In this paper, the nature of distinction drawing, in the sense of George Spencer Brown, is examined with special reference to the distinction between the self and the other. It is noted that a distinction, which must draw its self, also requires an other and a transfer distinction, both within a particular distinction and for that distinction to be part of, and that these can generate the purpose of the distinction as becoming, of, by and for itself.

Biology has no definitive definition of life yet. Second Cybernetics and Autopoiesis revealed that autonomy is the keypoint to work on, but no real autonomy can arise from an abstract idea that, like autopoietical organization, isolates a logical mechanism from its materialization. Two main problems are posed; 1) how to distinguish a living system from a simulation of it, and 2) what to do with those physical systems that although fulfilling the autopoietical conditions cannot intuitively be considered living beings. We propose that autonomy is not separable from the evolutive and reproductive capacities of living systems and, therefore, autonomous systems capable of self-reproduction and evolution need to be explained as two level mechanisms involving informational records and dynamic instances capable of interpreting them.