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“Philosophy of Science”
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Abraham T. H. (2012) Transcending disciplines: Scientific styles in studies of the brain in mid-twentieth century America. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43(2): 552–568. https://cepa.info/3935
Abraham T. H.
(
2012
)
Transcending disciplines: Scientific styles in studies of the brain in mid-twentieth century America
.
Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science
Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
43(2): 552–568.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3935
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Much scholarship in the history of cybernetics has focused on the far-reaching cultural dimensions of the movement. What has garnered less attention are efforts by cyberneticians such as Warren McCulloch and Norbert Wiener to transform scientific practice in an array of disciplines in the biomedical sciences, and the complex ways these efforts were received by members of traditional disciplines. In a quest for scientific unity that had a decidedly imperialistic flavour, cyberneticians sought to apply practices common in the exact sciences – mainly theoretical modeling – to problems in disciplines that were traditionally defined by highly empirical practices, such as neurophysiology and neuroanatomy. Their efforts were met with mixed, often critical responses. This paper attempts to make sense of such dynamics by exploring the notion of a scientific style and its usefulness in accounting for the contrasts in scientific practice in brain research and in cybernetics during the 1940s. Focusing on two key institutional contexts of brain research and the role of the Rockefeller and Macy Foundations in directing brain research and cybernetics, the paper argues that the conflicts between these fields were not simply about experiment vs. theory but turned more closely on the questions that defined each area and the language used to elaborate answers.
Key words:
Cybernetics
,
Macy foundation
,
Neurophysiology
,
Rockefeller Foundation
,
Theoretical modeling
,
Warren S. McCulloch
Bertalanffy L. (1950) An outline of general systems theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1(2): 134–165.
Bertalanffy L.
(
1950
)
An outline of general systems theory
.
British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science
1(2): 134–165.
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A survey of the history of science shows that very similar conceptions have been developed independently in various branches of science. At present, for example, holistic interpretations are prevalent in all fields whereas in the past atomistic explanations were common. Such considerations lead to the postulation of General System Theory which is a logico-mathematical discipline applicable to all sciences concerned with systems. The fact that certain principles have general applicability to systems explains the occurrence of isomorphic laws in different scientific fields. Just as Aristotelian logic was a fundamental organon for the classificatory sciences of antiquity, so may General System Theory define the general principles of dynamic interaction which appears as the central problem of modern science.
Bich L. & Bechtel W. (2022) Organization needs organization: Understanding integrated control in living organisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 93: 96–106. https://cepa.info/8036
Bich L.
&
Bechtel W.
(
2022
)
Organization needs organization: Understanding integrated control in living organisms
.
Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science
93: 96–106.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8036
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Organization figures centrally in the understanding of biological systems advanced by both new mechanists and proponents of the autonomy framework. The new mechanists focus on how components of mechanisms are organized to produce a phenomenon and emphasize productive continuity between these components. The autonomy framework focuses on how the components of a biological system are organized in such a way that they contribute to the maintenance of the organisms that produce them. In this paper we analyze and compare these two accounts of organization and argue that understanding biological organisms as cohesively integrated systems benefits from insights from both. To bring together the two accounts, we focus on the notions of control and regulation as bridge concepts. We start from a characterization of biological mechanisms in terms of constraints and focus on a specific type of mechanism, control mechanisms, that operate on other mechanisms on the basis of measurements of variables in the system and its environment. Control mechanisms are characterized by their own set of constraints that enable them to sense conditions, convey signals, and effect changes on constraints in the controlled mechanism. They thereby allow living organisms to adapt to internal and external variations and to coordinate their parts in such a manner as to maintain viability. Because living organisms contain a vast number of control mechanisms, a central challenge is to understand how they are themselves organized. With the support of examples from both unicellular and multicellular systems we argue that control mechanisms are organized heterarchically, and we discuss how this type of control architecture can, without invoking top-down and centralized forms of organizations, succeed in coordinating internal activities of organisms.
Key words:
mechanismautonomycontrolheterarchyconstraintintegration
Bich L. & Mossio M. (2011) On the role of constraints in the emergence of biological organization. Logic and Philosophy of Science 9(1): 381–388.
Bich L.
&
Mossio M.
(
2011
)
On the role of constraints in the emergence of biological organization
.
Logic and
Philosophy of Science
9(1): 381–388.
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In this paper we provide some theoretical guidelines for the characterization of the specificity of biological systems in terms of organization and constraints. In the first place we advocate the view according to which a sound account of biological organization requires an appeal to emergent causation, and we propose a theoreti-cal justification of emergence against existing criticisms by consid-ering it as a causal power stemming from the relational properties of material configurations. Then, by interpreting constraints as a spe-cific form of this emergent causal power, we propose a distinction between the roles played by constraints in physical and biological systems. As a result we provide a possible definition of biological organization as a closed network of co-dependent and internally produced constraints.
Boden M. A. (1999) Is metabolism necessary? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50(2): 231–248.
Boden M. A.
(
1999
)
Is metabolism necessary?
.
The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science
50(2): 231–248.
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Metabolism is a criterion of life. Three senses are distinguished. The weakest allows strong A-Life: virtual creatures having physical existence in computer electronics, but not bodies, are classes as ‘alive’. The second excludes strong A-Life but allows that some non-biochemical A-Life robots could be classed as alive. The third, which stresses the body’s self-production by energy budgeting and self-equilibrating energy exchanges of some (necessary) complexity, excludes both strong A-Life and living non-biochemical robots.
Bohr N. (1937) Causality and complementarity. Philosophy of Science 4(3): 289–298. https://cepa.info/6244
Bohr N.
(
1937
)
Causality and complementarity
.
Philosophy of Science
4(3): 289–298.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6244
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Excerpt:
In several occasions I have pointed out that the lesson taught us by recent developments in physics regarding the necessity of a constant extension of the frame of concepts appropriate for the classification of new experiences leads us to a general epis-temological attitude which might help us to avoid apparent conceptual difficulties in other fields of science as well. Since, however, the opinion has been expressed from various sides that this attitude would appear to involve a mysticism incompatible with the true spirit of science, I am very glad to use the present opportunity of addressing this assembly of scientists working in quite different fields but united in their striving to find a common ground for our knowledge, to come back to this question, and above all to try to clear up the misunderstandings which have arisen.
Desautels J. & Larochelle M. (1990) A constructivist pedagogical strategy: The epistemological disturbance (experiment and preliminary results). In: Herget D. E. (ed.) More history and philosophy of science in science teaching. Florida State University, Tallahassee FL: 236–257.
Desautels J.
&
Larochelle M.
(
1990
)
A constructivist pedagogical strategy: The epistemological disturbance (experiment and preliminary results)
.
In: Herget D. E. (ed.)
More history and
philosophy of science
in science teaching
. Florida State University, Tallahassee FL: 236–257.
Copy Citation
Facoetti M. (2021) United in diversity: An organic overview of non-adaptationist evolutionary epistemology. Journal for General Philosophy of Science: 52(2): 211–225. https://cepa.info/6448
Facoetti M.
(
2021
)
United in diversity: An organic overview of non-adaptationist evolutionary epistemology
.
Journal for General
Philosophy of Science
:
52(2): 211–225.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6448
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The non-adaptationist approach to evolutionary epistemology (EE) was born at the end of the 1970s as an alternative to traditional adaptationist EE. Despite the fact that non-adaptationist EE offers compelling interpretative models and its explanatory power is widely recognised, an organic overview of the broad non-adaptationist field is still lacking. In this paper, I propose to fill this gap. To this effect, after providing a systematisation of the perspectives that are commonly associated with non-adaptationist EE, I will discuss two recurring orders of arguments that non-adaptationist scholars, often independently of one another, put forward against their adaptationist rivals. By offering a way to conceive non-adaptationist evolutionary epistemological approaches as part of a structured whole, the resulting systematic account is meant to provide a reading grid, a compass for orienting oneself in the uneven territories of non-adaptationist EE. Moreover, the consequent identification of two recurring argumentative bodies is intended to add to the explanatory power of non-adaptationist EE, which in finding new strength in numbers eventually acquires a greater critical efficacy against its adaptationist counterpart.
Key words:
evolutionary epistemology
,
non-adaptationism
,
adaptationism
,
overview
,
world-in-itself
,
epistemic circularity.
Feyerabend P. K. (1970) Against method: Outline of an anarchist theory of knowledge. In: Radner M. & Winolur S. (eds.) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, Vol. IV. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: 17–130.
Feyerabend P. K.
(
1970
)
Against method: Outline of an anarchist theory of knowledge
.
In: Radner M. & Winolur S. (eds.)
Minnesota studies in the
philosophy of science
, Vol. IV
. University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: 17–130.
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Garzón F. C. (2008) Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59(3): 259–292. https://cepa.info/5823
Garzón F. C.
(
2008
)
Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism
.
The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science
59(3): 259–292.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5823
Copy Citation
This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation – the dynamic field approach (Spencer and Scho ̈ner [2003]) – according to which the alleged representational gap between DST and representational theories of cognition needs to be bridged in order to explain higher-order cognitive activity will then be reviewed. In Section 3 I shall argue that Spencer and Scho ̈ ner’s attempt to bridge the representational gap may jeopardize the whole (antirepresentationalist) spirit of the DST project. In order to show why, I shall introduce the key concepts of ‘‘reliability of environment’’ and ‘‘primagenesis’’, and argue that DST can account for de-coupled, offline cognitive activity with no need of positing representational resources. Conclusions and directions for future research will follow.
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