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fulltext:"Man, having within himself an imagined world of lines and numbers, operates in it with abstractions just as God in the universe, did with reality"
fulltext:"Man, having within himself an imagined world of lines and numbers, operates in it with abstractions just as God in the universe, did with reality"
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Barandiaran X. (2017) Autonomy and enactivism: Towards a theory of sensorimotor autonomous agency. Topoi 36(3): 409–430. https://cepa.info/4149
Barandiaran X.
(
2017
)
Autonomy and enactivism: Towards a theory of sensorimotor autonomous agency
.
Topoi
36(3): 409–430.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4149
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The concept of “autonomy,” once at the core of the original enactivist proposal in The Embodied Mind (Varela et al. in The embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991), is nowadays ignored or neglected by some of the most prominent contemporary enactivists approaches. Theories of autonomy, however, come to fill a theoretical gap that sensorimotor accounts of cognition cannot ignore: they provide a naturalized account of normativity and the resources to ground the identity of a cognitive subject in its specific mode of organization. There are, however, good reasons for the contemporary neglect of autonomy as a relevant concept for enactivism. On the one hand, the concept of autonomy has too often been assimilated into autopoiesis (or basic autonomy in the molecular or biological realm) and the implications are not always clear for a dynamical sensorimotor approach to cognitive science. On the other hand, the foundational enactivist proposal displays a metaphysical tension between the concept of operational closure (autonomy), deployed as constitutive, and that of structural coupling (sensorimotor dynamics); making it hard to reconcile with the claim that experience is sensorimotorly constituted. This tension is particularly apparent when Varela et al. propose Bittorio (a 1D cellular automata) as a model of the operational closure of the nervous system as it fails to satisfy the required conditions for a sensorimotor constitution of experience. It is, however, possible to solve these problems by re-considering autonomy at the level of sensorimotor neurodynamics. Two recent robotic simulation models are used for this task, illustrating the notion of strong sensorimotor dependency of neurodynamic patterns, and their networked intertwinement. The concept of habit is proposed as an enactivist building block for cognitive theorizing, re-conceptualizing mental life as a habit ecology, tied within an agent’s behaviour generating mechanism in coordination with its environment. Norms can be naturalized in terms of dynamic, interactively self-sustaining, coherentism. This conception of autonomous sensorimotor agency is put in contrast with those enactive approaches that reject autonomy or neglect the theoretical resources it has to offer for the project of naturalizing minds.
Key words:
Autonomy
,
enactivism
,
operational closure of the nervous system
,
sensorimotor constitution of experience
,
mental life
,
habit
,
sensorimotor autonomous agency
,
autonomist sensorimotor enactivism.
Barrett N. F. (2017) The normative turn in enactive theory: An examination of its roots and implications. Topoi 36(3): 431–443. https://cepa.info/2473
Barrett N. F.
(
2017
)
The normative turn in enactive theory: An examination of its roots and implications
.
Topoi
36(3): 431–443.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/2473
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This paper traces the development of enactive concepts of value and normativity from their roots in the canonical work of Varela et al. (Embodied mind: cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991) through more recent works of Ezequiel Di Paolo and others. It aims to show the central importance of these concepts for enactive theory while exposing a potentially troublesome ambiguity in their definition. Most definitions of enactive normativity are purely proscriptive, but it seems that enactive theories of cognitive agency and experience demand something more. On the other hand, it is not clear that anything other than proscriptive normativity can be made compatible with the enactive tenet of autonomy and the rejection of representations.
Key words:
Enactive theory
,
Value
,
Normativity
,
Adaptivity
,
Cognition
Chappell Z. (2022) The enacted ethics of self-injury. Topoi, Online first.
Chappell Z.
(
2022
)
The enacted ethics of self-injury
.
Topoi
,
Online first.
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Colombetti G. (2017) Enactive affectivity, extended. Topoi 36(3): 445–455. https://cepa.info/5681
Colombetti G.
(
2017
)
Enactive affectivity, extended
.
Topoi
36(3): 445–455.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5681
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In this paper I advance an enactive view of affectivity that does not imply that affectivity must stop at the boundaries of the organism. I first review the enactive notion of “sense-making”, and argue that it entails that cognition is inherently affective. Then I review the proposal, advanced by Di Paolo (
Topoi
28:9–21, 2009), that the enactive approach allows living systems to “extend”. Drawing out the implications of this proposal, I argue that, if enactivism allows living systems to extend, then it must also allow sense-making, and thus cognition as well as affectivity, to extend – in the specific sense of allowing the physical processes (vehicles) underpinning these phenomena to include, as constitutive parts, non-organic environmental processes. Finally I suggest that enactivism might also allow specific human affective states, such as moods, to extend.
Key words:
enactivism
,
extended mind
,
extended life
,
affectivity
,
emotion
,
mood.
Degenaar J. & Kevin O’Regan J. (2017) Sensorimotor theory and enactivism. Topoi 36(3): 393–407. https://cepa.info/4204
Degenaar J.
&
Kevin O’Regan J.
(
2017
)
Sensorimotor theory and enactivism
.
Topoi
36(3): 393–407.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/4204
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The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal rep-resentations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind (and more particularly autopoiesis, autonomy, and valence)? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience may fit into sensorimotor enactivism, and we identify differences between this interpretation and autopoietic enactivism. By taking artificial consciousness as a case in point, we further sharpen the distinction between sensorimotor enactivism and autopoietic enactivism. We argue that sensorimotor enactivism forms a strong default position for an enactive account of perceptual consciousness.
Key words:
Consciousness
,
Sensorimotor theory
,
Enactivism
,
Autopoiesis
,
Artificial consciousness
Di Paolo E. A. (2009) Extended life. Topoi 28(1): 9–21. https://cepa.info/322
Di Paolo E. A.
(
2009
)
Extended life
.
Topoi
28(1): 9–21.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/322
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This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a perspective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intuitions about what counts as cognitive.
Di Paolo E. A. & De Jaegher H. (2022) Enactive ethics: Difference becoming participation. Topoi 41(2): 241–256. https://cepa.info/7523
Di Paolo E. A.
&
De Jaegher H.
(
2022
)
Enactive ethics: Difference becoming participation
.
Topoi
41(2): 241–256.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7523
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Enactive cognitive science combines questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics by conceiving of bodies as open-ended and mutually transforming through activity. While enaction is not a theory of ethics, it can contribute to its foundations. We present a schematization of enactive ideas that underlie traditional distinctions between Being, Knowing, and Doing. Ethics in this scheme begins in the relation between knowing and becoming. Critical of dichotomous thinking, we approach the questions of alterity and ethical reality. Alterity is relevant to the enactive approach, but not in the radical sense of transcendental arguments. We propose difference, instead, as a more generative concept. Following Simondon, we see norms and values manifest in webs of past and future acts together with their potentialities for becoming. We propose a transindividual concept of moral attunement that includes ethical know-how and consciousness raising. Through generative difference and attunement to configurations of becoming, enaction underpins an ethics of participation linking virtue ethics and ethics of care.
Key words:
Participatory sense-making
,
becoming
,
moral attunement
,
difference
,
ethics of participation
,
Simondon
,
engaging epistemology
Dierckxsens G. (2022) Introduction: Ethical dimensions of enactive cognition – Perspectives on enactivism, bioethics and applied ethics. Topoi 41(2): 235–239. https://cepa.info/7691
Dierckxsens G.
(
2022
)
Introduction: Ethical dimensions of enactive cognition – Perspectives on enactivism, bioethics and applied ethics
.
Topoi
41(2): 235–239.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7691
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Excerpt:
The papers collected in this special issue are written to further develop diverse aspects of human morality. On the one hand, they develop further the already existing foundation of enactive ethics, elaborating key concepts such as participatory sense-making and ethical know-how. They also navigate further into the relations between enactivism and neighboring ethical theories, such as care ethics, phenomenological and hermeneutical ethics, as well as relations with moral psychology and the social sciences. Yet, at the same time, this special issue intends to bring enactivism closer to applied ethics, that is, several papers in this issue investigate how enactivism can respond to contemporary ethical issues, such as environmental ethics and health care. The papers collected here tackle ethical aspects of enactive cognition on three main levels: 1. Some of the articles develop further already existing aspects and concepts of relations between ethics and enactivism, for example, by developing further the notion of ethical know-how. 2. A second way in which the contributed papers develop ethical aspects of enactive cognition is by engaging into a dialogue with other, neighboring domains of enactivism, including moral psychology and hermeneutics. 3. Finally, this special issue features contributions that apply enactive theory to specific moral problems, such as health care, the environment and social media.
Dierckxsens G. & Bergmann L. T. (2022) Enactive ethics and hermeneutics: From bodily normativity to critical ethics. Topoi 41(2): 299–312. https://cepa.info/7694
Dierckxsens G.
&
Bergmann L. T.
(
2022
)
Enactive ethics and hermeneutics: From bodily normativity to critical ethics
.
Topoi
41(2): 299–312.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7694
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Recent enactive accounts of cognition have begun to disentangle social and normative aspects of the human mind. In this paper, we will contribute to this debate by developing an enactive account of moral development, i.e. the learning of ethical norms, and critical engagement with these norms through social affordances, participatory sense-making, and moral concern. The difficulty in articulating such an account is in reconciling the affective embodied aspects of moral experiences with the more orthodox aspects of ethics like critical reflection. In order to respond to this difficulty, we bring Ricoeur’s hermeneutics into dialogue with enactivism. Complementing the enactive tradition, we frame critical ethical learning as embodied interaction with diverse ethical dimensions allowing us to incorporate moral values in the form of critical narratives and the social imaginary. We agree with enactivist theories that participation and democratic dialogue are essential parts of critical reflection on ethical norms. Yet, we also contend that this kind of critical reflection benefits from hermeneutical interpretation, challenging larger participatory networks, such as social institutions, which nourish inequality and maintain unethical values.
Key words:
enactivism
,
hermeneutics
,
ethics
,
embodied cognition
,
4e cognition.
Fourlas G. N. & Cuffari E. C. (2022) Enacting ought: ethics, anti-racism, and interactional possibilities. Topoi 41(2): 355–371. https://cepa.info/7696
Fourlas G. N.
&
Cuffari E. C.
(
2022
)
Enacting ought: ethics, anti-racism, and interactional possibilities
.
Topoi
41(2): 355–371.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/7696
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Focusing on political and interpersonal conflict in the U. S., particularly racial conflict, but with an eye to similar conflicts throughout the world, we argue that the enactive approach to mind as life can be elaborated to provide an exigent framework for present social-political problems. An enactive approach fills problematic lacunae in the Western philosophical ethics project by offering radically refigured notions of responsibility and language. The dual enactive, participatory insight is that interactional responsibility is not singular and language is not an individual property or ability, something that someone simply and uniformly ‘has’ or ‘controls’. These points have not been integrated into our self-understanding as moral actors, to everyone’s detriment. We first advocate for adequate appreciation of Colombetti and Torrance’s 2009 suggestion that participatory sense-making necessarily implies shared responsibility for interactional outcomes. We argue that the enactive approach presents open-ended cultivation of virtue as embodied, contextualized, and dynamic know-how and destabilizes an individualist metaphysics. Putting this framework to work, we turn to the interactional challenges of conversations that concern differences and that involve potentially oppositional parties, offering a reading of Claudia Rankine’s Just Us. Finally, we make explicit Rankine’s normative project of mindful navigation of multiple perspectives in an interaction. We abstract three interrelated spheres of participatory intervention: location, language, and labor. These also indicate routes for empirical investigation into complex perspective-taking in dynamic interactions.
Key words:
participation (or critical participation)
,
linguistic bodies
,
race
,
social interaction
,
knowhow
,
decolonial theory
,
perspective-taking.
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