I do not wish to deal with all the domains in which the word time enters as if it were referring to an obvious aspect of the world or worlds that we human live. Indeed, the very fact that time can be made an issue of reflection shows us that what the word time connotes changes with the circumstances in which it is used. This situation alone, however, would not constitute a problem inviting us to enter in deep reflections if we just accepted that the context defined the meaning of the word in each case. But we do not do that, and we ask the question what is time? as if we thought that the word time referred to some independent entity or dimension of nature that could be properly disclosed or described if we tried hard enough, even if we could not the final essence of it. I consider, however, that the question what is time? is adequate because it implies from the start the view that time can be properly treated as some kind of independent entity or dimension of nature. And I consider that such a view is fully inadequate because I think that all that we human beings talk about are relations that arises in our operation in language as a closed domain of recursive consensual coordinations of behaviors. Let me explain what I say with a few words about living, language, and cognition, and then answer the question what distinctions do we make or connote when we talk of time?

Excerpt: In contradistinction to the classical problem of scientific inquiry that postulates first a descr.iption-invariant “objective world” (as if there were such a thing) and then attempts to write its description, here we are challenged to develop a description-invariant “subjective world,” that is a world which includes the observer. This is the problem. However, in accord with the classic tradition of scientific inquiry which perpetually asks “How?” rather than”What?,” this task calls for an epistemology nf “How do we know?” rather than “What do we know?” The following notes on an epistemology cf living things address themselves to the “How?” They may serve as a magnifying glass through which this problem becomes better visible.

Excerpt: Constructivism provides an alternative epistemologica! base to the objectivist tradition. Constructivism, like objectivism, holds that there is a real world that we experience. However, the argument is that meaning is imposed on the world by us, rather than existing in the world independently of us. There are many ways to structure the world and there are many meanings or perspectives for any event or concept. Thus, there is not a correct meaning that we are striving for.

Excerpt: This is an essay in human communication. It contains “communication,” mentions and is, hence, about communication, but, what is important here yet often overlooked in other essays, it also is communication to its readers. This exemplifies that no statement, no essay and no theory can say anything about communication without also being communication to someone. Among the scientific discourses, this is an unusual fact – fact in the sense of having been made or realized – and I suggest it is constitutive of communication scholarship that its discourse is included in what it is about and, therefore, cannot escape the self-reference this entails. If I had to formulate a first axiom for communication research I would say that to be acceptable: Human communication theory must also be about itself.

Any analysis of constructivism is difficult because there is a great range of ideas and a great variety of theoretical positions whose proponents call “constructivist”. The idea that is common to all these flavors of constructivism is that students construct knowledge for themselves. The divergence of opinion among constructivists arises from differences in perception of the instructional implications of this basic tenet. For some, knowledge construction requires little more than the addition of coaching or help systems to traditional instructional strategies. For others who take a more radical position, knowledge construction implies that each of us knows the world in a different way, that there is therefore no shared objective world to teach about, and that consequently instructional analysis and prescription make no difference to what and how students learn. I must also point out that there is great diversity in the opinions and theoretical stances of instructional designers. These range from hard-core behaviorism to a cognitive orientation which, adopting the same tenet of knowledge construction, coincides with the position of “moderate” constructivists, as Merrill (1991) has pointed out. Only at their extremes are the positions of constructivists and instructional designers truly adversarial. Yet extremism has its uses. It helps clarify fuzzy issues by throwing differences of opinion into sharper relief, and it occasions useful debate (Cunningham, 1991b). This chapter therefore characterizes both constructivism and instructional design in terms that some might find extreme. In much of what follows, constructivism is portrayed as mistrusting claims for the existence of an objective world, and discounting the predictability of human behavior. On the other hand, instructional design is assumed to espouse both objectivism and predictability, and to use theory and tools that embody these very assumptions to analyze, prescribe and assess instruction. Only in the last section of this chapter will a more moderate stance appear, allowing us to identify ways in which instructional design can contribute to the efforts of constructivists.

Excerpt: Within the last few years, a distinctly different body of theory has begun to attract the attention of the field of instructional design and development – constructivism. A recent publication (Duffy and Jonassen, in press), as well as this volume, attests to the willingness of the field to explore the implications of these theories for instructional design. As with most labels, the term constructivism (as well as other labels often regarded as synonymous with it like experientialism, semiotics, relativism, etc.) hides the diversity of viewpoints that one will find, from moderate to extreme, to use Merrill’s (1991) characterization. In this paper, we would like to explore the implications of an undoubtedly extreme version of constructivism. in part because we believe it is a very powerful model, but also because it questions the very foundations underlying such diverse disciplines as biology, psychology, cognitive science and education. In other words, we relish the debate that this model usually provokes and feel strongly that such debate will cause others, even those not persuaded to our view, to rethink their own theoretical preferences.

Educational technology is an instantiation of technical rationality. Technical rationality depends on an objectivist epistemology and a representational model of mind. Currently, a growing number of practitioners in the field of educational technology consider themselves constructivists. Because their epistemological position conflicts with that of technical rationality, these practitioners must currently find a warrant for their practice outside the field. However, a warrant for a strong form of constructivism (enactive constructivism) can be located in recent developments in systems theory, one of the foundational pillars of educational technology. These developments have the potential to provide practitioners a philosophical mooring within the field itself. One of these developments, autonomous systems theory, with its rejection of the representational model of mind, is described, and implications of its application to educational technology are discussed.

One important way of describing the teaching of science in schools is as a process whereby students reconstruct their understandings in undergoing conceptual change. How to help teachers to promote conceptual change in an effective way in their classrooms is now a central concern of research groups in a number of countries and reflects the way curriculum development is being understood and approached. It is in contrast with the forms of curriculum development that took place in the 1960s and 1970s in which project teams outside schools developed and promoted a course and a package of related materials.

For more than 10 years, we have seen the emergence of new “probabilistic” models of learning. They clearly echo Jean Piaget’s works and theories but they also claim to go further. However, references to Piaget are often quick and rarely take the time to explore the rich heritage of the Genevan’s works. This article takes a closer look at their links through a systematic review of the literature. To do so, I selected, read, and compared articles and books about the probabilistic models of learning and the works of Jean Piaget dealing with similar questions. I will first present the theoretical evolutions offered by the probabilistic models of learning. Then, I will reexamine the words and works of Jean Piaget to show how he had in fact formulated and addressed similar questions at his time, from his point of view. I will finally discuss how we could question, today, Jean Piaget’s works in regard to these new models, but also how these new models could be discussed with regard to Piagetian works.