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Culture & Psychology
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fulltext:"Man, having within himself an imagined world of lines and numbers, operates in it with abstractions just as God in the universe, did with reality"
fulltext:"Man, having within himself an imagined world of lines and numbers, operates in it with abstractions just as God in the universe, did with reality"
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Baerveldt C. & Verheggen T. (1999) Enactivism and the experiential reality of culture: Rethinking the epistemological basis of cultural psychology. Culture & Psychology 5(2): 183–206. https://cepa.info/2414
Baerveldt C.
&
Verheggen T.
(
1999
)
Enactivism and the experiential reality of culture: Rethinking the epistemological basis of cultural psychology
.
Culture & Psychology
5(2): 183–206.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2414
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The key problem of cultural psychology comprises a paradox: while people believe they act on the basis of their own authentic experience, cultural psychologists observe their behavior to be socially patterned. It is argued that, in order to account for those patterns, cultural psychology should take human experience as its analytical starting point. Nevertheless, there is a tendency within cultural psychology to either neglect human experience, by focusing exclusively on discourse, or to consider the structure of this experience to originate in an already produced cultural order. For an alternative approach, we turn to the enactive view of cognition developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. Their theory of autonomy can provide the epistemological basis for a cultural psychology that explains how experience can become socially patterned in the first place. Cultural life forms are then considered as consensually coordinated, embodied practices.
Key words:
cultural psychology
,
embodiment
,
enactivism
,
epistemology
,
experiential reality
Chryssides A., Dashtipour P., Keshet S., Righi C., Sammut G. & Sartawi M. (2009) We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the fundamental incompatibilities between the two. Culture & Psychology 15(1): 83–95.
Chryssides A.
,
Dashtipour P.
,
Keshet S.
,
Righi C.
,
Sammut G.
&
Sartawi M.
(
2009
)
We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the fundamental incompatibilities between the two
.
Culture & Psychology
15(1): 83–95.
Copy Citation
Underlying all theories are philosophical presuppositions that lend themselves to different epistemological approaches, which need to be unfurled when comparing theories and offering alternative explanations. Contrary to Verheggen and Baerveldt’s (2007) promulgation that `enactivism’ may be an adequate alternative for Wagner’s social representation approach, this commentary outlines how this may be a misguided position. Enactivism, following an outward trajectory from nervous systems, to minds, to `(inter)action’, to social enactivism, is incompatible with the dialogical epistemology underpinning social representations theory. Social representations are not reducible to individual minds, and dialogical interaction is not reducible to operationally closed `systems’ in (inter)action. The difference between the two approaches lies in the fundamental paradigmatic distinction between molar and molecular explanatory frameworks. Offering one as an alternative to the other overlooks the epistemological differences between the two and fails to appreciate the discrepancies between different levels of analysis, explanatory frameworks and the very phenomena that theories problematize.
Key words:
dialogical epistemology
,
enactivism
,
social representation
Daanen P. (2009) Conscious and non-conscious representation in social representations theory: Social representations from the phenomenological point of view. Culture & Psychology 15(3): 372–385.
Daanen P.
(
2009
)
Conscious and non-conscious representation in social representations theory: Social representations from the phenomenological point of view
.
Culture & Psychology
15(3): 372–385.
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Verheggen and Baerveldt’s (2007) recent paper critiques the concept of ‘sharedness’ in Social Representations Theory (SRT). However, these arguments against sharedness are themselves founded upon an implicit argument against the role of ‘representation’ in SRT. This constitutes what I call the phenomenological critique of SRT. From a discussion of Heidegger’s phenomenology one can better understand Verheggen and Baerveldt’s argument. By concentrating on anchoring and objectification, the notion of ‘representation’ can be conceived as both a ‘conscious’ and a ‘non-conscious’ account of meaning. A Heideggerian phenomenological approach can unify the conscious and non-conscious elements of SRT into a common framework. Such phenomenological appreciation of SRT can contribute to a theory of meaning for cultural psychology.
Key words:
cultural psychology
,
enactivism
,
heidegger
,
implicit meaning
,
phenomenology
,
practical knowledge
,
social representations theory
Laughlin C. D. & Throop C. J. (2006) Cultural neurophenomenology: Integrating experience, culture and reality through Fisher information. Culture & Psychology 12(3): 305–337. https://cepa.info/6372
Laughlin C. D.
&
Throop C. J.
(
2006
)
Cultural neurophenomenology: Integrating experience, culture and reality through Fisher information
.
Culture & Psychology
12(3): 305–337.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6372
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Anthropologists and psychologists have long debated the relative importance of nature and nurture in human affairs. By and large anthropologists have opted for what might be called the ‘naïve culturological position’ that when our species developed culture, it left its biological roots behind. Psychologists, on the other hand, until relatively recently, have largely ignored the impact of culture upon the processes and functioning of the human mind. In their attempt to approximate the rigors of scientific methods practiced in the so-called ‘hard’ sciences, it is often a naïve scientism that drives theorizing and research in the discipline. The single most decisive impediment to the emergence of a mature anthropology and psychology is the mind–body schism. We will argue that bridging the mind–body schism requires a language by means of which we can refer to individual experience, culture and extramental reality simultaneously. Our approach is that of a cultural neurophenomenology that allows us to speak about the social and biological factors that produce, potentiate and limit human experience. We show that one key concept in unifying the languages of these different domains is ‘information’. We trace the history of the concept of information, and demonstrate that from the perspective of Fisher information one may more easily conceive of the interactions among experience, culture and reality in commensurable terms. Fisher information also allows us to model the relationship between knowledge and reality, and to suggest some of the mechanisms by which the individual psyche and a society’s culture remain ‘trued-up’ relative to the reality of the world and the individual’s own being.
Key words:
brain
,
cultural neurophenomenology
,
culture
,
experience–reality problem
,
husserl
,
information
,
psychological anthropology
Sridharan V. (2015) Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities. Culture & Psychology 21(2): 259–275.
Sridharan V.
(
2015
)
Beyond consensual domains: Enactivism, social representations and third-order unities
.
Culture & Psychology
21(2): 259–275.
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Although Enactivism and cultural anthropology share many core principles, a satisfactory Enactivist approach to culture has not yet been articulated. While the Enactivist embraces the cultural anthropologist’s skepticism with respect to a pregiven world described through objective truths, one of its stumbling blocks has been its difficulty in accounting for the normative background of interpersonal interaction, or what Wolfgang Wagner has referred to as “Social Representations.” This article argues that in order for the Enactivist to provide the conceptual tools necessary for this analysis, she must make use of what Varela and others refer to as “third-order unities.” The same principles that the Enactivist uses to explain the emergent properties of cells and organisms – autopiesis and identity-production – must be applied at the level of a society in order to understand how cultural meanings emerge and how they influence individual behavior. By applying these concepts at the supra-individual level, we get a more lucid picture of the fundamental features of an Enactivist account of culture, and can better understand the fundamental principles that Enactivism claims underlie all living systems both simple and complex.
Key words:
enactivism
,
culture
,
identity
,
social representations
,
shared meanings
Verheggen T. & Baerveldt C. (2007) We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the ground for an intrinsically social Psychology. Culture & Psychology 13(1): 5–27.
Verheggen T.
&
Baerveldt C.
(
2007
)
We don’t share! The social representation approach, enactivism and the ground for an intrinsically social Psychology
.
Culture & Psychology
13(1): 5–27.
Copy Citation
Wolfgang Wagner is a current and productive advocate of the social representation approach. He developed a version of the theory in which social representations are freed from individual minds and instead conceived of as concerted interactions. These epistemological starting points come very close to the enactive outlook on consensually coordinated actions. Yet Wagner is not radical enough in that he continues to see concerted interaction as an expression of representations that are already shared by the actors constituting a group. In our view, the ubiquitous notion of sharedness – which is also found in studies on social models, cultural patterns, schemas, scenarios, and so forth – is conceptually problematic and reveals a misapprehension of how orchestrated actions come about. Moreover, it obscures a proper understanding of what really constitutes intrinsically social behavior. Enactivism provides a much more consistent epistemology for a psychology that is intrinsically social.
Key words:
cultural psychology
,
culture
,
enactivism
,
epistemology
,
sharedness
,
social representations
Verheggen T. & Baerveldt C. (2012) Mixed up perspectives: Reply to Chryssides et al. and Daanen and their critique of enactive cultural psychology. Culture & Psychology 18(2): 272–284.
Verheggen T.
&
Baerveldt C.
(
2012
)
Mixed up perspectives: Reply to Chryssides et al. and Daanen and their critique of enactive cultural psychology
.
Culture & Psychology
18(2): 272–284.
Copy Citation
In earlier contributions to
Culture & Psychology
we have put forward enactivism as an epistemological alternative for representationalist accounts of meaning in relation to action and experience. Critics continue to charge enactive cultural psychology of being a solipsistic and a materialist reductionistic epistemology. We address that critique, arguing that it consistently follows from misunderstanding in particular the enactivist notion of “operational closure,” and from mixing up two observer viewpoints that must be analytically severed when describing living, cognitive systems. Moreover, Daanen (2009) argued that in particular Heidegger’s phenomenology can help to reconcile enactive cultural psychology and social representation theory. We reply that although enactivism is indeed close to phenomenology, Daanen fails to appreciate Heidegger’s much more radical break with a philosophy of consciousness to anchor meaningful Being. Consequently, representationalist accounts cannot be salvaged, least of all by invoking Heidegger.
Key words:
enactive cultural psychology
,
enactivism
,
epistemology
,
heidegger
,
normativity
,
phenomenology
,
social representations
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