Excerpt: In comparing constructivist and sociocultural perspectives, it is worth considering at the outset whether any empirical or scientific claims are involved – claims that could be vulnerable to evidence – or whether the differences are entirely perspectival. The slogan “students construct their own knowledge” is not by itself a falsifiable claim. It is simply a concomitant of any cognitive stance – including the stance of folk psychology. As long as one views the mind as a container whose contents are beliefs, schemata, cognitive structures, or other cognitive objects, then any plausible explanation of how those objects get into the mind has to assume that they are created there. What alternative is there, short of thought transference? The only way to reject it is by rejecting the whole structure of cognitive psychological ideas built upon the mind-as-container metaphor.

Currently, considerable debate focuses on whether mind is located in the head or in the individual-in-social-action, and whether development is cognitive self-organization or enculturation into established practices. In this article, I question assumptions that initiate this apparent forced choice between constructivist and sociocultural perspectives. I contend that the two perspectives are complementary. Also, claims that either perspective captures the essence of people and communities should be rejected for pragmatic justifications that consider the contextual relevance and usefulness of a perspective. I argue that the sociocultural perspective informs theories of the conditions far the possibility of learning, whereas theories developed from the constructivist perspective focus on what students learn and the processes by which they do so.

Excerpt: Review of: Soviet Studies in Mathematics Education: Volume 2. Types of Generalization in Instruction. V. V. Davydov (Volume edited by Jeremy Kilpatrick; translated by Joan Teller). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 1990. Originally written in 1972, the book remains useful to educational researchers, including those beyond the mathematics educational community, because its major theory of dialectical materialism offers a view of knowledge that has a significant role for “activity.” It connects activity to a reinterpretation of the relationship between empirical and theoretical knowledge. In doing so, the work addresses such classroom issues as how to avoid the separation between abstract theoretical presentations and practical activity, and between superficial learning via imitation and repetition and a deeper understanding of the structure of the concepts. Ultimately the success of the volume will be assessed in relation to the studies it spawns, because the book is primarily a theoretical exposition. There is a paucity of examples and references to specific classroom-based studies, an absence recognized and noted by the author. Nonetheless Davydov’s theoretical presentation merits careful analysis and critique.

The view that knowledge cannot be transmitted but must be constructed by the mental activity of learners underpins contemporary perspectives on science education. This article, which presents a theoretical perspective on teaching and learning science in the social setting of classrooms, is informed by a view of scientific knowledge as socially constructed and by a perspective on the learning of science as knowledge construction involving both individual and social processes. First, we present an overview of the nature of scientific knowledge. We then describe two major traditions in explaining the process of learning science: personal and social constructivism. Finally, we illustrate how both personal and social perspectives on learning, as well as perspectives on the nature of the scientific knowledge to be learned, are necessary in interpreting science learning in formal settings.

In recent years there has been a great deal of methodological debate among educational researchers, theoreticians, and practitioners concerning issues such as relativism raised by the so-called “new,” “Kuhnian” or “postpositivistic” philosophy of science. The intensity of this debate notwithstanding, the fundamental principles and their relations that comprise the postpositivistic view have not always been carefully spelled out. Some of the principles discussed will include (a) the problem of confirmation, (b) the underdetermination of theory by logic, (c) the underdetermination of theory by experience, (d) the Quine-Duhem thesis, (e) the theoryladenness of experience, and (f) the incommensurability of theories. No attempt will be made to evaluate these principles. However, those who are prepared to accept all of these will be hard pressed to avoid the dangers of relativism. I will argue that these dangers, if they exist, may be lessened if not eliminated by practicing the pragmatic virtues of epistemological conservatism and good sense.

Key words: philosophy, radical constructivism, education

Excerpt: The educational literature on constructivism is enormous, and growing rapidly; a significant indicator is that the 1993 AERA Annual Meeting Program contained more than a score of sessions explicitly on this topic. Even as interesting a symposium as that which recently appeared in the Educational Researcher (vol. 23, 7, 1994) was able to give only an inadequate hint of the many varieties of constructivism that presently exist. It is part of my purpose in this essay to complicate matters even more by pointing to relevant discussions in other literatures that are rarely, if ever, mentioned by those embroiled in the educational debates. In particular, I will try to show that in the fields of epistemology and philosophy of science, in the relatively young discipline of science studies (an interdisciplinary philosophical, sociological, and historical field), and in the rapidly burgeoning feminist literature, there is much of relevance and interest to be found.