The concept of self-organization is reviewed and its implications are explored in relation to management processes and social systems. A world view is taken, emphasizing a descriptive distinction of levels associated with the physical, biological, social, and mental. Self-organization principles, it is argued, are operative in all levels of such a stratified scheme, but they are manifest in different mechanisms and different embodiments. \\Management, planning, design, and other “intervention” type of activities are among the processes through which self-organization is manifest in the social domain. Ultimately they have to do with maintaining, enriching, and amplifying the potential variety of the systems concerned. The operationally critical question involved, it is suggested, is not whether management activities are “man-made” or “natural,” spontaneous” or “planned,” but rather, whether they enhance or supress the potential variety of a system under consideration.

Self-reference and recursion characterize a vast range of dynamic phenomena, particularly biological automata. In this paper we investigate the dynamics of self-referent phenomena using the Extended Calculus of Indications (ECI) of Kauffman and Varela, who have applied the ECI to mathematics, physics, linguistics, perception, and cognition. Previous studies have focused on the algebraic structure of the ECI, and on form dynamics using only the arithmetic of Spencer-Brown. We here examine the temporal behavior of self-referent or reentrant forms using the full power of the ECI to represent tangled hierarchies and multiple enfolded dimensions of space-time. Further, we explore the temporal convolution of static and recursive states in coherent fluctuation, providing a foundation for going beyond the Turing model of computation in finite automata. Novel results are presented on the structure of reentrant forms and the canonical elements of form eigenbehavior, the characteristic self-determined dynamic inherent in reentrant forms.

A problem of action selection emerges in complex and even not so complex interactive agents: what to do next? The problem of action selection occurs equally for natural and for artificial agents for any embodied agent. The obvious solution to this problem constitutes a form of representation, interactive representation, that is arguably the fundamental form of representation. More carefully, interactive representation satisfies a criterion for representation that no other model of representation in the literature can satisfy or even attempts to address: the possibility of systemdetectable representational error. It also resolves and avoids myriad other problematics of representation and integrates or opens the door to many additional mental processes and phenomena, such as motivation.

The aim of the paper is: a) to gain some knowledge of the so-called ‘natural systems’ as interpreted or defined by modern systems scientists; b) to discuss these descriptions and definitions from the viewpoint of modern philosophy of science. In the course of both a) and b) the interwovenness of the classes of natural systems and the controversial issues connected therewith (a.o. their interwovenness with the artificial systems) will be touched upon.

This paper discusses the phenomenological dimension of social understanding. The author’s general hypothesis is that complex forms of social understanding that biological agents especially humans show are based on two mechanisms: 1 the bodily, experiential dynamics of emphatic resonance and 2 the biographic reconstruction of a communication situation. The latter requires the agent’s bodily experiences as the point of reference for the reconstruction process. This hypothesis is derived from discussions in philosophy, natural sciences, and cognitive science on the social embodiment of cognition and understanding. Evidence comes from studies on social cognition in primates, infants, and autistic people that are interpreted in terms of the “mind-experiencing” hypothesis. The second part of the paper sketches an '‘interactive’’ experiment that investigates the dynamic coupling of a robot with its environment. This example is used to discuss the role of the human observer and designer as an active, embodied agent who is biased toward interpreting the world in terms of intentionality and explanation. The paper describes how this aspect can influence the processes of understanding and interpretation of the behavior of autonomous robotic agents. The author concludes by stressing the need to overcome the distinction between computationalism and phenomenology in order to develop complex artificial systems.

How is the field of systems science different from other scientific fields, and how can we distinguish the various traditions within systems science? We propose that there is a set of underlying assumptions which are generally shared within systems science but are less common in other scientific fields. Furthermore, the various traditions within systems science have adopted different combinations of these assumptions. We examine six traditions within systems science – cybernetics, operations research, general systems theory, system dynamics, total quality management, and organizational learning. We then consider eight underlying assumptions – observation, causality, reflexivity, self-organization, determinism, environment, relationships, and holism. We then assess where each tradition stands with respect to each of the underlying

This paper is primarily concerned with answering two questions: What are necessary elements of embodied architectures? How are we to proceed in a science of embodied systems? Autonomous agents, more specifically cogni- tive agents, are offered as the appropriate objects of study for embodied AI. The necessary elements of the architectures of these agents are then those of embodied AI as well. A concrete proposal is presented as to how to proceed with such a study. This proposal includes a synergistic parallel employment of an engineering approach and a scientific approach. It also supports the exploration of design space and of niche space. A general architecture for a cognitive agent is outlined and discussed.

The recently developed notions of second-order cybernetics bring into focus a number of traditional concerns (e.g., self-reference). Here, a simple derivation of some of these notions is made from a brief characterization of the initial cybernetics ideas developed by N. Wiener and others. Matters of concern and consequence are then stated, and are summarized as facets of what should be the major area of research in the field: the question of cybernetics.

In this paper, the nature of distinction drawing, in the sense of George Spencer Brown, is examined with special reference to the distinction between the self and the other. It is noted that a distinction, which must draw its self, also requires an other and a transfer distinction, both within a particular distinction and for that distinction to be part of, and that these can generate the purpose of the distinction as becoming, of, by and for itself.

In order to excavate something of cybernetics, I look at the notion of stability. Stability is related to the basic cybernetic concept goal. It is shown that every goal must have a goal of its own. It is also shown that the determination that the goal is a goal is observer dependent. By an inversion, it is shown that every stable system must be assumed to have an internal goal of its own. Thus, apparently random behaviour (viewed from the outside) is entirely stable (viewed from the inside). Several ways of handling these potentially difficult concepts are indicated. A codification is given in an appendix.

Key words: behaviour, cybernetic, goal, inversion, observer, stability, steersman, system