Excerpt: In this article, we address the key points of contention raised by Chadwick (2004) in an effort to clarify the utility of a specific form of constructivismradical constructivism – as a viable theory of knowing. We believe that radical constructivism is a cohesive and convincing explanation of individual knowing, and we use this theory as the primary framework to counter Chadwick’s accusations about constructivism’s lack of utility and value. First, we identify the various definitions and philosophies of constructivism. Second, we discuss the role of ontology in constructivist philosophy, with special attention to its role in radical constructivism (Glasersfeld, 1995), especially because of its potential for being radically misinterpreted. Third, we discuss the influence of radical constructivist theory on teaching, learning, and curriculum. We conclude by identifying some of the issues that remain unaddressed in constructivism and summarizing the main contributions of radical constructivism to a viable theory of individual knowing.

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that ‘affect-biased attention’ – the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others – provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one’s filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.