Toggle navigation
CEPA.INFO
FAQ
BROWSE
Authors
Constructivist Approaches
Background Disciplines
Reading Lists
Latest Fulltext Additions
LOGIN
Publications in
“Foundations of Science”
Publications Found:
22
·
Show All Abstracts
·
Highlight Matches
Search CEPA
» Help with Search
fulltext:maturana9999922unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--22x22=22x/
fulltext:maturanaor(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--and1=1/
fulltext:maturanaand1=1/
fulltext:maturana999999.1unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--and1=1/
fulltext:maturana99999'unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana99999"unionselectunhex(hex(version()))--"x"="x/
fulltext:maturana'or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana"or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--"x"="x/
fulltext:maturana22or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--22x22=22x/
fulltext:maturana22 or (1,2)=(selectfrom(select name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a) -- 22x22=22x/
By default, Find returns all publications that contain the words in the surnames of their author, in their titles, or in their years. For example,
Maturana
finds all publications authored by Maturana and publications that have "Maturana" in their title
Maturana 1974
finds all publications authored by Maturana in 1974
You can directly search for a reference by copy-pasting it. For example,
Glasersfeld E. von (1974) Jean Piaget and the radical constructivist epistemology
Unless a word (or phrase) if prefixed with a minus (-) it must be present in all results. Examples:
Glasersfeld Varela
shows all publications Ernst von Glasersfeld and Francisco Varela wrote together.
Glasersfeld "Jean Piaget"
finds all publications with
Glasersfeld
and
Jean Piaget
in it.
Prefix with
-
to indicate that this word must not be present in any result:
cognition -biology
will find entries that have
cognition
in the title but not
biology
.
Enter the surname of an author and a year to find all publications the author wrote in that year:
Glasersfeld 1995
presents all publications Ernst von Glasersfeld published in 1995.
Use
*
to match any characters:
constructivis*
matches constructivism and constructivist.
Enclose phrases between double quotes
"
to force phrase search:
"biology of cognition"
lists only the publications containing this phrase. Without the double quotes it will return all publications containing "biology" and all publications containing "cognition".
All the searches above match author names, titles and years. You can also address single fields:
author:glasersfeld title:reality
shows publications von Glasersfeld wrote on reality;
abstract:second-order
searches all abstracts for "second-order";
editor:Watzlawick
finds all books edited by Watzlawick.
Note there is no space after the colon.
Attention: Words of three letters and less are ignored.
"Not one, not two"
will return no result although there is
Varela's paper
of this title.
de Zeeuw G. (2001) Constructivism: A “next” area of scientific development? Foundations of Science%22\ title=\List all publications from Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science\>Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 77–98. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2745
de Zeeuw G.
(
2001
)
Constructivism: A “next” area of scientific development?
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler.
Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 77–98.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2745
Copy
Radical Constructivism has been defined as an‘unconventional approach to the problem ofknowledge and knowing’. Its unconventionalityis summarised by its claim that it isimpossible to attribute unique meaning toexperience – as no mind-independent yardstick canbe assumed to exist against which to identifyuniqueness, and hence to produce knowledge andknowing. In other words, it is claimed thatthere is no ‘reality’ that is knowable to allindividual knowers. This claim appearsindefensible by itself, as it does not explainwhy the successes of traditional science appearas such. However, it is defensible in thecontext of numerous failures to achieve uniqueattributions, or of the history of science. Even so, what is missing are concrete methodsand research designs. This often leaves RadicalConstructivism to be critical only, toconcentrate on justifying the impossibility ofsuccess without contributing itself. Where this is the case it reduces scientiststo individuals considered unable to communicatewith others on public (and unique)attributions-who may do so only by borrowingmethods from previous approaches. It is arguedthat a more valuable contribution is possibleif Radical Constructivism is seen as a responseto the challenge defined by frequent failuresof traditional approaches. The latter may beextended such that the extensions converge toRadical Constructivism. Such extensions arebased on reported observations, rather than onexperiences in general, and are to beattributed meanings – uniquely as well asnon-uniquely – by way of a collective. The lattershould allow its ‘actors’ to restrict whatmaintains the collective to what is observableto others, as well as use the collective torestrict their own observations. The study ofcollectives thus allows for the study ofrestrictions or values, and hence for includingsubjective or constructivist experiences beyond(reportable) observations.
Key words:
‘attached’ and ‘detached’ observation complete collective high quality experience high quality observation knowledge knowing language research design
Diettrich O. (2001) A physical approach to the construction of cognition and to cognitive evolution. Special issue on “The impact of radical constructivism on science” edited by A. Riegler. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 6(4): 273–341. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4500
Diettrich O.
(
2001
)
A physical approach to the construction of cognition and to cognitive evolution. Special issue on “The impact of radical constructivism on science” edited by A. Riegler.
Foundations of Science
6(4): 273–341.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4500
Copy
It is shown that the method of operational definition of theoretical terms applied in physics may well support constructivist ideas in cognitive sciences when extended to observational terms. This leads to unexpected results for the notion of reality, induction and for the problem why mathematics is so successful in physics. A theory of cognitive operators is proposed which are implemented somewhere in our brain and which transform certain states of our sensory apparatus into what we call perceptions in the same sense as measurement devices transform the interaction with the object into measurement results. Then, perceived regularities, as well as the laws of nature we would derive from them can be seen as invariants of the cognitive operators concerned and are by this human specific constructs rather than ontologically independent elements. (e.g., the law of energy conservation can be derived from the homogeneity of time and by this depends on our mental time metric generator). So, reality in so far it is represented by the laws of nature has no longer an independent ontological status. This is opposed to Campbell’s ‘natural selection epistemology’. From this it is shown that there holds an incompleteness theorem for physical laws similar to Gödels incompleteness theorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there is no definitive or object ‘theory of everything’. This constructivist approaches to cognition will allow a coherent and consistent model of both cognitive and organic evolution. Whereas the classical view sees the two evolution rather dichotomously (for ex.: most scientists see cognitive evolution converging towards a definitive world picture, whereas organic evolution obviously has no specific focus (the ‘pride of creation’).
Key words:
cognitive operator theory
,
epistemological autoreproduction
,
human specific character of natural laws
,
incompleteness theorem of mathematics (gödel) and physics
,
realism.
Gash H. (2013) Fixed or probable ideas. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 19(3): 283–284. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/894
Gash H.
(
2013
)
Fixed or probable ideas.
Foundations of Science
19(3): 283–284.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/894
Copy
This commentary concerns Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech’s paper on a semiotic model of ideologies. The commentary raises questions about the dynamic versus static nature of the model proposed, and in addition asks whether the model might be used to explain ethical flexibility and rigidity. The semiotic model is a mathematical one and a constructivist approach is evident.
Relevance:
This approach is clearly constructivist and concerns mathematical modelling of semiotics.
Key words:
Constructivist approach
,
modelling language
,
ethics
Gash H. (2014) Constructivism, truth and reality. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 19(3): 307–309. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1142
Gash H.
(
2014
)
Constructivism, truth and reality.
Foundations of Science
19(3): 307–309.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1142
Copy
This commentary to Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech’s “Reality, systems and impure systems” links ideas in their paper to radical constructivism and raises two questions. (1) Would it be helpful to substitute the constructivist notion of viability for the traditional notion of truth with its connotations of relating language and reality? (2) Is the link made to issues in ontological philosophy important since the implicit constructivist epistemology of the paper considers mathematical ideas are just as real as ideas about objects?
Relevance:
The text builds on Ernst von Glasersfeld’s constructivism.
Key words:
Truth
,
viability
,
ontology
,
constructivism
Glanville R. (2001) An observing science. Foundations of Science%22\ title=\List all publications from Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science\>Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 45–75. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3636
Glanville R.
(
2001
)
An observing science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler.
Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 45–75.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3636
Copy
In this paper I make the arguments that I see supporting a view of how we can come to know the world we live in. I start from a position in second order cybernetics which turns out to be a Radical Constructivist position. This position is essentially epistemological, and much of this paper is concerned with the act of knowing, crucial when we try to develop an understanding of what we mean when we discuss a field of knowing (knowledge), which is at the root of science. The argument follows a path in which I discuss the essential role of the observer in observing, the creation of constancies between different observings and their exteriorisation as objects which are then represented and used in communication with and between other observers, each unique (and therefore each observing in its own way). This leads to the assertion that the qualities we associate with the objects of our universes are attributes, rather than properties inherent in the objects themselves. At each step in the argument I explore consequences for how we understand the world, in particular through science. I show limitations, new insights and understandings, and reevaluate what we can expect to gain from science. One change is the shift from noun to verb in the consideration of processses – for instance, the study of living rather than life. In this way, I intend to show not only that Radical Constructivism is sensible, but that it does not preclude us having a science. In contrast, it can enrich science by taking on board the sensible. In the process, which science is seen to be the more basic is challenged.
Key words:
attributes/qualities
,
circularity
,
construct
,
constancy/pattern
,
(individual) experience
,
observing (observed
,
observer)
,
second-order cybernetics
,
science
Glasersfeld E. von (2001) The radical constructivist view of science. Foundations of Science%22\ title=\List all publications from Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science\>Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 31–43. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1536
Glasersfeld E. von
(
2001
)
The radical constructivist view of science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler.
Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 31–43.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1536
Copy
From the constructivist perspective, science cannot transcend the domain of experience. Scientific theories are seen as models that help to order and manage that domain. As the experiential field expands, models are replaced by others based on novel conceptual constructs. The paper suggests the substitution of ‘viability’ or ‘functional fit’ for the notions of Truth and objective representation of an experiencer-independent reality. This by-passes the sceptics’ incontrovertible arguments against certain real-world knowledge and proposes the Jean Piagetian conception of cognition as the function that generates ways and means for dealing with the world of experience.
Key words:
radical constructivism
,
philosophy
,
science
Reprinted as chapter 14 in
Glasersfeld E. von (2008) Key works in radical constructivism. Edited by M. Larochelle
Hennig C. (2010) Mathematical models and reality: A constructivist perspective. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 15(1): 29–48. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/363
Hennig C.
(
2010
)
Mathematical models and reality: A constructivist perspective.
Foundations of Science
15(1): 29–48.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/363
Copy
To explore the relation between mathematical models and reality, four different domains of reality are distinguished: observer-independent reality (to which there is no direct access), personal reality, social reality and mathematical/formal reality. The concepts of personal and social reality are strongly inspired by constructivist ideas. Mathematical reality is social as well, but constructed as an autonomous system in order to make absolute agreement possible. The essential problem of mathematical modelling is that within mathematics there is agreement about ‘truth’, but the assignment of mathematics to informal reality is not itself formally analysable, and it is dependent on social and personal construction processes. On these levels, absolute agreement cannot be expected. Starting from this point of view, repercussion of mathematical on social and personal reality, the historical development of mathematical modelling, and the role, use and interpretation of mathematical models in scientific practice are discussed.
Key words:
Radical constructivism
,
social constructivism
,
scientific agreement
,
history of mathematical modelling
,
modelling in practice
Hooker C. (2013) On the import of constraints in complex dynamical systems. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 18(4): 757–780. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5277
Hooker C.
(
2013
)
On the import of constraints in complex dynamical systems.
Foundations of Science
18(4): 757–780.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5277
Copy
Complexity arises from interaction dynamics, but its forms are co-determined by the operative constraints within which the dynamics are expressed. The basic interaction dynamics underlying complex systems is mostly well understood. The formation and operation of constraints is often not, and oftener under appreciated. The attempt to reduce constraints to basic interaction fails in key cases. The overall aim of this paper is to highlight the key role played by constraints in shaping the field of complex systems. Following an introduction to constraints (Sect. 1), the paper develops the roles of constraints in specifying forms of complexity (Sect. 2) and illustrates the roles of constraints in formulating the fundamental challenges to understanding posed by complex systems (Sect. 3).
Key words:
complexity
,
complex systems
,
dynamical constraints
,
lagrangian dynamics
,
organization
,
dynamical understanding.
Knyazeva H. (2009) Nonlinear cobweb of cognition. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 14: 167–179. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3910
Knyazeva H.
(
2009
)
Nonlinear cobweb of cognition.
Foundations of Science
14: 167–179.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3910
Copy
:The modem conception of enactive cognition is under discussion from the standpoint concerning the notions of nonlinear dynamics and synergetics. The contribu-tion of Francisco Varela and his precursors is considered. It is shown that the perceptual and mental processes are bound up with the “architecture” of human body and nonlinear and circular connecting links between the subject of cognition and the world constructed by him can be metaphorically called a nonlinear cobweb of cognition. Cognition is an autopoietic activity because it is directed to the search of elements that are missed; it serves to completing integral structures.
Key words:
Autopoiesis
,
complex systems
,
embodied cognition
,
enaction
,
non-linearity.
Lissack M. (2017) Second order science: Examining hidden presuppositions in the practice of science. Foundations of Science\>Foundations of Science 22(3): 557–573.
Lissack M.
(
2017
)
Second order science: Examining hidden presuppositions in the practice of science.
Foundations of Science
22(3): 557–573.
Copy
The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. To overcome this barrier, ‘science’ has imposed “enabling constraints” – hidden assumptions which are given the status of ceteris paribus. Such assumptions allow ambiguity to be bracketed away at the expense of transparency. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions, which we refer to throughout the article as “uceps.” The meanings of the various uceps are shown via their applicability to the science of climate change. Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. Second order science reveals hidden issues, problems and assumptions which all too often escape the attention of the practicing scientist (but which can also get in the way of the acceptance of a scientific claim) This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications.
Key words:
model
,
ambiguity
,
metaphysics
,
dependence
,
science.
Export result page as:
CF Format
·
APA
·
BibTex
·
EndNote
·
Harvard
·
MLA
·
Nature
·
RIS
·
Science
Page
1
2
3
Please provide us with your
feedback/evaluation/suggestions