I would like to examine in this essay a particular problem confronted by theories of perception that operate within the framework of naturalistic representational approaches to the mental. This problem concerns the capacity of such theories to account for a characteristic that Husserl considered the hallmark of perception, namely what he called the Leibhaftigkeit of the object in perception, that is, the fact that the object in perception appears as given in person or, to put it otherwise, as bodily present. Perceptual intentionality is presently the focus of a great deal of attention in the analytic philosophy of mind and more generally in cognitive science. Why this is so has a direct bearing on what is at stake with the problem of the Leibhaftigkeit of perception. Indeed, the Leibhaftigkeit of the object in perception can be thought to constitute a difficulty for a representational approach to perception. This difficulty may not be insuperable, provided one relinquishes a narrow, static, and punctual conception of representation in favor of a more dynamic approach to perception and perceptual representation. In fact, it may be that the analyses Husserl offers in Ding und Raum provide us with valuable indications of which representational capacities are needed in order to account for the Leibhaftigkeit of perception.

The purpose of this introductory essay is to make explicit the general intellectual project behind the book Naturalizing Phenomenology. It should be clear that it expresses the opinion of the editors; none of the contributors has been invited to discuss or modify it. In fact this essay does not even fully reflect the opinions of the editors, because it gives no room to the differences existing in their concerns and philosophical orientations. A more adequate statement of their respective positions is to be found in their individual contributions.

Excerpt: To which of these approaches – phenomenology or cognitive science – should we turn for an understanding of time consciousness? They are sometimes regarded as direct competitors. Philosophical arguments have been adduced to demonstrate that genuine knowledge of consciousness can only be achieved by one method or the other. The position taken here, however, is that these conclusions are unwarranted; phenomenology and cognitive science should be regarded not only as compatible, but as mutually constraining and enriching approaches to the study of mind. This paper attempts a kind of “proof by example” of this position. It will demonstrate how both phenomenology and cognitive science can shed light on the phenomenon of time consciousness, and how their respective contributions can inform each other. The claim will be that only phenomenology and cognitive science in conjunction can adequately resolve the paradox of time consciousness described above.

My purpose in this essay is to propose an explicitly naturalized account of the experience of present nowness based on two complementary approaches: phenomenological analysis and cognitive neuroscience. What I mean by naturalization, and the role cognitive neuroscience plays, will become clear as this essay unfolds.