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Frontiers in Psychology
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By default, Find returns all publications that contain the words in the surnames of their author, in their titles, or in their years. For example,
Maturana
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Glasersfeld E. von (1974) Jean Piaget and the radical constructivist epistemology
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Berkovich-Ohana A., Dor-Ziderman Y., Trautwein F-M., Schweitzer Y., Nave O., Fulder S. & Ataria Y. (2020) The hitchhiker’s guide to neurophenomenology: the case of studying self boundaries with meditators. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 1680. https://cepa.info/6666
Berkovich-Ohana A.
,
Dor-Ziderman Y.
,
Trautwein F-M.
,
Schweitzer Y.
,
Nave O.
,
Fulder S.
&
Ataria Y.
(
2020
)
The hitchhiker’s guide to neurophenomenology: the case of studying self boundaries with meditators
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 1680.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6666
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This paper is a practical guide to neurophenomenology. Varela’s neurophenomenological research program (NRP) aspires to bridge the gap between, and integrate, first-person (1P) and third-person (3P) approaches to understanding the mind. It does so by suggesting a methodological framework allowing these two irreducible phenomenal domains to relate and reciprocally support the investigation of one another. While highly appealing theoretically, neurophenomenology invites researchers to a challenging methodological endeavor. Based on our experience with empirical neurophenomenological implementation, we offer practical clarifications and insights learnt along the way. In the first part of the paper, we outline the theoretical principles of the NRP and briefly present the field of 1P research. We speak to the importance of phenomenological training and outline the utility of cooperating with meditators as skilled participants. We suggest that 1P accounts of subjective experience can be placed on a complexity continuum ranging between thick and thin phenomenology, highlighting the tension and trade-off inherent to the neurophenomenological attempt to naturalize phenomenology. We then outline a typology of bridges, which create mutual constraints between 1P and 3P approaches, and argue for the utility of alternating between the bridges depending on the available experimental resources, domain of interest and level of sought articulation. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the theory can be put into practice by describing a decade of neurophenomenological studies investigating the sense of self with increasing focus on its embodied, and minimal, aspects. These aspects are accessed via the dissolution of the sense-of-boundaries, shedding new light on the multi-dimensionality and flexibility of embodied selfhood. We emphasize the evolving neurophenomenological dialogue, showing how consecutive studies, placed differently on the thin-to-thick 1P continuum, advance the research project by using the bridging principles appropriate for each stage.
Buhrmann T., Di Paolo E. & Barandiaran X. (2013) A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies. Frontiers in Psychology 4: 285. https://cepa.info/2386
Buhrmann T.
,
Di Paolo E.
&
Barandiaran X.
(
2013
)
A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies
.
Frontiers in Psychology
4: 285.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2386
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According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how, constituted by lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) in an active and situated agent. Despite the attention that this approach has attracted, there have been few attempts to define its core concepts formally. In this paper, we examine the idea of SMCs and argue that its use involves notions that need to be distinguished. We introduce four distinct kinds of SMCs, which we define operationally. These are the notions of sensorimotor environment (open-loop motor-induced sensory variations), sensorimotor habitat (closed-loop sensorimotor trajectories), sensorimotor coordination (reliable sensorimotor patterns playing a functional role), and sensorimotor strategy (normative organization of sensorimotor coordinations). We make use of a minimal dynamical model of visually guided categorization to test the explanatory value of the different kinds of SMCs. Finally, we discuss the impact of our definitions on the conceptual development and empirical as well as model-based testing of the claims of the sensorimotor approach.
Key words:
embodied cognition
,
sensorimotor contingencies
,
dynamical systems
,
sensorimotor approach to perception
,
minimal cognition
Ceruti M. & Damiano L. (2018) Plural embodiment(s) of mind: Genealogy and guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology 9: 2204. https://cepa.info/5611
Ceruti M.
&
Damiano L.
(
2018
)
Plural embodiment(s) of mind: Genealogy and guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness
.
Frontiers in Psychology
9: 2204.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5611
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This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as “experimental epistemology.” In line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster’s model of the biological computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela’s model of emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts “cybernetic of networks” a coherent methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered the biological orientation of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology, laying foundations for contemporary “radically embodied” approaches to mind and consciousness – in particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes – consciousness included.
Key words:
autonomy
,
autopoiesis
,
constructivism
,
cybernetics of networks
,
(radical) embodiment
,
enaction
,
experimental epistemology
,
synthetic modeling
Constant A., Clark A. & Friston K. J. (2021) Representation wars: Enacting an armistice through active inference. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 598733. CEPA | Google | Google S. https://cepa.info/7831
Constant A.
,
Clark A.
&
Friston K. J.
(
2021
)
Representation wars: Enacting an armistice through active inference
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 598733. CEPA | Google | Google S.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7831
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Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.
Key words:
philosophy of cognitive science
,
free energy principle
,
active inference
,
embodiment
,
representationalism
Corris A. (2020) Defining the environment in organism–environment systems. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 1285. https://cepa.info/7382
Corris A.
(
2020
)
Defining the environment in organism–environment systems
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 1285.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7382
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Enactivism and ecological psychology converge on the relevance of the environment in understanding perception and action. On both views, perceiving organisms are not merely passive receivers of environmental stimuli, but rather form a dynamic relationship with their environments in such a way that shapes how they interact with the world. In this paper, I suggest that while enactivism and ecological psychology enjoy a shared specification of the environment as the cognitive domain, on both accounts, the structure of the environment, itself, is unspecified beyond that of contingent relations with the species-typical sensorimotor capacities of perceiving organisms. This lack of specification creates a considerable gap in theory regarding the organization of organisms as coupled with their environments. I argue that this gap can be filled by drawing from resources in developmental systems theory, namely, specifying the environmental state-space as a developmental niche that shapes and is shaped by individual organisms over developmental and, on a population scale, evolutionary time. Defining the environment as an organism’s developmental niche makes it clearer how and why certain contingencies have arisen, in turn, strengthening a joint appeal to both enactivism and ecological psychology as theories asserting complementarity between organisms and their environments.
Key words:
enactivism
,
ecological psychology
,
developmental systems theory
,
developmental niche
,
naturalization of perception
Crippen M. (2020) Enactive pragmatism and ecological psychology. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 538644. https://cepa.info/7319
Crippen M.
(
2020
)
Enactive pragmatism and ecological psychology
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 538644.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7319
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A widely cited roadblock to bridging ecological psychology and enactivism is that the former identifies with realism and the latter identifies with constructivism, which critics charge is subjectivist. A pragmatic reading, however, suggests non-mental forms of constructivism that simultaneously fit core tenets of enactivism and ecological realism. After advancing a pragmatic version of enactive constructivism that does not obviate realism, I reinforce the position with an empirical illustration: Physarum polycephalum, a communal unicellular organism that leaves slime trails that form chemical barriers that it avoids in foraging explorations. Here, environmental building and sensorimotor engagement are part of the same process with P. polycephalum coordinating around self-created, affordance-bearing geographies, which nonetheless exist independently in ways described by ecological realists. For ecological psychologists, affordances are values, meaning values are external to the perceiver. I argue that agent-enacted values have the same status and thus do not obviate ecological realism or generate subjectivism. The constructivist-realist debate organizes around the emphasis that enactivists and ecological theorists respectively place on the inner constitution of organisms vs. the structure of environments. Building on alimentary themes introduced in the P. polycephalum example and also in Gibson’s work, I go on to consider how environment, brain, visceral systems, and even bacteria within them enter perceptual loops. This highlights almost unfathomable degrees of mutually modulating internal and external synchronization. It also shows instances in which internal conditions alter worldly configurations and invert values, in Gibson’s sense of the term, albeit without implying subjectivism. My aim is to cut across the somatic focus of enactive constructivism and the external environment-oriented emphasis of ecological realism and show that enactivism can enrich ecological accounts of value.
Key words:
affect and value
,
central and peripheral nervous system
,
ecological psychology
,
enactivism
,
gut microbiome
,
pragmatism and phenomenology
,
physarum polycephalum
,
realism vs. constructivism.
Cummins F. (2020) Zoom Out Camera! The Reflexive Character of an Enactive Account. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 919. https://cepa.info/6632
Cummins F.
(
2020
)
Zoom Out Camera! The Reflexive Character of an Enactive Account
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 919.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6632
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The reflexive character of enactive theory is spelled out, in an effort to make explicit that which is usually implicit in debate: that we are responsible for the distinctions we draw, and that ultimately, the world that we collectively characterize is a joint production. Enaction, as treated here, is not a positivist scientific field, but an epistemologically self-conscious way to ground our understanding of the value-saturated lives of embodied beings. This stance is seen as entirely congruent with the scientific field of ecological psychology, which is itself then cast as a specific example of the kind of science that can be done in an enactive mode.
Key words:
enaction
,
laws of form
,
ecological psychology
,
reflexivity
,
adaptivity
de Carvalho E. & Rolla G. (2020) An enactive-ecological approach to information and uncertainty. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 588. https://cepa.info/7320
de Carvalho E.
&
Rolla G.
(
2020
)
An enactive-ecological approach to information and uncertainty
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 588.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7320
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Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as a minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view by showing how direct learning, seen as an instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity.
Di Paolo E. A. (2020) Picturing organisms and their environments: Interaction, transaction, and constitution loops. Frontiers in Psychology 11: 1912. https://cepa.info/7383
Di Paolo E. A.
(
2020
)
Picturing organisms and their environments: Interaction, transaction, and constitution loops
.
Frontiers in Psychology
11: 1912.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7383
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Changing conceptions of the relation between organisms and their environments make up a crucial chapter in the history of psychology. This may be approached by a comparative study of how schematic diagrams portray this relation. Diagrams drive the communication and the teaching of ideas, the sedimentation of epistemic norms and methods of analysis, and in some cases the articulation of novel concepts through pictographic variants. Through a sampling of schematic representations, I offer a concise comparison of how different authors, with different interests and motivations, have portrayed important aspects of the organism–environment relation. I compare example diagrams according to the features they underscore (or omit) and group them into classes that emphasize interaction, transaction, and constitution loops.
Key words:
organism–environment relation
,
diagrams
,
schematic representation
,
interaction
,
transaction
,
constitution
,
enaction
,
ecological psychology
Edelman S. (2011) Regarding reality: Some consequences of two incapacities. Frontiers in Psychology 2: 44. https://cepa.info/4765
Edelman S.
(
2011
)
Regarding reality: Some consequences of two incapacities
.
Frontiers in Psychology
2: 44.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4765
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By what empirical means can a person determine whether he or she is presently awake or dreaming? Any conceivable test addressing this question, which is a special case of the classical metaphysical doubting of reality, must be statistical (for the same reason that empirical science is, as noted by Hume) Subjecting the experienced reality to any kind of statistical test (for instance, a test for bizarreness) requires, however, that a set of baseline measurements be available. In a dream, or in a simulation, any such baseline data would be vulnerable to tampering by the same processes that give rise to the experienced reality, making the outcome of a reality test impossible to trust. Moreover, standard cryptographic defenses against such tampering cannot be relied upon, because of the potentially unlimited reach of reality modification within a dream, which may range from the integrity of the verification keys to the declared outcome of the entire process. In the face of this double predicament, the rational course of action is to take reality at face value. The predicament also has some intriguing corollaries. In particular, even the most revealing insight that a person may gain into the ultimate nature of reality (for instance, by attaining enlightenment in the Buddhist sense) is ultimately unreliable, for the reasons just mentioned. At the same time, to adhere to this principle, one has to be aware of it, which may not be possible in various states of reduced or altered cognitive function such as dreaming or religious experience. Thus, a subjectively enlightened person may still lack the one truly important piece of the puzzle concerning his or her existence.
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