Much scholarship in the history of cybernetics has focused on the far-reaching cultural dimensions of the movement. What has garnered less attention are efforts by cyberneticians such as Warren McCulloch and Norbert Wiener to transform scientific practice in an array of disciplines in the biomedical sciences, and the complex ways these efforts were received by members of traditional disciplines. In a quest for scientific unity that had a decidedly imperialistic flavour, cyberneticians sought to apply practices common in the exact sciences – mainly theoretical modeling – to problems in disciplines that were traditionally defined by highly empirical practices, such as neurophysiology and neuroanatomy. Their efforts were met with mixed, often critical responses. This paper attempts to make sense of such dynamics by exploring the notion of a scientific style and its usefulness in accounting for the contrasts in scientific practice in brain research and in cybernetics during the 1940s. Focusing on two key institutional contexts of brain research and the role of the Rockefeller and Macy Foundations in directing brain research and cybernetics, the paper argues that the conflicts between these fields were not simply about experiment vs. theory but turned more closely on the questions that defined each area and the language used to elaborate answers.

Key words: Cybernetics, Macy foundation, Neurophysiology, Rockefeller Foundation, Theoretical modeling, Warren S. McCulloch

In this paper we examine an enactive approach to social cog- nition, a species of radical embodied cognition typically pro- posed as an alternative to traditional cognitive science. Ac- cording to enactivists, social cognition is best explained by reference to the social unit rather than the individuals that par- ticipate in it. We identify a methodological problem in this approach, namely a lack of clarity with respect to the model of explanation it adopts. We review two complaints about a mechanistic explanatory framework, popular in traditional cognitive science, that prevent enactivists from embracing it. We argue that these complaints are unfounded and propose a conceptual model of enactive mechanistic explanation of so- cial cognition.

Key words: enactivism, social cognition, mechanistic expla- nation

In this paper two swarm intelligence algorithms are used, the first leading the “attention” of the swarm and the latter responsible for the tracing mechanism. The attention mechanism is coordinated by agents of Stochastic Diffusion Search where they selectively attend to areas of a digital canvas (with line drawings) which contains (sharper) corners. Once the swarm’s attention is drawn to the line of interest with a sharp corner, the corresponding line segment is fed into the tracing algorithm, Dispersive Flies Optimisation which “consumes” the input in order to generate a “swarmic sketch” of the input line. The sketching process is the result of the “flies” leaving traces of their movements on the digital canvas which are then revisited repeatedly in an attempt to re-sketch the traces they left. This cyclic process is then introduced in the context of autopoiesis, where the philosophical aspects of the autopoietic artist are discussed. The autopoetic artist is described in two modalities: gluttonous and contented. In the Gluttonous Autopoietic Artist mode, by iteratively focussing on areas-of-rich-complexity, as the decoding process of the input sketch unfolds, it leads to a less complex structure which ultimately results in an empty canvas; therein reifying the artwork’s “death”. In the Contented Autopoietic Artist mode, by refocussing the autopoietic artist’s reflections on “meaning” onto different constitutive elements, and modifying her reconstitution, different behaviours of autopoietic creativity can be induced and therefore, the autopoietic processes become less likely to fade away and more open-ended in their creative endeavour.

Key words: creativity, autopoiesis, stochastic diffusion search, dispersive flies optimisation, generative art.

This paper is a report of a study conducted with preservice elementary teachers at the University of Wyoming during the summer of 1993. The study had two purposes: (1) to observe the effectiveness of using a constructivist approach in teaching mathematics to preservice elementary teachers, and (2) to focus on teaching probability using a constructivist approach. The study was conducted by one instructor in one class, The Theory of Arithmetic II, a required mathematics class for preservice elementary teachers.

Key words: educational methods, teacher education, concept formation, constructivist teaching, preservice teacher education, problem solving, classroom techniques, mathematical concepts, teacher education programs

To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how the boundary between the different areas of the brain, the brain and body, and the body and environment is not only blurred but indeterminate. In turn, we propose that cognition is supported by a nested structure of task‐specific synergies, which are softly assembled from a variety of neural, bodily, and environmental components (including other individuals), and exhibit interaction dominant dynamics.

Key words: embodied cognition, dynamic systems, social coordination, modularity, faculty psychology

Excerpt: Recent experimental work on imitation in infancy has challenged Piaget’s theory and timetable. Two aspects of Piaget’s work have been criticized: his contention that imitation of invisible gestures (i.e., gestures the imitator cannot see when he or she performs them) could not occur until the third quarter of the first year, and his contention that deferred imitation of novel sequences of actions could not occur until the beginning of the second year. The critics have marshalled empirical research that they interpret as showing invisible imitation in the neonatal period and deferred imitation at 6–9 months. This chapter argues that in both areas the empirical criticism of Piaget is not well founded. It removes a source of support for theories that attribute mental representation to young infants. In turn, it provides support for Piagetian theories that see mental representation as evolving gradually in the course of the first year. The chapter starts with a brief summary of Piaget’s theory to provide a context for his work on imitation. This summary is followed by an examination of the work on invisible imitation and deferred imitation.

Constructivist ideas have had a major influence on science educators over the last decade. In this report a model describing possible student responses during science lessons is outlined, and a rationale for it is provided on the basis of both constructivist theory and tests of the model in middle school science classes. The study therefore explores a way to analyze and describe learning derived from both constructivist theoretical considerations and classroom practice. The model was tested in a series of science lessons, resulting in several revisions. The final version explained in this report is therefore consistent with the science lesson contexts explored and the theoretical constructs which underlie it. The lessons were conducted in three classes of 11- to 13-year-olds in provincial cities in Queensland, Australia. Students were mostly of Caucasian extraction, in mixed-ability and mixed-gender classes. Three students from each class were interviewed individually immediately following each of the three lessons, for a total of 27 interviews. The interviews, videotapes of lessons, and field notes were used as data sources. The final version of the model proved to be fairly robust in describing students’ cognitive progress through the lessons. This study has resulted in a model for science lessons which allows the identification and description of students’ cognitive progress through the lessons. By using this focus on the learner, it provides preknowledge for teachers about how students might arrive at solutions to science problems during lessons, and therefore potentially provides indications about appropriate teaching strategies.

For some years, there have been in‐service efforts to help teachers become familiar with constructivist ideas about learning, and to apply them in their science teaching. This study is a vignette of one teacher’s science teaching some time after such an in‐service activity. It explores the ways in which the teacher implemented his perceptions of constructivist ideas about learning in his teaching of a topic. The extent to which the teacher used teaching principles based on constructivism was influenced by his views of science and of learning, how he usually planned his teaching, and his confidence in his own understanding of the topic. Features of the teaching which reflect a constructivist view of learning are discussed and some problems are identified. We conclude with some reflections about in‐service programs within a constructivist framework.

This chapter situates the conception of language (and communication) in enaction in the context of the research program of the cognitive sciences. It focuses on the formulation of the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts and the vision of language according to the metaphor of structural coupling. The exclusion of expressive speech acts in this design is problematized. An examination is offered of the critical steps to the theory of language as a reflection and the linguistic correspondence of cognitivism. We examine the foundations of the proposal in the line of language and social enaction as emergent phenomena which are not reducible to autopoiesis but which constitute a new neurophenomenological position in the pragmatic language dimension. A proposal is made for the integration of hermeneutic phenomenology with genetic and generative phenomenology in social semiotics. The inclusion of expressive speech acts based on the functions of language in the Habermas–Bühler line is also addressed. An opening is proposed of enaction to the expressive dimension of language and meaning holism with the referential use of language.

Key words: enaction, neurophenomenology, performative speech acts, expressive speech acts, background, meaning holism.

Neuroscience techniques provide an open window previously unavailable to the origin of thoughts and actions in children. Developmental cognitive neuroscience is booming, and knowledge from human brain mapping is finding its way into education and pediatric practice. Promises of application in developmental cognitive neuroscience rests however on better theory-guided data interpretation. Massive amounts of neuroimaging data from children are being processed, yet published studies often do not frame their work within developmental models – in detriment, we believe, to progress in this field. Here we describe some core challenges in interpreting the data from developmental cognitive neuroscience, and advocate the use of constructivist developmental theories of human cognition with a neuroscience interpretation.