Author N. Danielyan
Danielyan N. (2013) Subject’s rational cognitive activity in the theory of self-organization and epistemological constructivism. International Journal of Philosophy 1(4): 51–56. https://cepa.info/8227
Danielyan N.
(
2013)
Subject’s rational cognitive activity in the theory of self-organization and epistemological constructivism.
International Journal of Philosophy 1(4): 51–56.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8227
The author provides a comparative analysis of the approach to cognition in the theory of self-organization and radical constructivism from the position of synergy between man and nature. It is advanced the idea on the basis of radical constructivism representatives’ concepts by such authors as H. von Foerster, H. Maturana, F. Varela, N. Luhmann, F. Wallner that epistemological subject should be considered as a complex self-organizing object. Its cognitive activity takes place according to the logics of synergetic models. The author proves that cognition based on the constructive realism is the most appropriate to the modern stage of epistemology development as it cancels the opposition of constructivism and realism to some extent as the cognition process from synergetic point of view is an act of projective and constructive thinking which is open for further criticism.
Danielyan N. (2017) Constructivism representatives about cognition process. Philosophy 7(2): 75–86. https://cepa.info/8228
Danielyan N.
(
2017)
Constructivism representatives about cognition process.
Philosophy 7(2): 75–86.
Fulltext at https://cepa.info/8228
The article provides an analysis of the approach to cognition in the theory of constructivism according to different constructivism concepts such as: methodical constructivism, scientific-theoretical constructivism, natural epistemology, personal construct theory, social constructivism, concepts of some radical constructivism representatives, constructive realism. The analysis demonstrates that constructivism helps to establish subject’s control over the reality perceived by him when eliminating any deviations or resentments from his preferable target condition. In this case, the model of the world cognized contains only the aspects which are relevant to subject’s purposes and actions. It is advanced the idea the current stage of science development is connected with the change of its fundamental bases. As a result, the model of the reality becomes a result of interaction between subject of scientific and cognitive activity with the reality, but the ideas of constructivism in its classical meaning don’t correspond to this conclusion. The author proves that cognition based on the constructive realism is the most appropriate to the modern stage of epistemology development as it cancels the opposition of constructivism and realism in some extent and promotes getting a rational knowledge about the reality by subject.
Danielyan N. (2017) Ernst Mach and epistemological breakthrough in philosophy of science. PONTE International Journal of Science and Research 73(3): 146–151.
Danielyan N.
(
2017)
Ernst Mach and epistemological breakthrough in philosophy of science.
PONTE International Journal of Science and Research 73(3): 146–151.
Ernst Mach’s works had a great influence on understanding the nature of cognition and forming non-classical space and time ideas. The article makes a special stress on the epistemological breakthrough based on Mach’s ideas: cognition subject from transcendental to natural world; empirical knowledge as a sum of natural and mental processes; relative nature of space and time that resulted in both Einstein’s theory of relativity and the relational concept of space and time being developed in science nowadays. Mach paid his attention mainly to the search of obvious ontological principles that resulted from experiments and could be taken as a basis to construct theories describing them. On the contrary, the modern epistemology considers the cognition process as the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Thus, the categories of subject and object create an entity which elements acquire a meaning only in the interdependence on each other and the whole system. The author proves that Mach’s suggestion to consider the basic purpose of science as adapting an idea to experience gives a negative result due to the unilateral direction of the cognition process and the emergence of “model-dependent realism”. As for the methodology of his works, they were written from the position of dialectics because of Mach’s argument with Newton and Kant’s metaphysical approaches to prior and absolute categories. The author makes a conclusion that it was Mach who proposed the idea of subject and object’s unity in the form of their “principal coordination”. This approach forms the foundation of understanding the cognition process in the modern epistemology.
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