In my article, I propose to discuss constructivism and realism in terms of actions instead of doing that in a usual way, in terms of theories, philosophers or general positions. To enable this, I offer two conceptual tools. First, I use modified model of four types of knowledge introduced by Andrzej Zybertowicz. It approaches any knowledge-building process as a cultural game, and recognizes reproduction, discovery, redefinition, and design of a new game. Second, I use Stanislaw Lem’s model of three types of geniuses. I illustrate my approach briefly using examples from Plato, Spinoza and Berkeley.

Key words: Constructivism, realism, cultural theory, actions, knowledge.

In the reception of Josef Mitterer’s writings up to now, there are two predominant types of motifs: the radical constructivist background of his philosophy and the ontological and epistemological foundations and consequences of non-dualism. The critics are focused rather on some problematic consequences of non-dualism, ranging from the problem of infinite regress up to the thesis assuming that Mitterer’s philosophy presupposes a world reduced to descriptions. However, these two types of readings are founded on dualizing assumptions which are not coherent with non-dualism. \\Thus, in the present paper I interpret non-dualism in the frame of non-dual-ism, based on non-dualizing assumptions. I argue that non-dualism is a rhetorical project resulting in far-reaching consequences in the field of academic and scientific debates, poetics and practice of negotiations and deliberations, as well as in ordinary discourse. Non-dualism fulfills Richard Rorty’s dream of culture as a never-ending conversation in which the argument of power is successfully replaced by the power of argument. Mitterer makes transparent the rhetorical techniques performed in the dualizing discourse (not only in situations of conflict) in order to present an alternative – the non-dualizing mode of discourse. Mitterer’s philosophy – reread in the context of Rorty’s pragmatism, Foucault’s conception of discourses, Perelman’s new rhetoric – offers the new vocabulary (in Rorty’s meaning) which may change the practice of speaking

Key words: non-dualizing mode of speaking, description “so far” / “from now on, ” constructivism, rhetoric, discourse.

Taking the hypothesis of the Anthropocene as a starting point, the paper challenges traditional epistemologies and indicates fundamental changes within scientific concepts. Initially suggested in 2000, the hypothesis that we have entered the new geological era of the Anthropocene has started an intense debate on its plausibility and on the evidence the era could be based on. The hypothesis of the Anthropocene implies a concept fundamentally different from many precursors: It is assumed that humans and their societies no longer have a symbiotic relationship with nature but rather modify and transform natural processes to such an extent that humans have to be acknowledged as a natural force. Taking the assumptions of the Anthropocene seriously, a fundamental revision of almost every concept of the relation of societies, humans and nature would be required, as well as of our concepts of ourselves as humans and our responsibilities as scientists. The paper focuses on the question of epistemology and argues that epistemologies rooted in dualistic thinking are not suitable in the Anthropocene.

Key words: anthropocene, epistemology, non-dualism, niklas luhmann, karen barad

According to constructivism, the world we can know is a construction and it is not possible to gain knowledge about the world as it is in itself. This thesis of constructivism has been criticized as being self-refuting. It is discussed whether this criticism is sound. Constructivists have tried three ways in order to avoid self-refutation. It is argued that the first two ways are unconvincing. The third solution is tenable. However, at a closer look the third solution turns out as a moderate kind of realism since it gives up the central claim of constructivism.

Key words: Anti-realism, fallibilism, radical constructivism, self refutation, social/cultural constructivism

Strategic communication plays are in ‘between’ and their messages have a paradox character. The paper identifies these paradoxes using the example of truth. On the one hand, a basic doubt in the possibilities of recognizing and in absolute concepts such as truth is a condition for entering a strategic communication play. On the other hand, truth is implicitly or explicitly alleged in these situations. And, finally, strategic communication plays can – despite the ‘great doubt’ – have in medium term at least such an effect that descriptions are recognized as truth. The paper describes the epistemological questions from a non-dualistic perspective (Mitterer 1992, 2001). Thereto, the concept of the strategic communication play is developed with the help of the play term used by Bateson (1956, 1985) and of the frame analysis (Goffman 1980).

Key words: play, non-dualism, strategic communication

In this paper I argue that Josef Mitterer’s non-dualizing mode of discourse and Richard Rorty’s ironist philosophy should team up. After an introduction (1), my starting point is the portrayal of anti-representationalism which is of central importance in Rorty’s philosophical project (2). Then I argue that the nondualizing mode of discourse is the best available way to cash out anti-representationalism (3). To close this paper I will describe a type of philosopher who will most likely be sympathetic towards such a non-dualizing project (4). Here I will make use of Rorty’s ideas in calling this figure the edifying ironist. My claim is that edifying ironists should consider adopting the non-dualizing way of speaking and that non-dualists should consider becoming edifying ironists.

Key words: Non-dualism, richard rorty, josef mitterer, edifying philosophy, irony.

This paper unpacks variables embedded in the following definition of relativism: “Relativism is the view that values such as truth, goodness, or beauty are relative to a reference frame, and no absolute overarching standards to adjudicate between reference frames exist.” When unpacked and combined in various ways, the embedded variables give rise to a myriad of relativisms. In turn, strands of absolutism may be realist, universalist, or foundationalist. While I remain neutral about the plausibility of these strands of absolutism, I find that when absolutism is disambiguated according to them, the self-referential argument against relativism is shown to be invalid.

Key words: relativism, absolutism, self-refutation argument.

This paper tries to make plausible the following claims: The paragraphs §608–612 of On Certainty do not speak in favour of what Boghossian construes as the Master Argument for Relativism; that On Certainty introduces various relativistic themes; and that Boghossian and Wittgenstein conceptualize epistemic systems in rather different ways that lead to very different views on three candidate cases for radical difference in epistemic systems.

Key words: wittgenstein, relativism, paul boghossian, on certainty.