A series of articles has recently appeared in which implications of second-order cybernetics for the practice of family therapy have been discussed. In this article, we attempt to advance the discussion by addressing ideas that we think have not been adequately emphasized thus far. Specifically proposed are ideas about conditions that might facilitate the emergence of consciously pragmatic strategy informed by the kind of systemic wisdom that delicately balances natural systems without the benefit of human planning. It is argued that a shift in the personal habits of knowing and acting that typically organize individual human experience is required. After attempting to specify what this shift might involve, implications of these ideas for the practice of family therapy and for human action in general are discussed.

The concept of homeostasis has served as a major building block, if not the cornerstone, of family theory and family therapy. Designed to account for the perceived stability of systems (and symptoms), homeostasis is an epistemologically flawed concept that has repetitively been used in the service of dualistic, animistic, and vitalistic interpretations of systems. Accordingly, homeostasis has led to quirky clinical formulations and a great deal of fuzzy theorizing. This paper contends that the notion of homeostasis is fundamentally inconsistent with systemic epistemology and should be replaced with the more compatible concept of coherence. Whereas homeostasis is a heuristic concept that is not part of a more encompassing theory, the concept of coherence is inseparable from the epistemology in which it is embedded

If family therapists remain aware of the indivisible and recursive nature of their interactions with families, and if they use this awareness to form a collaborative rather than a hierarchical therapeutic system, and at the same time minimize their attempts to change persons or family structures in strategic or predetermined ways, then they may be said to be practicing a “second-order” family therapy. This article analyzes the development of the second-order position on therapist power and influence, concluding that it is inconsistent and possibly disingenuous.

Using detailed case examples, we contrast firstand second-order cybernetics approaches to family problems involving somatic symptoms in a family member. A second-order cybernetics approach views the reality of the problem as linguistically shaped by those interacting around it, including the therapist and observing team members. This co-constructed reality, the story of the problem, inadvertently contributes to the problem’s endurance by narrowing the choice of more effective solutions. In our approach, the therapist elicits from each person his or her story about the illness in the family. The therapist then facilitates a therapeutic conversation that provides a context for new linguistic distinctions to be drawn, including the way mind and body may interact to generate the symptoms. Shifts in beliefs and behaviors follow, and more innovative solutions to the problem can then emerge. Unlike the approach in our previously published work based upon ecosystemic patterns as “system diagnoses,” this approach uses only descriptions and explanations of the problem as are collaboratively constructed within this therapeutic conversation.

Excerpt: Dr. Von Foerster does not directly challenge the basic point to which the clarifications we offer eventually lead. It may be helpful to simplify that point in the following way. It is contradictory to hold both an epistemology (meaning 1) which maintains that reality (or the world) is a function of ourselves as knowers (of our subjectivity, our theories, or our language) and an epistemology (meaning 2) which maintains that reality really has certain features that are independent of the knower – features that should be acknowledged by every investigator. One example we gave of such a supposed feature of nature in general, or at least of nature as encountered in family therapy, is circular causality. It is a supposed feature argued for by some of those whom we perceive to be laboring under the burden of that contradiction.

The epistemology debates within the field of family therapy have become relatively infrequent in the last year or so, perhaps as a consequence of the confusion they have generated for many family therapists. This article maintains that the primary reason for the confusion is a failure to distinguish clearly between the conventional meaning of the term epistemology, which concerns the nature of knowledge, and the unconventional meaning given the term in family therapy, which concerns the nature of what we know. It is proposed that the confusion can be diminished by understanding the relationship between the two meanings, which are here distinguished as epistemology (meaning 1) and epistemology (meaning 2) respectively. Particular attention is given to the logical consequences of adopting a position on epistemology (meaning 1) – e.g, is the knower capable of knowing an independent reality, or does the act of knowing make its own reality? – or on epistemology (meaning 2) – e.g., is causality linear or nonlinear?. The relevance and implications of these problems for the theory and practice of family therapy are discussed.

In this essay I attempt to map the dimensions of my own move away from a cybernetic‐biologic analogy for “family‐systems” therapy. Central to this shift has been social construction theory augmented by two other lenses: a second‐order view, and a sensitivity to gender. These conceptual tools have helped me to distance myself from my previous therapeutic stance and to envision a very different model, one that is less strategic and instrumental, and more collaborative and unconcealed.

This paper takes issue with a number of family therapists who appear to hold that reality is entirely constructed out of our beliefs and that different views of reality can only be discriminated between on the basis of their usefulness for a particular purpose. Rather this paper argues for a co-constructivist position, that is, that the knower’s beliefs and constructs are in an interpenetrating relationship with reality and that different views of reality can be discriminated between on the basis of their adequacy in describing that reality and that it is this adequacy that will determine their usefulness. These issues are not just of theoretical interest but have important implications for the practice of therapy.