Arminjon M. (2018) How Far Can We Extend E-approaches? Calling for an Epistemological and Political History of Embodiment. Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 27–30. https://cepa.info/5581
Arminjon M.
(
2018)
How Far Can We Extend E-approaches? Calling for an Epistemological and Political History of Embodiment.
Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 27–30.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5581
Open peer commentary on the article “Decentering the Brain: Embodied Cognition and the Critique of Neurocentrism and Narrow-Minded Philosophy of Mind” by Shaun Gallagher. Abstract: I intend to explore some of the implications of Gallagher’s target article. Retracing the circulation of concepts such as “embodied,” “embedded,” “extended,” etc. in social epidemiology, feminist science and epigenetics, I advocate for studying E-approaches from an epistemological, historical and political viewpoint in order to critically assess the transformations of knowledge that we are currently witnessing.
Zaslawski N. & Arminjon M. (2018) Shaun Gallagher and the Sciences of the Mind: Recontextualizing “Decentered” Cognition. Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 1–8. https://cepa.info/5577
Zaslawski N. & Arminjon M.
(
2018)
Shaun Gallagher and the Sciences of the Mind: Recontextualizing “Decentered” Cognition.
Constructivist Foundations 14(1): 1–8.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/5577
Context: Shaun Gallagher’s work is very influential in contemporary philosophy, especially when it comes to the mind, to philosophical issues raised by developmental psychology, and to intersubjectivity. Problem: Classical cognitivism” has been, and often still is dominating the sciences of the mind. The reasons for this dominance include being implementable on computers, being consistent with Darwinism, and being allegedly experimentally testable. However, this dominance could just as well be a historical phase as cognitivism is disconnected from biological, anthropological, and neuroscientific research. Method: We historically and epistemologically contextualize how Gallagher contributed to bringing the body and subjectivity back to the center of the sciences of the mind by focusing on two examples: theory of mind and evolutionary psychology. Results: Both contemporary epistemologists and Gallagher’s work indicate why classical cognitivism provides a flawed model of cognition, especially when it comes to its explanatory scope: embodiment, subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, among other things, are fundamentally mistreated by cognitivism. Implications: Gallagher helped to structure what Andler calls “heterodoxical” approaches to cognition by conceptualizing a unifying framework, the so-called “E-approaches.” This unification has the major implication of leading Gallagher to a model in which cognition is “decentered,” which helps tackle the philosophical issues one might encounter when narrowing down philosophy of cognition. Constructivist content: We apply E-approaches to the philosophy of cognition, psychology and social sciences.