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Frontiers in Psychology
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fulltext:maturana'or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--'x'='x/
fulltext:maturana"or(1,2)=(selectfrom(selectname_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(char(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a)--"x"="x/
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fulltext:maturana22 or (1,2)=(selectfrom(select name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1),name_const(CHAR(111,108,111,108,111,115,104,101,114),1))a) -- 22x22=22x/
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Buhrmann T., Di Paolo E. & Barandiaran X. (2013) A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 4: 285. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2386
Buhrmann T.
,
Di Paolo E.
&
Barandiaran X.
(
2013
)
A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies.
Frontiers in Psychology
4: 285.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2386
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According to the sensorimotor approach, perception is a form of embodied know-how, constituted by lawful regularities in the sensorimotor flow or in sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs) in an active and situated agent. Despite the attention that this approach has attracted, there have been few attempts to define its core concepts formally. In this paper, we examine the idea of SMCs and argue that its use involves notions that need to be distinguished. We introduce four distinct kinds of SMCs, which we define operationally. These are the notions of sensorimotor environment (open-loop motor-induced sensory variations), sensorimotor habitat (closed-loop sensorimotor trajectories), sensorimotor coordination (reliable sensorimotor patterns playing a functional role), and sensorimotor strategy (normative organization of sensorimotor coordinations). We make use of a minimal dynamical model of visually guided categorization to test the explanatory value of the different kinds of SMCs. Finally, we discuss the impact of our definitions on the conceptual development and empirical as well as model-based testing of the claims of the sensorimotor approach.
Key words:
embodied cognition
,
sensorimotor contingencies
,
dynamical systems
,
sensorimotor approach to perception
,
minimal cognition
Ceruti M. & Damiano L. (2018) Plural embodiment(s) of mind: Genealogy and guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 9: 2204. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5611
Ceruti M.
&
Damiano L.
(
2018
)
Plural embodiment(s) of mind: Genealogy and guidelines for a radically embodied approach to mind and consciousness.
Frontiers in Psychology
9: 2204.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5611
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This article focuses on a scientific approach to the study of cognition that Warren McCulloch introduced in the era of cybernetics as “experimental epistemology.” In line with recent attempts to highlight its contribution to cognitive science and AI, our article intends to draw attention to its unexplored influence on contemporary embodied approaches to the investigation of mind and consciousness. To this end, we will survey a series of models of cognitive systems genealogically related to the McCulloch-Pitts networks-based modeling approach, i.e., von Foerster’s model of the biological computer, the Maturana-Varela model of the autopoietic system, and Varela’s model of emergent selves. Based on examination of the relevant aspects of these models, we will argue that they offered the McCulloch-Pitts “cybernetic of networks” a coherent methodological and theoretical line of development, complementary to the well-known computationalist one. As we will show, this alternative evolutionary line empowered the biological orientation of McCulloch’s experimental epistemology, laying foundations for contemporary “radically embodied” approaches to mind and consciousness – in particular the Thompson-Varela approach. We will identify the heritage of this tradition of inquiry for future research in cognitive science and AI by proposing guidelines that synthetize how its methodological and theoretical insights suggest taking into account the role(s) played by the biological body in cognitive processes – consciousness included.
Key words:
autonomy
,
autopoiesis
,
constructivism
,
cybernetics of networks
,
(radical) embodiment
,
enaction
,
experimental epistemology
,
synthetic modeling
Edelman S. (2011) Regarding reality: Some consequences of two incapacities. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 2: 44. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4765
Edelman S.
(
2011
)
Regarding reality: Some consequences of two incapacities.
Frontiers in Psychology
2: 44.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4765
Copy
By what empirical means can a person determine whether he or she is presently awake or dreaming? Any conceivable test addressing this question, which is a special case of the classical metaphysical doubting of reality, must be statistical (for the same reason that empirical science is, as noted by Hume) Subjecting the experienced reality to any kind of statistical test (for instance, a test for bizarreness) requires, however, that a set of baseline measurements be available. In a dream, or in a simulation, any such baseline data would be vulnerable to tampering by the same processes that give rise to the experienced reality, making the outcome of a reality test impossible to trust. Moreover, standard cryptographic defenses against such tampering cannot be relied upon, because of the potentially unlimited reach of reality modification within a dream, which may range from the integrity of the verification keys to the declared outcome of the entire process. In the face of this double predicament, the rational course of action is to take reality at face value. The predicament also has some intriguing corollaries. In particular, even the most revealing insight that a person may gain into the ultimate nature of reality (for instance, by attaining enlightenment in the Buddhist sense) is ultimately unreliable, for the reasons just mentioned. At the same time, to adhere to this principle, one has to be aware of it, which may not be possible in various states of reduced or altered cognitive function such as dreaming or religious experience. Thus, a subjectively enlightened person may still lack the one truly important piece of the puzzle concerning his or her existence.
Fox K. C. R., Thompson E., Andrews-Hanna J. R. & Christoff K. (2014) Is Thinking Really Aversive? A Commentary on Wilson et al.’s “Just Think: The Challenges of a Disengaged Mind”. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 5(01427): electronic. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2334
Fox K. C. R.
,
Thompson E.
,
Andrews-Hanna J. R.
&
Christoff K.
(
2014
)
Is Thinking Really Aversive? A Commentary on Wilson et al.’s “Just Think: The Challenges of a Disengaged Mind”.
Frontiers in Psychology
5(01427): electronic.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2334
Copy
Spontaneous thought, often colloquially referred to as “daydreaming” or “mind-wandering,” is increasingly being investigated by scientists (for recent reviews, see Christoff, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Smallwood and Schooler, 2014). In a recent article published in Science, Wilson et al. (2014) argue in support of the view (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) that such thinking is predominantly unpleasant, and even emotionally aversive. While we were impressed with the enormous wealth of data collected by Wilson et al. and by the number of experimental manipulations carried out, we found their interpretations surprising in light of prior research. We applaud Wilson et al.‘s detailed effort to investigate the content and affective qualities of “just thinking” – but upon examining their dataset, we find little support for their claims.
Kyselo M. (2014) The body social: An enactive approach to the self. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 5: 986. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2517
Kyselo M.
(
2014
)
The body social: An enactive approach to the self.
Frontiers in Psychology
5: 986.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2517
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This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.
Lowe R. & Ziemke T. (2011) The feeling of action tendencies: On the emotional regulation of goal-directed behavior. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 2(346). Fulltext at https://cepa.info/785
Lowe R.
&
Ziemke T.
(
2011
)
The feeling of action tendencies: On the emotional regulation of goal-directed behavior.
Frontiers in Psychology
2(346).
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/785
Copy
In this article, we review the nature of the functional and causal relationship between neurophysiologically/psychologically generated states of emotional feeling and action tendencies and extrapolate a novel perspective. Emotion theory, over the past century and beyond, has tended to regard feeling and action tendency as independent phenomena: attempts to outline the functional and causal relationship that exists between them have been framed therein. Classically, such relationships have been viewed as unidirectional, but an argument for bidirectionality rooted in a dynamic systems perspective has gained strength in recent years whereby the feeling–action tendency relationship is viewed as a composite whole. On the basis of our review of somatic–visceral theories of feelings, we argue that feelings are grounded upon neural-dynamic representations (elevated and stable activation patterns) of action tendency. Such representations amount to predictions updated by cognitive and bodily feedback. Specifically, we view emotional feelings as minimalist predictions of the action tendency (what the agent is physiologically and cognitively primed to do) in a given situation. The essence of this point is captured by our exposition of action tendency prediction–feedback loops which we consider, above all, in the context of emotion regulation, and in particular, of emotional regulation of goal-directed behavior. The perspective outlined may be of use to emotion theorists, computational modelers, and roboticists.
Relevance:
The paper presents an enactive/cybernetic/dynamical systems perspective on embodied emotion theory (James, Damasio, etc).
Marchetti G. (2014) Attention and working memory: Two basic mechanisms for constructing temporal experiences. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 5(00880). Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1192
Marchetti G.
(
2014
)
Attention and working memory: Two basic mechanisms for constructing temporal experiences.
Frontiers in Psychology
5(00880).
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1192
Copy
Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously relive past events – episodic memory – and conceive future events, entails an active process of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language and conscious thinking. This article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how it works. The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed.
Relevance:
The article (1) shows that various forms of consciousness (such as time travel, linguistic thought, dreams) are the result of an active process of construction, rather than faithful representations of a world independent from the observer; (2) puts forward an hypothesis about the most plausible mechanisms underpinning the process of construction; (3) shows how the combined working of these mechanisms generate some forms of consciousness
McGann M. (2014) Enacting a social ecology: Radically embodied intersubjectivity. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 5: 1321. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4695
McGann M.
(
2014
)
Enacting a social ecology: Radically embodied intersubjectivity.
Frontiers in Psychology
5: 1321.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4695
Copy
Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as “world-involving,” indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment is frequently left ill-described, however, and provides a challenge for such approaches, particularly, it is noted here, for the enactive approach which emphasizes this complementarity in quite radical terms. This paper argues that enactivists should work to find common cause with a dynamic form of ecological psychology, a theoretical perspective that provides the most explicit theory of the psychological environment currently extant. In doing so, the intersubjective, cultural nature of the ecology of human psychology is explored, with the challenges this poses for both enactivist and ecological approaches outlined. The theory of behavior settings (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989) is used to present a framework for resolving some of these challenges. Drawing these various strands together an outline of a radical embodied account of intersubjectivity and social activity is presented.
Miłkowski M., Clowes R. W., Rucińska Z., Przegalińska A., Zawidzki T., Gies A., Krueger J., McGann M., Afeltowicz Ł., Wachowski W. M. & Stjernberg F. (2018) From wide cognition to mechanisms: A silent revolution. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 9: 2393. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5617
Miłkowski M.
,
Clowes R. W.
,
Rucińska Z.
,
Przegalińska A.
,
Zawidzki T.
,
Gies A.
,
Krueger J.
,
McGann M.
,
Afeltowicz Ł.
,
Wachowski W. M.
&
Stjernberg F.
(
2018
)
From wide cognition to mechanisms: A silent revolution.
Frontiers in Psychology
9: 2393.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5617
Copy
In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. Wide perspectives are essentially research heuristics for building mechanistic explanations. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We argue that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals toward the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences.
Overgaard M. (2017) The status and future of consciousness research. Frontiers in Psychology\>Frontiers in Psychology 8: 1719. Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5824
Overgaard M.
(
2017
)
The status and future of consciousness research.
Frontiers in Psychology
8: 1719.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5824
Copy
Excerpt:
As it will be argued below, consciousness research may face problems in the future that are currently less debated but which are logical extensions of the challenges above. It is a natural ambition when developing a measure of consciousness to be able to determine whether non-reporting subjects or even machines are conscious and of what. And it is a natural ambition when finding neural correlates of consciousness to understand how these correlates relate to a deeper metaphysical understanding of the relation between subjective experience and the physical substrate of the brain.
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