We start from the systemic autoreferential epistemology that A. Pichot and J. Varela have applied to Biology, to describe some properties of living matter. Pichot broadens the approach to describe the cerebral functions with convincing results. We show how the same logic can be applied to a description of the human mind. This allows a description that takes into account the different therapeutic levels without reducing one to the other, and makes it possible to articulate them logically better than the usual psychiatric theories do. This leads to a much more coherent picture of the clinical psychiatric symptoms and of the therapeutic procedures.

Key words: epistemology, psychiatry, autoreference, human person.

Earlier versions of evolutionary epistemology were based on – or at least strongly informed by – the adaptationist paradigm. It is for this reason that advocates of evolutionary epistemol- ogy have been frequently criticized by those who have adopted an organismic perspective in evolutionary thinking. Evolutionists defending the view that any living system – including all its characters at the anatomical as well as the behavioral level – can be sufficiently explained in terms of adaptation, have neglected the (somehow trivial) fact that organisms are active systems that do not entirely depend on their respective environment(s). Meanwhile, however, a systems-theoretical approach to understanding living beings and their evolution has made clear that (1) organisms and their environment(s) have a common history and have not evolved independent of each other, (2) any living system and its environment(s) are linked together by a feedback principle, and (3) adaptability is not defined by the environment but the or- ganism itself. This has serious consequences for evolutionary epistemology. In this paper, I outline a non-adaptationist version of this epistemology. I also briefly discuss its philosophical implications. The main focus is the problem of realism.

I identify two similarities between evolutionary epistemology (EE) and radical constructivism (RC): (1) They were founded primarily by biologists and (2) their respective claims can be related to Kant. Despite this fact there seems to be an abyss between them. I present an attempt to reconcile this gap and characterize EE as the approach that focuses on external behaviour, while RC emphasizes the perspective from within. The central concept of hypothetical realism is criticized as unnecessarily narrowing down the scope of EE. Finally, methodological and philosophical conclusions are drawn.

The non-adaptationist approach to evolutionary epistemology (EE) was born at the end of the 1970s as an alternative to traditional adaptationist EE. Despite the fact that non-adaptationist EE offers compelling interpretative models and its explanatory power is widely recognised, an organic overview of the broad non-adaptationist field is still lacking. In this paper, I propose to fill this gap. To this effect, after providing a systematisation of the perspectives that are commonly associated with non-adaptationist EE, I will discuss two recurring orders of arguments that non-adaptationist scholars, often independently of one another, put forward against their adaptationist rivals. By offering a way to conceive non-adaptationist evolutionary epistemological approaches as part of a structured whole, the resulting systematic account is meant to provide a reading grid, a compass for orienting oneself in the uneven territories of non-adaptationist EE. Moreover, the consequent identification of two recurring argumentative bodies is intended to add to the explanatory power of non-adaptationist EE, which in finding new strength in numbers eventually acquires a greater critical efficacy against its adaptationist counterpart.

Key words: evolutionary epistemology, non-adaptationism, adaptationism, overview, world-in-itself, epistemic circularity.

According to the dominant paradigm in both biology and the language sciences, “information” is an entity which can be “contained” in genes or words; “transferred” to a receptor, this “information” is supposedly the key to phenomena such as the ontogenesis of living organisms or the meaning of language. Argues that this paradigm suffers from unsurmountable weaknesses and, moreover, that possible alternatives exist: maybe the time has come to abandon the information cult.

Attention is paid to the similarities between pragmatic philosophy and symbolic interactionism on the one hand, and radical constructive epistemologies on the other. Referring to the work of George Herbert Mead, symbolic interactionism has frequently been designated as a naive and idealistic sociological theory promoting the liberty of the individual by the use of the metaphysically echoing concepts as “the self”, “the I and the Me” and “taking the role of the other”. In reading the work of Mead closely, however, one is struck by the theoretic nature of these concepts which is not always clearly mentioned in symbolic interactionism. Furthermore, the work of Mead treats very similar topics and in a very similar way to the work of present theorists on autopoiesis and auto‐organisation and its origins in the relation between individuals and society. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest the work of Mead as a possible frame of reference for the elaboration of present discussions on the matter.