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“Special Issue ���The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science��� edited by Alexander Riegler: Foundations of Science”
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fulltext:"artificial"
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fulltext:22artificial intelligence22 author:maturana
fulltext:"artificial intelligence" author:maturana
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de Zeeuw G. (2001) Constructivism: A “next” area of scientific development? Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 77–98. https://cepa.info/2745
de Zeeuw G.
(
2001
)
Constructivism: A “next” area of scientific development?
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 77–98.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2745
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Radical Constructivism has been defined as an‘unconventional approach to the problem ofknowledge and knowing’. Its unconventionalityis summarised by its claim that it isimpossible to attribute unique meaning toexperience – as no mind-independent yardstick canbe assumed to exist against which to identifyuniqueness, and hence to produce knowledge andknowing. In other words, it is claimed thatthere is no ‘reality’ that is knowable to allindividual knowers. This claim appearsindefensible by itself, as it does not explainwhy the successes of traditional science appearas such. However, it is defensible in thecontext of numerous failures to achieve uniqueattributions, or of the history of science. Even so, what is missing are concrete methodsand research designs. This often leaves RadicalConstructivism to be critical only, toconcentrate on justifying the impossibility ofsuccess without contributing itself. Where this is the case it reduces scientiststo individuals considered unable to communicatewith others on public (and unique)attributions-who may do so only by borrowingmethods from previous approaches. It is arguedthat a more valuable contribution is possibleif Radical Constructivism is seen as a responseto the challenge defined by frequent failuresof traditional approaches. The latter may beextended such that the extensions converge toRadical Constructivism. Such extensions arebased on reported observations, rather than onexperiences in general, and are to beattributed meanings – uniquely as well asnon-uniquely – by way of a collective. The lattershould allow its ‘actors’ to restrict whatmaintains the collective to what is observableto others, as well as use the collective torestrict their own observations. The study ofcollectives thus allows for the study ofrestrictions or values, and hence for includingsubjective or constructivist experiences beyond(reportable) observations.
Key words:
‘attached’ and ‘detached’ observation complete collective high quality experience high quality observation knowledge knowing language research design
Glanville R. (2001) An observing science. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 45–75. https://cepa.info/3636
Glanville R.
(
2001
)
An observing science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 45–75.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3636
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In this paper I make the arguments that I see supporting a view of how we can come to know the world we live in. I start from a position in second order cybernetics which turns out to be a Radical Constructivist position. This position is essentially epistemological, and much of this paper is concerned with the act of knowing, crucial when we try to develop an understanding of what we mean when we discuss a field of knowing (knowledge), which is at the root of science. The argument follows a path in which I discuss the essential role of the observer in observing, the creation of constancies between different observings and their exteriorisation as objects which are then represented and used in communication with and between other observers, each unique (and therefore each observing in its own way). This leads to the assertion that the qualities we associate with the objects of our universes are attributes, rather than properties inherent in the objects themselves. At each step in the argument I explore consequences for how we understand the world, in particular through science. I show limitations, new insights and understandings, and reevaluate what we can expect to gain from science. One change is the shift from noun to verb in the consideration of processses – for instance, the study of living rather than life. In this way, I intend to show not only that Radical Constructivism is sensible, but that it does not preclude us having a science. In contrast, it can enrich science by taking on board the sensible. In the process, which science is seen to be the more basic is challenged.
Key words:
attributes/qualities
,
circularity
,
construct
,
constancy/pattern
,
(individual) experience
,
observing (observed
,
observer)
,
second-order cybernetics
,
science
Glasersfeld E. von (2001) The radical constructivist view of science. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 31–43. https://cepa.info/1536
Glasersfeld E. von
(
2001
)
The radical constructivist view of science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 31–43.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1536
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From the constructivist perspective, science cannot transcend the domain of experience. Scientific theories are seen as models that help to order and manage that domain. As the experiential field expands, models are replaced by others based on novel conceptual constructs. The paper suggests the substitution of ‘viability’ or ‘functional fit’ for the notions of Truth and objective representation of an experiencer-independent reality. This by-passes the sceptics’ incontrovertible arguments against certain real-world knowledge and proposes the Jean Piagetian conception of cognition as the function that generates ways and means for dealing with the world of experience.
Key words:
radical constructivism
,
philosophy
,
science
Reprinted as chapter 14 in
Glasersfeld E. von (2008) Key works in radical constructivism. Edited by M. Larochelle
Peschl M. F. (2001) Constructivism, cognition, and science: An investigation of its links and possible shortcomings. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 125–161. https://cepa.info/3635
Peschl M. F.
(
2001
)
Constructivism, cognition, and science: An investigation of its links and possible shortcomings.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 125–161.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3635
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This paper addresses the questions concerning the relationship between scientific and cognitive processes. The fact that both, science and cognition, aim at acquiring some kind of knowledge or representation about the “world” is the key for establishing a link between these two domains. It turns out that the constructivist framework represents an adequate epistemological foundation for this undertaking, as its focus of interest is on the (constructive) relationship between the world and its representation. More specifically, it will be shown how cognitive processes and their primary concern to construct a representation of the environment and to generate functionally fitting behavior can act as the basis for embedding the activities and dynamics of the process of science in them by making use of constructivist concepts, such as functional fitness, structure determinedness, etc. Cognitive science and artificial life provide the conceptual framework of representational spaces and their interaction between each other and with the environment enabling us to establish this link between cognitive processes and the development/dynamics of scientific theories. The concepts of activation, synaptic weight, and genetic (representational) spaces are powerful tools which can be used as “explanatory vehicles” for a cognitive foundation of science, more specifically for the “context of discovery” (i.e., the development, construction, and dynamics of scientific theories and paradigms). Representational spaces do not only offer us a better understanding of embedding science in cognition, but also show, how the constructivist framework, both, can act as an adequate epistemological foundation for these processes and can be instantiated by these representational concepts from cognitive science. The final part of this paper addresses some more fundamental questions concerning the positivistic and constructivist understanding of science and human cognition. Among other things it is asked, whether a purely functionalist and quantitative view of the world aiming almost exclusively at its prediction and control is really satisfying for our intellect (having the goal of achieving a profound understanding of reality).
Key words:
cognitive science
,
functional fitness
,
human person
,
knowledge (representation)
,
(natural) science
,
representational space
Riegler A. (2001) Towards a radical constructivist understanding of science. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 1–30. https://cepa.info/1860
Riegler A.
(
2001
)
Towards a radical constructivist understanding of science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 1–30.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1860
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Constructivism is the idea that we construct our own world rather than it being determined by an outside reality. Its most consistent form, Radical Constructivism (RC), claims that we cannot transcend our experiences. Thus it doesn’t make sense to say that our constructions gradually approach the structure of an external reality. The mind is necessarily an epistemological solipsist, in contrast to being an ontological solipsist who maintains that this is all there is, namely a single mind within which the only world exists. RC recognizes the impossibility of the claim that the world does not exist. Yet, RC has the potential to go much further. I claim that RC provides the foundation of a new world-view in which we can overcome hard scientific problems. Thus, the paper is urging us to carry RC further, not just on philosophical grounds, but also into the domain of science.
Schwegler H. (2001) Physics develops unaffected by constructivism. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 241–253. https://cepa.info/3633
Schwegler H.
(
2001
)
Physics develops unaffected by constructivism.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 241–253.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3633
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The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the development of science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.
Key words:
consensuality
,
language-games
,
quantum theory
,
realism in physics
,
scientific education
Stewart J. (2001) Radical constructivism in biology and cognitive science. Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 99–124. https://cepa.info/3634
Stewart J.
(
2001
)
Radical constructivism in biology and cognitive science.
Special Issue “The Impact of Radical Constructivism on Science” edited by Alexander Riegler. Foundations of Science
6(1–3): 99–124.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3634
Copy Ref
This article addresses the issue of “objectivism vs constructivism” in two areas, biology and cognitive science, which are intermediate between the natural sciences such as physics (where objectivism is dominant) and the human and social sciences (where constructivism is widespread). The issues in biology and in cognitive science are intimately related; in each of these twin areas, the “objectivism vs constructivism” issue is interestingly and rather evenly balanced; as a result, this issue engenders two contrasting paradigms, each of which has substantial specific scientific content. The neo-Darwinian paradigm in biology is closely resonant with the classical cognitivist paradigm in cognitive science, and both of them are intrinsically objectivist. The organismic paradigm in biology, based on the concept of autopoiesis, is consonant with the paradigm of “enaction” in cognitive science; the latter paradigms are both profoundly constructivist. In cognitive science, the objectivism vs constructivism issue is internal to the scientific field itself and reflexivity is inescapable. At this level, strong ontological objectivism is self-contradictory and therefore untenable. Radical constructivism is self-coherent; but it also rehabilitates a weak form of objectivism as a pragmatically viable alternative. In conclusion, there is an even-handed reciprocity between “objectivist” and “constructivist” perspectives Finally, the article examines the consequences of this conclusion for fields other than cognitive science: biology; physics and the natural sciences; and the human and social sciences.
Key words:
autopoiesis
,
cognitivism
,
neo-darwinism
,
objectivism
,
organism
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