Diettrich O. (2006) The biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world view. In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach. Springer, Dordrecht: 67–93. https://cepa.info/5159
Diettrich O.
(
2006 )
The biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world view.
In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach . Springer, Dordrecht: 67–93.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5159
It is shown that the laws of nature providing us with cognitive survival competence are not objective properties of the world, rather they depend on the previously acquired phenotype in the same sense as the acting competence of organisms depends on the previously acquired organic phenotype. For example: the law of energy-conservation can be derived from the homogeneity of time. But homogeneity in time is defined by how our internal clock (which is part of our phenotype) is constructed. Cognitive evolution is subject to the boundary condition that will result in a world view (i.e. physics) that has to be invariant under all we do within this world-view. As locomotion is the oldest and most important capability of our ancestors our world view must be invariant first of all under locomotion, i.e. it has to be Galilei-invariant. Emmy Noether has shown that this is sufficient to derive the 10 conservation laws of classical mechanics. The other so-called laws of nature are defined as invariants of physical measurements. Therefore, cognitive evolution itself has brought about what we call the laws of nature and, therefore, cannot be subject to these laws as advocated by Campbell.
Riegler A. (2005) Like cats and dogs: Radical constructivism and evolutionary epistemology. In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach. Springer-Verlag, Dordrecht: 47–65. https://cepa.info/1781
Riegler A.
(
2005 )
Like cats and dogs: Radical constructivism and evolutionary epistemology.
In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach . Springer-Verlag, Dordrecht: 47–65.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1781
I identify two similarities between evolutionary epistemology (EE) and radical constructivism (RC): (1) They were founded primarily by biologists and (2) their respective claims can be related to Kant. Despite this fact there seems to be an abyss between them. I present an attempt to reconcile this gap and characterize EE as the approach that focuses on external behaviour, while RC emphasizes the perspective from within. The central concept of hypothetical realism is criticized as unnecessarily narrowing down the scope of EE. Finally, methodological and philosophical conclusions are drawn.
Wuketits F. M. (2006) Evolutionary epistemology: The non-adaptationist approach. In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach. Springer-Verlag, Dordrecht: 33–46. https://cepa.info/6447
Wuketits F. M.
(
2006 )
Evolutionary epistemology: The non-adaptationist approach.
In: Gontier N., van Bendegem J. P. & Aerts D. (eds.) Evolutionary epistemology, language and culture: A non-adaptationist, systems theoretical approach . Springer-Verlag, Dordrecht: 33–46.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6447
Earlier versions of evolutionary epistemology were based on – or at least strongly informed by – the adaptationist paradigm. It is for this reason that advocates of evolutionary epistemol- ogy have been frequently criticized by those who have adopted an organismic perspective in evolutionary thinking. Evolutionists defending the view that any living system – including all its characters at the anatomical as well as the behavioral level – can be sufficiently explained in terms of adaptation, have neglected the (somehow trivial) fact that organisms are active systems that do not entirely depend on their respective environment(s). Meanwhile, however, a systems-theoretical approach to understanding living beings and their evolution has made clear that (1) organisms and their environment(s) have a common history and have not evolved independent of each other, (2) any living system and its environment(s) are linked together by a feedback principle, and (3) adaptability is not defined by the environment but the or- ganism itself. This has serious consequences for evolutionary epistemology. In this paper, I outline a non-adaptationist version of this epistemology. I also briefly discuss its philosophical implications. The main focus is the problem of realism.