Current phenomenological approaches consider schizophrenia as a fundamental disturbance of the embodied self, or a disembodiment. This includes (1) a weakening of the basic sense of self, (2) a disruption of implicit bodily functioning, and (3) a disconnection from the intercorporeality with others. As a result of this disembodiment, the pre-reflective, practical immersion of the self in the shared world is lost. Instead, the relationship of self and world is in constant need of being reconstructed by deliberate efforts, leading to the growing perplexity and hyperreflexive ruminations that are found in schizophrenia patients. The paper distinguishes different levels of self-experience and relates them to the psychopathology of schizophrenia, taking particularly into account disturbances of self-awareness, perception, action, and intersubjectivity. On this basis, psychotherapeutic approaches based on body awareness and movement techniques are outlined that are suited to foster self-management and enable patients to re-establish a more stable and coherent sense of self.

I argue that theory theory approaches to autism offer a wholly inadequate explanation of autistic symptoms because they offer a wholly inadequate account of the non-autistic understanding of others. As an alternative I outline interaction theory, which incorporates evidence from both developmental and phenomenological studies to show that humans are endowed with important capacities for intersubjective understanding from birth or early infancy. As part of a neurophenomenological analysis of autism, interaction theory offers an account of interpersonal problems that is fully consistent with the variety of social and nonsocial symptoms found in autism.

Within the philosophy of psychiatry and the study of psychopathology more broadly, there is rapidly growing interest in embodied, embedded, and enactive approaches to mental disorder. Two recent approaches have attempted to provide overarching frameworks, considering the conceptual nature of mental disorder itself from an embodied, embedded, and enactive view. These are de Haan’s ‘Enactive Psychiatry,’ and Nielsen’s ‘Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology,’ These two frameworks were developed essentially in parallel. This article compares the two frameworks, exploring their similarities as well as three key differences. Some relative strengths and weaknesses are explored. It is argued the two frameworks are largely compatible, do different work to one another, and are best understood as complimentary. Related to the differences explored, three recommendations are made for the continued development of an embodied, embedded, and enactive conceptualization of mental disorder.

We propose that typical schizophrenic delusions develop on the background of preexisting anomalies of self-experience. We argue that disorders of the Self represent the experiential core clinical phenomena of schizophrenia, as was already suggested by the founders of the concept of schizophrenia and elaborated in the phenomenological psychiatric tradition. The article provides detailed descriptions of the pre-psychotic or schizotypal anomalies of self-experience, often illustrated through clinical vignettes. We argue that delusional transformation in the evolution of schizophrenic psychosis reflects a global reorganization of consciousness and existential reorientation, both of which radiate from a fundamental alteration of the Self. We critically address the contemporary cognitive approaches to delusion formation, often finding them inconsistent with the clinical features of schizophrenia or implausible from a phenomenological point of view.

Key words: self-awareness, subjective experience, preschizophrenic prodrome, phenomenology, psychosis, cognitivism.