images, or any other symbols – is a frequently occurring yet little known phenomenon. Unsymbolized thinking is a distinct phenomenon, not merely, for example, an incompletely formed inner speech or a vague image, and is one of the five most common features of inner experience (the other four: inner speech, inner seeing, feelings, and sensory awareness). Despite its high frequency, many people, includ- ing many professional students of consciousness, believe that such an experience is impos- sible. However, because the existence of unsymbolized thinking indicates that much experienced thinking takes place without any experience of words or other symbols, acknowledging the existence of unsymbolized thinking may have substantial theoretical import.
Key words:
descriptive experience sampling
,
phenomenal consciousness
,
thinking
,
wordless thinking
,
imageless thought
,
inner speech.
John E. R. (2001) In memoriam. Francisco J. Varela (September 7, 1946–May 28, 2001). Consciousness and Cognition 10: 594–597.
John E. R.
(
2001
)
In memoriam. Francisco J. Varela (September 7, 1946–May 28, 2001)
.
Consciousness and Cognition
10: 594–597.
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Jurgens A. & Kirchhoff M. D. (2019) Enactive social cognition: Diachronic constitution & coupled anticipation. Consciousness and Cognition 70: 1–10. https://cepa.info/5857
Jurgens A.
&
Kirchhoff M. D.
(
2019
)
Enactive social cognition: Diachronic constitution & coupled anticipation
.
Consciousness and Cognition
70: 1–10.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5857
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This paper targets the constitutive basis of social cognition. It begins by describing the traditional and still dominant cognitivist view. Cognitivism assumes internalism about the realisers of social cognition; thus, the embodied and embedded elements of intersubjective engagement are ruled out from playing anything but a basic causal role in an account of social cognition. It then goes on to advance and clarify an alternative to the cognitivist view; namely, an enactive account of social cognition. It does so first by articulating a diachronic constitutive account for how embodied engagement can play a constitutive role in social cognition. It then proceeds to consider an objection; the causal-constitutive fallacy (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Block, 2005) against enactive social cognition. The paper proceeds to deflate this objection by establishing that the distinction between constitution and causation is not co-extensive with the distinction between internal constitutive elements and external causal elements. It is then shown that there is a different reason for thinking that an enactive account of social cognition is problematic. We call this objection the ‘poverty of the interactional stimulus argument’. This objection turns on the role and characteristics of anticipation in enactive social cognition. It argues that anticipatory processes are mediated by an internally realised model or tacit theory (Carruthers, 2015; Seth, 2015). The final part of this paper dissolves this objection by arguing that it is possible to cast anticipatory processes as orchestrated as well as maintained by sensorimotor couplings between individuals in face-to-face interaction.
Key words:
Social cognition
,
enactivism
,
intersubjectivity
,
diachronic constitution
,
theory of mind
,
sensorimotor contingencies
,
causal-constitutive fallacy
Lenay C. & Steiner P. (2010) Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception. Consciousness and Cognition 19: 938–952. https://cepa.info/4047
Lenay C.
&
Steiner P.
(
2010
)
Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perception
.
Consciousness and Cognition
19: 938–952.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4047
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This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally antecedent to this debate. We call the position we defend enactive externalism. It is based on experimental settings which, in virtue of their minimalism, make it possible both to defend a sensori-motor/enactive theory of perception; and, especially, to inquire into the origin of the space of perception, showing how it is concretely enacted before the controversy between internalism and externalism can even take place.
Key words:
Constitution
,
enaction
,
externalism
,
internalism
,
sensori-motor
,
sensory-substitution
,
space.
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