Mojica L. (2021) The enactive naturalization of normativity: From self-maintenance to situated interactions. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43(4): 1–27. https://cepa.info/8117
Mojica L.
(
2021)
The enactive naturalization of normativity: From self-maintenance to situated interactions.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43(4): 1–27.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8117
The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent’s sensorimotor identity establishes the cognitive norms that regulate its behavior, and the self-maintenance of its social identity determines the social norms. However, there is no clear explanation of how individuals, who by their very constitution are primarily moved to interact with the world under the norm of self-maintenance, could interact with the world driven by non-individual norms. Furthermore, understanding all normativity as self-maintenance makes it unclear how agents establish genuine social interactions and acquire habits that have no implication for their constitution as individuals. So, to face these challenges, I propose an alternative notion of normativity grounded on a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic conception of meaning that distinguishes between an agent with a normative point of view and external normative criteria. I defend that a normative phenomenon is an interaction that is established by an individual point of view as defined by autopoietic enactivism and that is part of a self-maintaining system. The latter establishes the external normative criteria to evaluate the interaction, and it may or may not coincide with the identity of the interacting agent. Separating external normative criteria from the self-constitution of the interactant agent not only solves the challenge but potentially explains the situated and relational character of agency.
Mossio M. & Moreno A. (2010) Organisational closure in biological organisms. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32(2/3): 269–288. https://cepa.info/5238
Mossio M. & Moreno A.
(
2010)
Organisational closure in biological organisms.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32(2/3): 269–288.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5238
The central aim of this paper consists in arguing that biological organisms realize a specific kind of causal regime that we call “organisational closure”; i.e., a distinct level of causation, operating in addition to physical laws, generated by the action of material structures acting as constraints. We argue that organisational closure constitutes a fundamental property of biological systems since even its minimal instances are likely to possess at least some of the typical features of biological organisation as exhibited by more complex organisms. Yet, while being a necessary condition for biological organization, organisational closure underdetermines, as such, the whole set of requirements that a system has to satisfy in order to be taken as a paradigmatic example of organism. As we suggest, additional properties, as modular templates and control mechanisms via dynamical decoupling between constraints, are required to get the complexity typical of full-fledged biological organisms.
Mossio M. & Moreno A. (2010) Organizational closure in biological organisms. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32(2): 269–288.
Mossio M. & Moreno A.
(
2010)
Organizational closure in biological organisms.
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 32(2): 269–288.