What is being discribed as differences between organic and cultural evolution (for example that one is Darwinian, the other, Lamarckian in character) depends on the implicit agreements made on what are analogue issues in culture and life. A special consequence of the definitions used is that opposite causal mechanisms are attributed. The development of empirical scientific theories is seen as an internal adaptation to external data. Organic evolution, however, is seen as an external selection of internal modifications. Seeing science as a special cognitive tool in the sense of evolutionary epistemology (EE) which then has to evolve according to the same principles as evolution of organic tools does, would require some notional realignments in order to level the established organismic/cultural dichotomy. Central to the approach used here is the notion of reality and adaptation. The EE declares that human categories of perception and thinking (space, time, object, causality etc.) result from evolutionary adaptation to the independent structures of an ontological reality (Campbell: “natural-selection-epistemology”). Here a “Constructivist evolutionary epistemology” (CEE) is proposed which goes one step further and considers also the category of reality itself to be a special mental concept acquired phylogenetically to immunize proven ideas under the label of “reality.” According to the CEE, the evaluation criteria for strategies and theories are the consistency with the previously and phylogenetically acquired organic and mental structures, rather than the adaptation to external data. A similar view can also be held in organic evolution where the various metabolic processes and higher strategies modify the external data according to their previously established own requirements rather than changing those requirements in adaptation to external data. Thus cognitive and scientific as well as organic evolution is an enterprise of conquest rather than of discovery and reality will lose its role as a universal legislator and evaluator. The CEE implements this thought, by considering all regularities perceived and the laws of nature derived from them as invariants of mental or sensory operators. The extension of human sense organs by means of physical measurement operators leads to the completion of classical physics if the experimental and the inborn cognitive operators commute. Otherwise non-classical (i.e. “non-human”) approaches are required such as quantum mechanics, which are based on the invariants brought about experimentally. As the set of possible experimental facilities (and therefore of new invariants) is not closed it follows that evolution of science will not end in a definitive “theory of everything” but in basically endless co-evolution between experiments and their theoretical interpretations. The same applies to organic evolution which can be considered as coevolution between genomic structures and their interpretation by the epigenetic system which itself is subject to genomic modifications. This may lead to non-stable recursive processes described here as nonlinear genetics. Some general evolutionary strategies and principles are discussed with a view to being applicable in organic evolution as well as in cultural and social evolution. Special consideration is given to the view that the need to master the physical world (mainly being done by scientific efforts) may be superseded in the long run by the need to master our social environment.

The unsolved problem of induction is closely linked to “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” (Wigner 1960) and to the question “why the universe is algorthmicly compressible” (Davies 1960). The problem of induction is approached here by means of a constructivist version of the Evolutionary Epistemology (CEE) considering both, the perceived regularities we condense to the laws of nature and the mathematical structures we condense to axioms, as invariants of inborn cognitive and mental operators. A phylogenetic relationship between the mental operators generating the perceived and the mathematical regularities respectively may explain the high suitability of mathematical tools to extrapolate observed data. The extension of perceptional operators by means of experimental operators, i.e., by means of measurement devices) would lead to the completion of the classical world picture if both the cognitive and the physical operators are commutable in the sense of operator algebra (quantitative extensions). Otherwise the physical operators will have invariants which no longer can be described in classical terms, and, therefore, would require the formation of non-classical theories (qualitative extension), exceeding the classical world picture. The mathematical analogon would be the algorithmic extension of elementary mathematical thinking exceeding the axiomatic basis previously established according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. As a consequence there will be neither a definitive set of axioms in mathematics, nor will be there a definitive theory of everything in physics.

Theories based on the Darwinian idea of “selection” as an evolutionary driving force may help to understand the workings and functions of human consciousness. The philosopher Daniel C. Dennett has argued that consciousness was developed as a means to increase the rate of survival. However, it is one of the central features of consciousness that it “feels like something” to exist. Thus there seems to be a subjective quality of conscious experience. In philosophy of mind, this has traditionally been termed “qualia”, and the term refers to for instance the sensation of red as opposed to the sensation of blue, or the complex feelings of pain or love. Any theory of consciousness must provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon. Dennett claims that from a scientific perspective there is no problem of qualia. In our ancestors, qualia developed as a discriminative ability in order to structure the outside world, and did not entail any subjective qualities. In humans, however, the subjective qualities came along with linguistic abilities, because these provide man with the possibility to relate to himself as an agent, i.e. regard himself from the outside. Eventhough the discussion of qualia on this account can be dissolved, the question remains, whether Dennett has succeeded in explaining why there is a subjective quality of conscious experience, i.e. why it “feels” like something to be conscious.

Key words: consciousness, daniel dennett, evolution, first order intentionality as opposed to second order intentionality, qualia, selective advantage, subjective qualities of conscious experience.

This article explores the possibility that the tendency to believe in an objective, mind-independent external world traces to innate aspects of the human mind. The aspects of mind in question are, first, the capacity to distinguish mental states that have objective referents from those that do not (e.g., perceptual states versus mental imagery), and second, the capacity to mentally represent the continued existence of parts of the world that are beyond the reach of the senses. It is proposed that the evolutionary function of these cognitive abilities relates to the production of novel but adaptive voluntary behaviour. Evidence and arguments are provided in support of the innateness hypothesis. Among these is a Chomskyan-style poverty-of-the-stimulus argument derived from the philosophical literature. The evolutionary account of the subjective-objective distinction leads to the prediction that, in conditions of uncertainty, people will tend to err on the side of assuming the objectivity of their perceptions and other judgements.

Key words: Evolutionary psychology, external world, innate ideas, object permanence, objective-subjective distinction, philosophy.

In this paper, the emergence of psychic structures is conceived of within a dynamic structuralist framework, which is developed in dialogue with the biological viewpoint on the emergence and the maintenance of living structures (Collier/Hooker 1999; Salthe 1985; Van de Vijver/Salthe/Delpos 1998). More in particular, it is suggested (i) to consider organizational closure as a minimal condition to be fulfilled in order for dynamic systems to be stable, self-maintaining and self-producing, (ii) to conceive of living systems in terms of intricate organizational closures that set the stage for meaningful interactions (Kauffman 1993; Maturana/Varela 1980; Pattee 1995; Rosen 1985, 1991; Varela 1979) and (iii) to situate the psychological realm in continuity with this viewpoint. In analogy with the organizational closure of living systems, the mechanism of psychic closure is presented as the key mechanism for the constitution of psychic structures, and is interpreted in terms of identification: an identificatory judgment is a self-referential, closing judgment that involves a reinterpretation of the level below (the organic body) and is addressed to the level above (the fellow human being). The way in which identification has worked determines the kinds of psychic structures that are formed, it leads to different kinds of signifying practices, as well as to different ways of taking into account the underlying biological and material processes.

Key words: closure, identification, complex dynamical systems

Evolutionary epistemology has been often criticized as unduly ‘adaptationistic’. There is some substance to this criticism. One of the main roots of evolutionary epistemology is indeed an adaptationist theory of evolution. In this paper, however, I give some arguments for a non-adaptationist version of evolutionary epistemology by paying attention to organisms as active systems and organismic constraints for evolutionary change. I also compare this view with some implications of constructivism. The result is that cognition, be it in humans or other living beings, is neither a mere adaptation to, nor a construction of an external world, but rather a phenomenon that is to be explained by the organisms’ requirements and their interrela-tion with the surroundings.

Key words: evolutionary epistemology, adaptation, adaptationism, correspondence, coherence, realism, constructivism.