Adams F. & Aizawa K. (2010) Defending the bounds of cognition. In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge MA, MIT Press: 67–80. https://cepa.info/6681
Adams F. & Aizawa K.
Defending the bounds of cognition.
In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge MA, MIT Press: 67–80.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/6681
This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is connected to a cognitive agent is a “coupling-constitution fallacy.” From this fallacy, many hastily proceed to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.
Clark A. (2010) Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended. In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge MA, MIT Press: 43–66.
Memento’s revenge: The extended mind, extended.
In: Menary R. (ed.) The extended mind. Cambridge MA, MIT Press: 43–66.
Excerpt: Is the mind contained (always? sometimes? never?) in the head? Or does the notion of thought allow mental processes (including believings) to inhere in extended systems of body, brain, and aspects of the local environment? The answer, we claimed, was that mental states, including states of believing, could be grounded in physical traces that remained firmly outside the head. As long as a few simple conditions were met (more on which below), Leonard’s notes and tattoos could indeed count as new additions to his store of long-term knowledge and dispositional belief. In the present treatment I revisit this argument, defending our strong conclusion against a variety of subsequent observations and objections. In particular, I look at objections that rely on a contrast between the (putatively) intrinsic content of neural symbols and the merely derived content of external inscriptions, at objections concerning the demarcation of scientifific domains via natural kinds, and at objections concerning the ultimate locus of agentive control and the nature of perception versus introspection.