In the visual arts, “representation” usually means a copy or reproduction of some original. In that context it is clear that the original is always something the representer has seen, something that is the product of ordinary visual perception. With the introduction of the term in philosophical writings, the spurious question has arisen whether or not representations could reproduce, replicate, or correspond to things-in-themselves. The question was long ago given a negative answer on logical grounds by neurophysiology. Most arguments on the topic could have been avoided if one had followed Mark Baldwin, the pioneer of cognitive psychology, and had used the term “presentation” which has the added advantage of being a viable translation of the German “Vorstellung.”

Key words: Jean Piaget, cognition, evolution

This paper discusses the notion of representation and outlines the ideas and questions which led to the organization of this volume. We argue for a distinction between the classical view of referential representation, and the alternative concept of system-relative representation. The latter refers to situated cognitive processes whose dynamics are merely modulated by their environment rather than being instructed and determined by it.

Consciousness has many different connotations, some of which are amenable to treatment within neurobiological description systems while others are not. It is possible to define in neurobiological terms the brain states associated with conscious-ness. It is also conceivable that neurobiology will ultimately provide a reductionistic explanation of mechanisms which enables the brain (1) to construct from the sparse and diverse signals of its sensors coherent models of its environment, including the or-ganism itself, and to generate abstract descriptions, (2) to iterate the same strategy to monitor its own states, thereby generating meta descriptions, (3) to weigh the combined results of these analyses in order to reach decisions and to generate adapted behavioural responses, and (4) to communicate through various channels at different levels of ab-straction the results of these cognitive processes to other brains. Since it became clear that the concept of the Cartesian theatre is untenable, that processes in the brain are highly distributed and that there is no single convergence center where the results of the numerous parallel operations are brought together for joint interpretation and decision making, analysis of processes that are in principle amenable to neurobiological explanation is in itself a major challenge. \\Problems of different nature are encountered if one attempts a reductionistic explanation of the subjective connotations of consciousness associated with self-awareness, attributes that are assessed by introspection and by extrapolation from one’s own awareness of mental states to that of others. I shall defend the position that these aspects of consciousness cannot be understood as emergent properties of individual brains alone but come into existence only through communication among brains whose cognitive abilities must be sufficiently developed to generate a theory of mind, i.e. to generate models of presumed states of the respective other brain. Thus, self-awareness and the ability to experience sensations as subjective reality would have to be considered as cultural achievements or, and this is equivalent, as the result of experiencing dialogues of the kind: “I know that you know that I know.” Hence, these aspects of consciousness come into existence only through a social learning process in which brains experience a class of mental phenom-ena that emerge only from mutual reflection. These phenomena are ontologically different from those qualified above as amenable to direct neurobiological investigation because unlike the latter they are the result of a dialogue among brains that got in-creasingly refined during cultural evolution. This is probably the reason why these phenomena appear as not deducible from analysis of individual brains in the same way as one can analyse the neuronal substrate of pattern recognition, memory or motor con-trol. My proposal is that the phenomena that give rise to the so called “hard problems” in the philosophy of consciousness, problems resulting from the ability to be aware of one’s own brain functions can be understood as emergent properties of brains without having to take a dualistic position; however, because these phenomena have a social or cultural origin and hence both a historical and interpersonal dimension, they cannot be understood as an emergent property of an isolated brain alone and hence transcend the reach of conventional neurobiological approaches.

A comparative look at the animal kingdom reveals that there are as many animal realities as there are basic animal types. A borderline between simple reactions and higher cognitive functions cannot be drawn, instead we find a plethora of ways of relating to reality, where the common denominator is that the methods of representation allow the animal to act in an adaptive way. Animal representation does not depiet reality-but it is a way of doing something to reality which in the long run ensures survival and reproduction. If reality is represented this way or that way, or at all, is of no importance, as long as the animal can act adoptively. It is even questionable if the concept of representation is helpful in understanding the cognition of lower animals, where interaction with reality merely consists of preprogrammed reactions devoid of understanding. Nevertheless, a focus on representation as a biological adaptation is helpful when discussing our own way of relating to reality, since the mechanisms at work must have evolved in a stone age ecology, geared at living in that particular form of reality. Some of our more notorious failures at handling our present-day world may be more easy to understand if this heritage is taken into account.

The grounding problem is, generally speaking, the problem of how to embed an artificial agent into its environment such that its behaviour, as well as the mechanisms, representations, etc. underlying it, can be intrinsic and meaningful to the agent itself, rather than dependent on an external designer or observer. This paper briefly reviews Searle’s and Harnad’s analyses of the grounding problem, and then evaluates cognitivist and enactive approaches to overcoming it. It is argued that, although these two categories of approaches differ in their nature and the problems they have to face, both, so far, fall short of solving the grounding problem for similar reasons. Further it is concluded that the reason the problem is still somewhat underestimated lies in the fact that modern situated and embodied AI, despite its emphasis of agent-environment interaction, still fails to fully acknowledge the historically rooted integrated nature of living organisms and their environmental embedding.