It has long been theorised that there are two temporally distinct forms of self-reference: extended self-reference linking experiences across time, and momentary self-reference centred on the present. To characterise these two aspects of awareness, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine monitoring of enduring traits (’narrative’ focus, NF) or momentary experience (’experiential’ focus, EF) in both novice participants and those having attended an 8 week course in mindfulness meditation, a program that trains individuals to develop focused attention on the present. In novices, EF yielded focal reductions in self-referential cortical midline regions (medial prefrontal cortex, mPFC) associated with NF. In trained participants, EF resulted in more marked and pervasive reductions in the mPFC, and increased engagement of a right lateralised network, comprising the lateral PFC and viscerosomatic areas such as the insula, secondary somatosensory cortex and inferior parietal lobule. Functional connectivity analyses further demonstrated a strong coupling between the right insula and the mPFC in novices that was uncoupled in the mindfulness group. These results suggest a fundamental neural dissociation between two distinct forms of self-awareness that are habitually integrated but can be dissociated through attentional training: the self across time and in the present moment.

Key words: self-reference, attention, meditation, fmri, insula, prefrontal cortex, somatosensory, plasticity

Excerpt: In this article, we address the key points of contention raised by Chadwick (2004) in an effort to clarify the utility of a specific form of constructivismradical constructivism – as a viable theory of knowing. We believe that radical constructivism is a cohesive and convincing explanation of individual knowing, and we use this theory as the primary framework to counter Chadwick’s accusations about constructivism’s lack of utility and value. First, we identify the various definitions and philosophies of constructivism. Second, we discuss the role of ontology in constructivist philosophy, with special attention to its role in radical constructivism (Glasersfeld, 1995), especially because of its potential for being radically misinterpreted. Third, we discuss the influence of radical constructivist theory on teaching, learning, and curriculum. We conclude by identifying some of the issues that remain unaddressed in constructivism and summarizing the main contributions of radical constructivism to a viable theory of individual knowing.

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that ‘affect-biased attention’ – the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others – provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one’s filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.