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“Frontiers in Human Neuroscience”
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Bockelman P., Reinerman-Jones L. & Gallagher S. (2013) Methodological lessons in neurophenomenology: Review of a baseline study and recommendations for research approaches. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 608. https://cepa.info/4058
Bockelman P.
,
Reinerman-Jones L.
&
Gallagher S.
(
2013
)
Methodological lessons in neurophenomenology: Review of a baseline study and recommendations for research approaches
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
7: 608.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4058
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Neurophenomenological (NP) methods integrate objective and subjective data in ways that retain the statistical power of established disciplines (like cognitive science) while embracing the value of first-person reports of experience. The present paper positions neurophenomenology as an approach that pulls from traditions of cognitive science but includes techniques that are challenging for cognitive science in some ways. A baseline study is reviewed for “lessons learned,” that is, the potential methodological improvements that will support advancements in understanding consciousness and cognition using neurophenomenology. These improvements, we suggest, include (1) addressing issues of interdisciplinarity by purposefully and systematically creating and maintaining shared mental models among research team members; (2) making sure that NP experiments include high standards of experimental design and execution to achieve variable control, reliability, generalizability, and replication of results; and (3) conceiving of phenomenological interview techniques as placing the impetus on the interviewer in interaction with the experimental subject.
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H. (2012) The interactive brain hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 6: 163. https://cepa.info/761
Di Paolo E. A.
&
De Jaegher H.
(
2012
)
The interactive brain hypothesis
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
6: 163.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/761
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Enactive approaches foreground the role of interpersonal interaction in explanations of social understanding. This motivates, in combination with a recent interest in neuroscientific studies involving actual interactions, the question of how interactive processes relate to neural mechanisms involved in social understanding. We introduce the Interactive Brain Hypothesis (IBH) in order to map the spectrum of possible relations between social interaction and neural processes. The hypothesis states that interactive experience and skills play enabling roles in both the development and current function of social brain mechanisms, even in the absence of immediate interaction. We examine the plausibility of this hypothesis against developmental and neurobiological evidence and contrast it with the widespread assumption that mindreading is crucial to all social cognition. We describe the elements of social interaction that bear most directly on this hypothesis and discuss the empirical possibilities open to social neuroscience. The link between coordination dynamics and social understanding can be grasped by studying transitions between coordination states. These transitions form part of the self-organization of interaction processes that characterize the dynamics of social engagement. The patterns of this self-organization help explain how individuals understand each other. Various possibilities for role-taking emerge during interaction, determining a spectrum of participation. This view contrasts sharply with the observational stance that has guided research in social neuroscience until recently. We also introduce the concept of readiness to interact to describe the practices and dispositions that are summoned in situations of social significance.
Relevance:
The paper derives in explicit form some of the empirical neuroscientific implications of the enactive approach to intersubjectivity.
Di Paolo E. A., Barandiaran X. E., Beaton M. & Buhrmann T. (2014) Learning to perceive in the sensorimotor approach: Piaget’s theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 551. https://cepa.info/4799
Di Paolo E. A.
,
Barandiaran X. E.
,
Beaton M.
&
Buhrmann T.
(
2014
)
Learning to perceive in the sensorimotor approach: Piaget’s theory of equilibration interpreted dynamically
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
8: 551.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4799
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Learning to perceive is faced with a classical paradox: if understanding is required for perception, how can we learn to perceive something new, something we do not yet understand? According to the sensorimotor approach, perception involves mastery of regular sensorimotor co-variations that depend on the agent and the environment, also known as the “laws” of sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) In this sense, perception involves enacting relevant sensorimotor skills in each situation. It is important for this proposal that such skills can be learned and refined with experience and yet up to this date, the sensorimotor approach has had no explicit theory of perceptual learning. The situation is made more complex if we acknowledge the open-ended nature of human learning. In this paper we propose Piaget’s theory of equilibration as a potential candidate to fulfill this role. This theory highlights the importance of intrinsic sensorimotor norms, in terms of the closure of sensorimotor schemes. It also explains how the equilibration of a sensorimotor organization faced with novelty or breakdowns proceeds by re-shaping pre-existing structures in coupling with dynamical regularities of the world. This way learning to perceive is guided by the equilibration of emerging forms of skillful coping with the world. We demonstrate the compatibility between Piaget’s theory and the sensorimotor approach by providing a dynamical formalization of equilibration to give an explicit micro-genetic account of sensorimotor learning and, by extension, of how we learn to perceive. This allows us to draw important lessons in the form of general principles for open-ended sensorimotor learning, including the need for an intrinsic normative evaluation by the agent itself. We also explore implications of our micro-genetic account at the personal level.
Hutto D., Kirchhoff M. & Myin E. (2014) Extensive enactivism: Why keep it all in? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 706. https://cepa.info/2392
Hutto D.
,
Kirchhoff M.
&
Myin E.
(
2014
)
Extensive enactivism: Why keep it all in?
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
8: 706.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2392
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Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive “mark of the cognitive” and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity. It also argues that giving proper attention to the way the folk use their psychological concepts requires questioning the legitimacy of commonsense functionalism. In place of extended functionalism – empirical or commonsensical – we promote the fortunes of extensive enactivism, clarifying in which ways it is distinct from notions of extended mind and distributed cognition.
Key words:
enactivism
,
functionalism
,
embodied cognition
,
mental representation
,
extended mind
Kiverstein J. & Miller M. (2015) The embodied brain: Towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9: 237. https://cepa.info/2281
Kiverstein J.
&
Miller M.
(
2015
)
The embodied brain: Towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
9: 237.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2281
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In this programmatic paper we explain why a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience is needed. We argue for such a claim based on problems that have arisen in cognitive neuroscience for the project of localizing function to specific brain structures. The problems come from research concerned with functional and structural connectivity that strongly suggests that the function a brain region serves is dynamic, and changes over time. We argue that in order to determine the function of a specific brain area, neuroscientists need to zoom out and look at the larger organism-environment system. We therefore argue that instead of looking to cognitive psychology for an analysis of psychological functions, cognitive neuroscience should look to an ecological dynamical psychology. A second aim of our paper is to develop an account of embodied cognition based on the inseparability of cognitive and emotional processing in the brain. We argue that emotions are best understood in terms of action readiness (Frijda, 1986, 2007) in the context of the organism’s ongoing skillful engagement with the environment (Rietveld, 2008; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015, forthcoming). States of action readiness involve the whole living body of the organism, and are elicited by possibilities for action in the environment that matter to the organism. Since emotion and cognition are inseparable processes in the brain it follows that what is true of emotion is also true of cognition. Cognitive processes are likewise processes taking place in the whole living body of an organism as it engages with relevant possibilities for action.
Key words:
Emotion cognition interactions
,
psychological constructionism
,
salience network
,
embodied cognition
,
affordances
,
dynamical systems theory
Moya P. (2014) Habit and embodiment in Merleau-Ponty. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 542. https://cepa.info/6921
Moya P.
(
2014
)
Habit and embodiment in Merleau-Ponty
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
8: 542.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6921
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Excerpt:
Merleau-Ponty (French phenomenological philosopher, born in 1908 and deceased in 1961) refers to habit in various passages of his Phenomenology of Perception as a relevant issue in his philosophical and phenomenological position. Through his exploration of this issue he explains both the pre-reflexive character that our original linkage with the world has, as well as the kind of “understanding” that our body develops with regard to the world. These two characteristics of human existence bear a close relation with the vision of an embodied mind sustained by Gallagher and Zahavi in their work The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Merleau-Ponty uses concepts like those of the lived or own body and of lived space in order to emphasize, from a first-person perspective, the co-penetration that exists between subject and world.
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C., O’Regan J. K. & Petitmengin C. (2013) Exploring the subjective experience of the “rubber hand” illusion. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7: 659. https://cepa.info/4444
Valenzuela-Moguillansky C.
,
O’Regan J. K.
&
Petitmengin C.
(
2013
)
Exploring the subjective experience of the “rubber hand” illusion
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
7: 659.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4444
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Despite the fact that the rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been widely used in the last 14 years to investigate different aspects of the sense of bodily self, very few studies have sought to investigate the subjective nature of the experience that the RHI evokes. The present study investigates the phenomenology of the RHI through a specific elicitation method. More particularly, this study aims at assessing whether the conditions usually used as control in the RHI have an impact in the sense of body ownership and at determining whether there are different stages in the emergence of the illusion. The results indicate that far from being “all or nothing,” the illusion induced by the RHI protocol involves nuances in the type of perceptual changes that it creates. These perceptual changes affect not only the participants” perception of the rubber hand but also the perception of their real hand. In addition, perceptual effects may vary greatly between participants and, importantly, they evolve over time.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00659
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