Foerster H. von (1984) On Constructing a Reality. In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The Invented Reality. W. W. Norton, New York: 41–62.
Foerster H. von
(
1984)
On Constructing a Reality.
In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The Invented Reality. W. W. Norton, New York: 41–62.
Glasersfeld E. von (1984) An introduction to radical constructivism. In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality. Norton, New York: 17–40. https://cepa.info/1279
Glasersfeld E. von
(
1984)
An introduction to radical constructivism.
In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality. Norton, New York: 17–40.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/1279
Within the limits of one chapter, an unconventional way of thinking can certainly not be thoroughly justified, but it can, perhaps, be presented in its most characteristic features anchored here and there in single points. There is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. In the case of constructivism, there is the additional risk that it will be discarded at first sight because, like skepticism – with which it has a certain amount in common – it might seem too cool and critical, or simply incompatible with ordinary common sense. The proponents of an idea, as a rule, explain its nonacceptance differently than do the critics and opponents. Being myself much involved, it seems to me that the resistance met in the 18th century by Giambattista Vico, the first true constructivist, and by Silvio Ceccato and Jean Piaget in the more recent past, is not so much due to inconsistencies or gaps in their argumentation, as to the justifiable suspicion that constructivism intends to undermine too large a part of the traditional view of the world. Indeed, one need not enter very far into constructivist thought to realize that it inevitably leads to the contention that man – and man alone – is responsible for his thinking, his knowledge and, therefore, also for what he does. Today, when behaviorists are still intent on pushing all responsibility into the environment, and sociobiologists are trying to place much of it into genes, a doctrine may well seem uncomfortable if it suggests that we have no one but ourselves to thank for the world in which we appear to be living. That is precisely what constructivism intends to say – but it says a good deal more. We build that world for the most part unawares, simply because we do not know how we do it. That ignorance is quite unnecessary. Radical constructivism maintains – not unlike Kant in his Critique – that the operations by means of which we assemble our experiential world can be explored, and that an awareness of this operating (which Ceccato in Italian so nicely called consapevolezza operativa) can help us do it differently and, perhaps, better.
Stolzenberg G. (1984) Can an inquiry into the foundations of mathematics tell us anything interesting about mind. In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality: How do we know what we believe we know. W. W. Norton, New York: 257–308. https://cepa.info/3060
Stolzenberg G.
(
1984)
Can an inquiry into the foundations of mathematics tell us anything interesting about mind.
In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality: How do we know what we believe we know. W. W. Norton, New York: 257–308.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/3060
Varela F. J. (1984) The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality: Contributions to constructivism. W. W. Norton, New York: 309–325. https://cepa.info/2089
Varela F. J.
(
1984)
The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity.
In: Watzlawick P. (ed.) The invented reality: Contributions to constructivism. W. W. Norton, New York: 309–325.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2089